holding that PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find defendant's mental health experts convincing in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance for not presenting mental health evidence
How later courts described this case
- holding that PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find defendant's mental health experts convincing in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance for not presenting mental health evidence
- stating that during sentencing phase of capital case, prosecutor must be afforded reasonable latitude in arguing position to jury and may employ oratorical flair in arguing in favor of death penalty
- holding that "[jjury instructions will be upheld if they adequately and accurately reflect the law and are sufficient to guide the jury properly in its deliberations"
- rejecting a claim of racial discrimination that relied on similar evidence where defendant showed no links between such evidence and his particular case
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice NIGRO
dissenting.
I dissent, as I agree with Justice Saylor that Appellant has demonstrated that his trial-counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present evidence of mitigation, including evidence of Appellant’s mental health and abusive childhood, at his penalty phase hearing. Appellant, however, has presented only a boilerplate allegation that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in this regard. Thus, as the majority notes, Appellant has not preserved an ineffectiveness claim arising from appellate counsel’s deficient performance and such a claim is the only one on which relief may be granted. See Op. at 68-70, 863 A.2d at 512. Given these circumstances, I would, consistent with this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth *90 v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574 , 832 A.2d 1014 (2003), remand the matter to provide Appellant with the opportunity to develop his claim as it relates to appellate counsel’s performance.