dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Nix setting forth detailed history of case law evidencing a shift away from the former paternalistic approach of protecting women towards a newer approach of equal treatment
How later courts described this case
- dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Nix setting forth detailed history of case law evidencing a shift away from the former paternalistic approach of protecting women towards a newer approach of equal treatment
- "These agreements are nothing more than contracts and should be treated as such." (Nix, C.J. dissenting)
- “Such disclosure must include both the general financial pictures of the parties involved, and evidence that the parties are aware of the statutory rights which they are relinquishing.”
- discussing application of the Equal Rights Amendment to interpretation of antenuptial agreements
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. Numerous societal changes have impacted upon family units in recent times, and the law has advanced accordingly to recognize the equal status of men and women in our society. No longer are women regarded as the “weaker” party in a marriage, or in society generally. Accordingly, the law has discarded presumptions and protections that arose to protect women from the inferiorities and incapacities which they were perceived as having in earlier times.
Enlightened thinking has accorded equality between the sexes, and, with that equality, it has become inconsistent to preserve special protections that arose in response to perceived inequalities. Certainly, it is not surprising that persons may attempt to reap the benefits of being “equal,” while asserting the need for special protections in areas where it would be self-serving to assert certain limited inequalities. To enjoy the benefits of being equal, however, without sharing in the burdens thereof, would be unsupportable. In recognition of this, the law has accorded equal rights to all spouses, without reference to gender. In the context of the instant case, where the validity of an ante-nuptial agreement is at issue, there is no basis for allowing to stand an implicit presumption that spouses are of unequal status or not knowledgeable enough to understand the nature of the contracts they enter. If, in fact, there is fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching, then traditional principles of contract law provide an adequate remedy.
*517 The opinion authored by Mr. Justice McDermott reaches a contrary result. Instead of applying the traditional rule of contract law that binds one to the contents of agreements entered, a contrary rule is applied, which, in effect, binds one only if it is determined that the terms, and effects, of the agreement were fully understood. This is a departure from longstanding, traditional principles of contract law. See Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance, 503 Pa. 300, 305 , 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983) (failure to read a contract does not warrant avoidance or nullification of its provisions); Estate of Brant, 463 Pa. 230, 235 , 344 A.2d 806, 809 (1975); Bollinger v. Central Pennsylvania Quarry Stripping & Construction Co., 425 Pa. 430, 432 , 229 A.2d 741, 742 (1967) (“Once a person enters into a written agreement he builds around himself a stone wall, from which he cannot escape by merely asserting he had not understood what he was signing.”); Montgomery v. Levy, 406 Pa. 547, 550 , 177 A.2d 448, 450 (1962) (one is legally bound to know the terms of the contract entered). Based upon these principles, the terms of the instant ante-nuptial agreement should be regarded as binding, without inquiry into whether the significance of the agreement was understood by the party against whom enforcement is sought.