explaining reasonable diligence means "simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist"
How later courts described this case
- explaining reasonable diligence means "simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist"
- stating that the exercise of reasonable diligence means an injured party must act with some promptness when the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right has been invaded or some claim against another party might exist
- holding the three-year limitations period for a legal malpractice claim began running on the date the adverse verdict was entered against the client, even though the attorney continued to represent the client throughout the appellate process
- rejecting the continuous- representation rule and affirming the dismissal of a legal malpractice case based on the expiration of the statute of limitations on the ground the three-year limitations period began to run on the date that the adverse verdict was entered against claimant
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson, 416 S.C. 517 (2016)
610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (S.C. 2005), overruled on other grounds, Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson, 787 S.E.2d 485
The opinion
Justice PLEICONES
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I concur in the majority’s rejection of the continuous-representation rule and in its retention of the discovery rule. In my opinion, however, Brown should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. I would therefore reverse and remand to the circuit court for trial.
“Under South Carolina law, a defendant may be estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense if the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute ha[s] been induced by the defendant’s conduct.” Kleckley v. N.W. Nat. Cas. Co., 338 S.C. 131, 136 , 526 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2000) (internal quotation omitted). “Such inducement may consist of conduct that suggests a lawsuit is not necessary.” Kleckley, 338 S.C. at 136-37 , 526 S.E.2d at 220 .
Brown affirmatively represented to Epstein that the adverse verdict had resulted from errors of law committed by the trial judge which had in turn affected the jury’s fact-finding role. Brown also remained nominally as counsel to Epstein throughout the appeal from the verdict. I would hold that the circuit court erred by holding that Brown’s representations coupled with his presence on the appellate team did not reasonably induce Epstein’s forbearance. That Brown did not actually participate in the appellate representation, other *385 than filing the appeal and being counsel of record, makes this conclusion all the more compelling, as his watchful presence bolstered his affirmative representations. I would therefore hold that Brown is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.