dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Nix setting forth detailed history of case law evidencing a shift away from the former paternalistic approach of protecting women towards a newer approach of equal treatment
How later courts described this case
- dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Nix setting forth detailed history of case law evidencing a shift away from the former paternalistic approach of protecting women towards a newer approach of equal treatment
- "These agreements are nothing more than contracts and should be treated as such." (Nix, C.J. dissenting)
- “Such disclosure must include both the general financial pictures of the parties involved, and evidence that the parties are aware of the statutory rights which they are relinquishing.”
- discussing application of the Equal Rights Amendment to interpretation of antenuptial agreements
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice, concurring.
I join the result reached by the Court but write separately to emphasize my reasoning. An antenuptial agreement, like any other agreement, must be construed in light of general principles of contract law. Thus, if the parties do not negotiate at arms length, the validity of any resulting contract is at issue. In In re Hillegass Estate, 431 Pa. 144 , 244 A.2d 672 (1968), we held that as a matter of public policy antenuptial agreements must be given special consideration because of the relationship between the parties. However, this does not mean that we can ignore traditional contract principles in evaluating a prenuptial agreement. Thus, in disposing of this appeal, we must first look to the agreement itself to determine whether there has been a full disclosure as set forth in paragraph 7 of the agreement. A presumption arises that full disclosure has been made if the agreement so provides. However, this presumption can be rebutted upon a showing of fraud or misrepresentation. In this case, the trial court determined that the decedent misrepresented to the Appellant Ms ownership interest in Geyer Kraft Korner. This is a material omission which is sufficient to rebut the plain language of paragraph 7 of the agreement. Accordingly, I join in the Court’s disposition and would hold that the decedent did not comply with the terms of the agreement, i.e. give the Appellant full disclosure of all his property.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins in this concurring opinion.