noting longtime precedent that lay witnesses can testify as to a defendant’s sanity when “ ‘by association and observation [they] have had an opportunity to form an opinion as to the sanity of a person’ ”
How later courts described this case
- noting longtime precedent that lay witnesses can testify as to a defendant’s sanity when “ ‘by association and observation [they] have had an opportunity to form an opinion as to the sanity of a person’ ”
- describing cross-examination as “the primary means by which trial counsel can attempt to persuade jurors of the weight or significance to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses” (quotation omitted)
- “the credibility of every witness presented to testify in a legal proceeding, including expert witnesses, is subject to attack and cross-examination, this being the primary means by which trial counsel can attempt to persuade jurors of the weight or significance to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses”
- "Kentucky case law indicates that '[t]he possibility of prejudice alone is not sufficient to support the position that speedy trial rights have been violated." '
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Keeling v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 160 (2012)
However, we neither renewed, nor commented on the continuing validity of, the Brown court’s concerns.15 Interestingly, the evidence presented to the Star court included an affidavit from a Deputy Warden in the Correctional Psychiatric Treatment Unit at the Kentucky State Reformatory.
The opinion
SCOTT FURKIN,
Special Justice, concurring.
I concur that the record in this case does not support reversal of Appellant’s convictions. Nevertheless, Appellant makes some compelling points as to the constitutional infirmities of the guilty but mentally ill (“GBMI”) statutes, not the least of which is the concern that jurors are too easily lured *250 into returning a GBMI verdict — in lieu of an acquittal based on the insanity defense — by the illusory promise of treatment during incarceration.
The trial court cannot be faulted for instructing this jury that Appellant would receive treatment if found GBMI since KRS 504.150(1) does indeed mandate treatment. However, because the legislature has consistently failed to provide adequate funding, the reality is that treatment for those found GBMI is uncertain if not nonexistent. Thus, as the majority opinion notes, the dispositional instruction proffered by Appellant is more accurate; and the constitutionality and effectiveness of the GBMI statutes depend, at least in part, upon how the jury is instructed. As Justice Leibson observed in his dissent in Mitchell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 781 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1990), “[w]e cannot expect the jury to render a ‘true verdict’ if they are misled or confused_”
For this reason, I would hold that in all future eases where it is requested, a disposi-tional instruction which specifies that treatment will be provided during incarceration only if available and deemed necessary shall be given until such time as the legislature commits adequate resources for treatment of those found GBMI. Perhaps this would ameliorate somewhat the potential inequity of a statutory scheme whose present application is aptly described by the majority opinion as “a method of punishment which appears to be nothing more that a charade, cloaked in a verdict ... which amounts to nothing more than an oxymoronic term of art.”