State v. Cameron

*532 Dore, J.

(concurring) — Last February, we decided the case of State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d 789 , 659 P.2d 488 (1983). Both Crenshaw and the subject case were almost factually identical; both involved outrageous, vicious, messy murders.

Crenshaw

Crenshaw stabbed his wife 27 times, one of which stabs was fatal. He later returned and decapitated her and then buried her remains in a hidden place. Cameron committed an equally brutal murder; he stabbed his stepmother 97 times. In Crenshaw , there was testimony by medical experts that he had delusions of grandeur, religiosity (including a belief in his possession of special powers), auditory hallucinations, lack of insight, and extreme emotional lability.

A psychiatrist testified that Crenshaw was suffering from a paranoid state and was in remission from former psychotic episodes. He had a history of mental problems. He was hospitalized in his home state of Texas 15 times between 1970 and 1978 where he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. Crenshaw testified he knew that if he killed his wife he was violating the law, but he believed he had a duty to do it under the teaching of his Moscovite "religious" beliefs.

Cameron

Medical experts testified that Cameron suffered from paranoid schizophrenia both at the time of the killing and at the time of the trial. Cameron related his feelings about the incident, "I felt confused ... I felt no different from the beginning than the end there was no difference. . . . legally I know, that it is against the law, but as far,as right and wrong in the eye of God, I would say I felt no particular wrong." Cameron believed that God commanded him to kill his stepmother and that he was, therefore, obligated to kill the "evil spirit". All doctors agreed that Cameron was legally insane at the time of the murder.

Concerning the legal tests for insanity, the mental health *533 experts opined that while Cameron understood it was against the law to kill, he believed he was responding to God's directive and thus had an obligation to rid the world of this "demon", "sorceress" or "evil spirit".

I

Both Crenshaw and Cameron came to this court challenging the identical instruction which defined insanity in terms limited to legal right and wrong and rejecting insanity based on moral right and wrong.

Such instruction read as follows:

In addition to the plea of not guilty, the defendant has entered a plea of insanity existing at the time of the act charged.

Insanity existing at the time of the commission of the act charged is a defense.

For a defendant to be found not guilty by reason of insanity you must find that, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant's mind was affected to such an extent that the defendant was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the acts with which the defendant is charged or was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the particular acts with which defendant is charged.

What is meant by the terms "right and wrong" refers to knowledge of a person at the time of committing an act that he was acting contrary to the law.

(Italics mine.)

In both cases, it was argued "right and wrong" should not have been defined in such a way as to exclude from the jury's deliberation the consideration of "right and wrong" in terms of one's ability to understand the moral qualities of the act. In Crenshaw , the majority rejected Crenshaw's argument and held that the instruction was a proper statement of the law.

The issue in both cases pertaining to the subject instruction was whether the terms "right" and "wrong", as used in RCW 9A.12.010(l)(b), should be qualified for the jury. In both cases at trial, the jury was instructed the defendant would not be legally insane if he knew legal right from legal *534 wrong. Both contended the trial court erred in defining right and wrong as legal right and wrong. Contrary to Crenshaw , the majority here, at page 527, holds that the subject instruction was prejudicial error, saying, "In short, the instruction prevented the jury from considering those essential relevant facts that formed petitioner's theory of the case. To this extent the trial court erred by adding the definitional paragraph to the instruction."

The majority in Crenshaw stated at page 798:

A narrow exception to the societal standard of moral wrong has been drawn for instances wherein a party performs a criminal act, knowing it is morally and legally wrong, but believing, because of a mental defect, that the act is ordained by God: such would be the situation with a mother who kills her infant child to whom she is devotedly attached, believing that God has spoken to her and decreed the act. See People v. Schmidt, [ 216 N.Y. 324 , 110 N.E. 945 (1915)] at 339. Although the woman knows that the law and society condemn the act, it would be unrealistic to hold her responsible for the crime, since her free will has been subsumed by her belief in the deific decree. People v. Schmidt, supra.

Although arriving at a directly opposite result, the majority in the subject case at page 527 seizes on this narrow exception to decide the case, saying, "While we hold the facts of this case fall within the Crenshaw exception

Crenshaw performed his dastardly murder believing he had a duty to do it under the teaching of his Moscovite "religious" beliefs. Cameron committed a very similar, vicious murder on the basis that God commanded him to kill his stepmother and that he was obligated to kill the evil spirit. I frankly don't see much or any distinction, however, in carrying out or executing a murder under the direction of God or Crenshaw's Moscovite religious beliefs, or under the beliefs of a prophet, Buddha, etc.

Crenshaw , in finding that the subject instruction did not constitute prejudicial error wherein the definition of right and wrong was limited to legal right and wrong, at page 805 *535 concluded:

We thus conclude that the additional statement in instruction 10 was not improper, or, at the very least, that it was harmless error.

Nevertheless, we do not believe that, in the future, such a comment should be necessary. As the Legislature has chosen to codify the M'Naghten test in statutory form, it would be preferable to have this test presented to the jury without any elaboration. This would permit both parties to argue their theories of the case. It would also prevent the possibility that the jury would presume that ignorance of the law is a defense in cases wherein it may not be as clear as it was here that the person knew the illegality of his act. See State v. Corley, 108 Ariz. 240 , 495 P.2d 470 (1972). Thus, we hold prospectively that as a general rule no definition of wrong should accompany an insanity defense instruction.

(Italics mine.)

The majority in the subject case, commenting on the identical instruction and in particular the last three lines, states at page 527:

The last paragraph of the trial court's challenged instruction precluded the jury's consideration of these factors and thus runs afoul of the Crenshaw exception. In short, the instruction prevented the jury from considering those essential relevant facts that formed petitioner's theory of the case. To this extent the trial court erred by adding the definitional paragraph to the instruction.

Both Crenshaw and the majority here seem to agree that, in the future when the issue of insanity is raised as a defense, the trial judge should give standard WPIC pattern jury instruction 20.01 without limiting language such as " [wjhat is meant by the terms 'right and wrong' refers to knowledge of a person at the time of committing an act that he was acting contrary to the law."

Conclusion

As this case does not reverse Crenshaw , which provided prospectively for giving WPIC 20.01 in all future insanity cases, I conclude in the subject case that in all future insanity cases WPIC 20.01 should be given without change *536 or modification and that defendants' defense counsel are free to argue legal and/or moral right and wrong as an affirmative defense.

Utter, J., concurs with Dore, J.