explaining reasonable diligence means "simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist"
How later courts described this case
- explaining reasonable diligence means "simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist"
- stating that the exercise of reasonable diligence means an injured party must act with some promptness when the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right has been invaded or some claim against another party might exist
- holding the three-year limitations period for a legal malpractice claim began running on the date the adverse verdict was entered against the client, even though the attorney continued to represent the client throughout the appellate process
- rejecting the continuous- representation rule and affirming the dismissal of a legal malpractice case based on the expiration of the statute of limitations on the ground the three-year limitations period began to run on the date that the adverse verdict was entered against claimant
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson, 416 S.C. 517 (2016)
610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (S.C. 2005), overruled on other grounds, Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson, 787 S.E.2d 485
The opinion
Chief Justice TOAL
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would adopt a bright-line rule that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in a legal malpractice action until an appellate court disposes of the action by sending a remittitur to the trial court.
I agree that under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations is tolled until the date the injured party either knows or should know, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that a cause of action exists for the wrongful conduct. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (Supp.2003); See also Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 363 , 468 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1996) (explaining the discovery rule). In Dean , this Court explained the nature of “reasonable diligence”:
[w]e have interpreted the exercise of reasonable diligence to mean that the injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury place a *384 reasonable person of common knowledge and experience on notice that a claim against another party might exist.
Id. (emphasis added).
I disagree with the majority’s decision holding that the appellants should have known of the existence of a cause of action arising from respondent’s alleged malpractice at the conclusion of the trial. In my opinion, there was no evidence that appellants were injured as a result of respondent’s alleged malpractice until the court of appeals disposed of the case by sending a remittitur to the trial court. Therefore, I would establish a bright-line rule that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in a legal malpractice action until a remittitur has been sent to the trial court. As a result, in my opinion, the statute of limitations does not bar Appellants’ claim.