striking down as vague gambling statute because “legislature has failed to sufficiently define the conduct of ‘receiving a bet’ so as to limit law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion in prosecuting only the professional, exploitive gambler”
How later courts described this case
- striking down as vague gambling statute because “legislature has failed to sufficiently define the conduct of ‘receiving a bet’ so as to limit law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion in prosecuting only the professional, exploitive gambler”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
In the petition for discretionary review we granted, appellant charges that the court of appeals ignored the crux of his contention concerning statutory construction and, instead, “answered an argument which the appellant never advanced (i.e., that § 47.03(a)(2) was unconstitutionally vague).” Petition, at 4. As I read the *686 opinion of the court of appeals, the court overruled his ground of error complaining that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the indictment on grounds that its allegations are vague and ambiguous. It did not decide that the statute is constitutional. Adley v. State, 675 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984).
Traditionally, the last action this Court or any other judicious appellate court will take is to address a claim that a statute is unconstitutional. Of course we are presently witnessing that tradition being breached by expedient sua sponte attacks on legislative acts in disfavor, but still cling to the hope that they are but expressions of the moment, ending when the particular job is done.
Adhering to the traditional approach in deciding questions of constitutionality of statutes, I respectfully dissent.
State's motion for rehearing on petition for discretionary review denied.
CLINTON, J. dissents joined by McCOR-MICK, J.