holding that PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find defendant's mental health experts convincing in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance for not presenting mental health evidence
How later courts described this case
- holding that PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find defendant's mental health experts convincing in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance for not presenting mental health evidence
- stating that during sentencing phase of capital case, prosecutor must be afforded reasonable latitude in arguing position to jury and may employ oratorical flair in arguing in favor of death penalty
- holding that "[jjury instructions will be upheld if they adequately and accurately reflect the law and are sufficient to guide the jury properly in its deliberations"
- rejecting a claim of racial discrimination that relied on similar evidence where defendant showed no links between such evidence and his particular case
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice BAER
concurring.
I write separately only to note my view that jury instructions, such'as those given here, which mirror the language of Section 9711(c)(l)(iv) of the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(l)(iv), impermissibly infer a requirement that any mitigating circumstance must be found unanimously by the jury in violation of Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). 1
*89 Nevertheless, I join the majority opinion in all respects for several reasons. First, the majority properly disposes of the assertion on a waiver theory, noting that such claim was previously litigated on direct appeal. Second, the majority notes the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Beard v. Banks, No. 02-1608, 542 U.S. 406 , 124 S.Ct. 2504 , 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004), makes it clear that Mills does not apply retroactively to cases, such as this, that were decided prior to its issuance. 2 Finally, the majority notes that, on direct appeal, this Court, in upholding the instruction at issue, relied on our decision in Commonwealth v. Frey, 520 Pa. 338 , 554 A.2d 27, 31 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 , 110 S.Ct. 1500 , 108 L.Ed.2d 635 (1990), holding that the language of the death penalty statute does not “state or infer a requirement that any given mitigating circumstance must be unanimously recognized before it can be weighed against aggravating circumstances in reaching a verdict.” Thus, based upon principles of stare decisis, I am bound to follow our prior precedent in this regard.
. Section 9711 (c)( 1 )(iv) provides:
[T]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating *89 circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life imprisonment in all other cases
. Appellant's trial occurred in 1986, two years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mills .