recognizing that cumulative effects of psychological and physical abuse by victim’s behavior in past relevant in determining “reasonableness” of battered person’s fear of imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that cumulative effects of psychological and physical abuse by victim’s behavior in past relevant in determining “reasonableness” of battered person’s fear of imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
- holding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome as a defense to homicide charges
- holding that battered spouse syndrome was a defense to homicide
- wherein the court held that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction in prosecution of battered wife for killing her husband
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The appellant here is a uniquely fortunate litigant in that the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth has elected to serve as her counsel. At trial, the parties contented themselves to address the self-defense issue in the traditional mode. On appeal, the issue of self-defense was argued consistent with traditional standards. The defense, as well as the prosecution, advised this Court at oral argument that the question of the applicability of the theory of what is known as “the battered women syndrome,” was not an issue in this case. Indeed the only reference in the briefs to this theory was by the amici. Notwithstanding this Court has chosen this appeal as the vehicle to recognize this doctrine as a valid defense for the first time in the history of this Commonwealth. Without commenting as to the merits or advisability of recognizing such a defense, I am constrained to express my chagrin with the abandonment by my colleagues of fundamental principles of sound jurisprudence. Regardless how laudable a particular provision may be, that judgment should only be made on a record that has fully explored all the ramifications of its adoption.
Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that precipitous judicial action often provides unfortunate consequences in the long run. In my view this issue is not properly before the Court in this appeal and therefore I cannot agree with this Court’s conclusion that counsel’s failure to pursue it constitutes ineffective assistance.
McDERMOTT, J., joins in this opinion.