recognizing that cumulative effects of psychological and physical abuse by victim’s behavior in past relevant in determining “reasonableness” of battered person’s fear of imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that cumulative effects of psychological and physical abuse by victim’s behavior in past relevant in determining “reasonableness” of battered person’s fear of imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
- holding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome as a defense to homicide charges
- holding that battered spouse syndrome was a defense to homicide
- wherein the court held that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction in prosecution of battered wife for killing her husband
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with Justice Larsen that Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an instruction that would have provided guidance to the jury as to the import of the history of the physical and psychological abuse in determining whether the Appellant reasonably believed that she was in danger of death or serious bodily injury. The jury heard extensive testimony about the victim’s violent nature and the abusive relationship between the Appellant and the victim. The jury was never instructed, however, that this history of abuse should be considered in determining whether the Appellant’s belief that she was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death prior to the shooting was reasonable. The trial court’s instructions on the issue of self-defense did not address this critical point of law, see Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467 , 431 A.2d 949 (1981). Trial counsel’s failure to request such an instruction was inimical to his client’s interests. No more harmful omission is conceivable.
For this reason alone, I believe a new trial is warranted. I would not address the second issue of whether a separate defense referred to as “battered woman syndrome” is recognizable under the law of this Commonwealth. Although *67 the issue was addressed by amici, the Appellant has made it clear that the “battered woman syndrome” is not involved in this matter. In footnote 5 of Appellant’s brief, appellate counsel made it clear that Appellant’s position on the self-defense issue is not to be mischaracterized as a failure to raise the “battered woman syndrome” issue. While I recognize the import of this issue, I believe its resolution is best left to a time when the issue is squarely before us.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.