striking down as vague gambling statute because “legislature has failed to sufficiently define the conduct of ‘receiving a bet’ so as to limit law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion in prosecuting only the professional, exploitive gambler”
How later courts described this case
- striking down as vague gambling statute because “legislature has failed to sufficiently define the conduct of ‘receiving a bet’ so as to limit law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion in prosecuting only the professional, exploitive gambler”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
In its motion for rehearing the State urges a construction of the statutes that would sustain constitutionality of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 47.03(a)(2). The majority disdains that approach, notwithstanding its antiquity in jurisprudence of practically every jurisdiction as well as this one. See 53 Tex.Jur.2d 277-278, Statutes, § 184.
For reasons stated in my dissenting opinion on original submission we should take that approach and, having taken it, uphold validity of § 47.03(a)(2) on the construction given the statutes in my dissenting opinion in Dowdy & Dowdy v. State, 713 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Cr.App.).
Because the majority causes the Court needlessly to strike down a statute intended and designed by the Legislature in exercise of its police power to advance significant public policy considerations pertaining to health, safety, peace and welfare of the citizens of this State, I dissent.
McCORMICK, J., joins.