stating that appellate judges are not immune from implicit bias and “[c]hanging habitual modes of thinking and acting on gender requires a concerted effort by the judiciary”
How later courts described this case
- stating that appellate judges are not immune from implicit bias and “[c]hanging habitual modes of thinking and acting on gender requires a concerted effort by the judiciary”
- holding that defendant was entitled to instruction allowing jury to consider deific decree theory
- recognizing the need for amplification beyond the "right and wrong" instruction where the defendant claimed to have killed under the command of God
- concluding that evidence had an objectively prejudicial effect
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dimmick, J.
(dissenting in part) — In State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d 789 , 659 P.2d 488 (1983) we began the odyssey. Today's majority opinion now leads us further into the Serbonian bog. In Crenshaw we recognized that one who knew the illegality of his act was not necessarily "'beyond any of the influences of the criminal law'" and thus not legally insane. Crenshaw , at 797. We thus found support for upholding an instruction identical to the one given in this case. However, Crenshaw contained several alternative holdings. One of which was that "legal" wrong and "moral" wrong were synonymous in that particular case. In explaining this holding, we included as dicta an exception for "deific decrees". Crenshaw , at 798. The majority in the instant case relies on this exception, holding that this court shall determine the scope of this exception on a case by case basis. Majority opinion, at 527. The majority thus condemns us to review every proffered insanity defense.
The exception itself is inconsistent with a legal definition of wrong. Additionally, what exactly does it entail? Apparently a person is legally insane if God gives him a direct command, such as the one Mr. Cameron allegedly received. However, a person is not legally insane if God does not directly ordain the act, but the person merely interprets his religious beliefs to require the act. See State v. Crenshaw, supra. In sum, I predict many problems with this exception.
Thus, I would affirm the Court of Appeals and trial court's holdings that the insanity instruction was proper in this case. The preferable approach, however, as later suggested in Crenshaw , is that the definition of "wrong" *537 should not be included in an instruction in the future.
Rosellini and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Dimmick, J.
Reconsideration denied January 11, 1984.