noting longtime precedent that lay witnesses can testify as to a defendant’s sanity when “ ‘by association and observation [they] have had an opportunity to form an opinion as to the sanity of a person’ ”
How later courts described this case
- noting longtime precedent that lay witnesses can testify as to a defendant’s sanity when “ ‘by association and observation [they] have had an opportunity to form an opinion as to the sanity of a person’ ”
- describing cross-examination as “the primary means by which trial counsel can attempt to persuade jurors of the weight or significance to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses” (quotation omitted)
- “the credibility of every witness presented to testify in a legal proceeding, including expert witnesses, is subject to attack and cross-examination, this being the primary means by which trial counsel can attempt to persuade jurors of the weight or significance to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses”
- "Kentucky case law indicates that '[t]he possibility of prejudice alone is not sufficient to support the position that speedy trial rights have been violated." '
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Keeling v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 160 (2012)
However, we neither renewed, nor commented on the continuing validity of, the Brown court’s concerns.15 Interestingly, the evidence presented to the Star court included an affidavit from a Deputy Warden in the Correctional Psychiatric Treatment Unit at the Kentucky State Reformatory.
The opinion
WINTERSHEIMER,
Justice, concurring.
I concur only in the result achieved by the majority opinion to the extent that it affirms the judgment of conviction. However, I wish to state my views separately. I certainly do not agree with the language of the majority opinion or with what I believe is the clear implication of it. Our only appellate duty is to review the facts and the law. The majority opinion is almost an engraved invitation to seek RCr 11.42 relief or to challenge the validity of the statute.
This conviction should be affirmed because Brown was not entitled to a directed verdict regarding his insanity defense. KRS 504.130 and the verdict of guilty but mentally ill are cleai’ly constitutional. The instructions by the trial judge pertaining to insanity and the verdict of guilty but mentally ill were sufficient to advise the jury that they must reject the insanity defense in order to find the defendant guilty but mentally ill. In addition, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury regarding the consequences of a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. The other allegations of the appellant are equally without merit.
The judgment of conviction should be affirmed in all respects.
GRAVES, J., joins in this concurring opinion.