finding sufficient intervening circumstances in support of attenuation despite fact that, in addition to defendant's confrontation with untainted evidence, defendant was also informed, prior to confessing, that he had been identified in a concededly illegal lineup
How later courts described this case
- finding sufficient intervening circumstances in support of attenuation despite fact that, in addition to defendant's confrontation with untainted evidence, defendant was also informed, prior to confessing, that he had been identified in a concededly illegal lineup
- handcuffing of man routinely checked by officer when seen walking along road constituted arrest; officer had no reasonable ground to believe defendant was committing or had committed a felony; documents seized at that time should have been suppressed; statements given much later were not fruits of the illegal arrest but of intervening events, and were admissible
- finding intervening event where defendant was confronted with sketch of robbery suspect prepared prior to his arrest and acknowledged sketch resembled him
- finding intervening event where defendant confronted with sketch of robbery suspect prepared prior to his arrest and acknowledged sketch resembled him
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Hobson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 191 (1983)
Other authorities relied upon by defendant (People v. Shaver (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 709, 396 N.E. 2d 643; People v. Gabbard (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 88, 398 N.E.2d 574) are distinguishable.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, also concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The facts are not in dispute. The appropriate law is not in dispute. Application of the law to the facts is in dispute. I believe the majority opinions here and in the appellate court ( 67 Ill. App. 3d 945 ) have usurped the trial court’s responsibility. It is the function of that court to determine whether probable cause, or reasonable grounds (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 107 — 2(c); People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 528-29 ), existed for the arrest; and that court’s finding should not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous (People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 505 ).
I agree with the majority here that the case does not involve a Terry stop (Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 , 905 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 1879 n.16), since, prior to the arrest (at the point of handcuffing), there was apparently no display of physical force by which Trooper Acup restrained the liberty of the defendant.
The dissent in the appellate court ( 67 Ill. App. 3d 945, 951-52 ) cited the appropriate law: People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77 . There this court stated:
“In considering whether probable cause existed, we stated in People v. Clay, 55 Ill. 2d 501, 504-05 , ‘Whether or not probable cause for an arrest exists in a particular case depends upon the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers when the arrest was made. [Citations.] In deciding the question of probable cause in a particular case the courts deal with probabilities and are not disposed to be unduly technical. These probabilities are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not legal technicians, act. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 , 79 S. Ct. 329 ; People v. Fiorito, 19 Ill. 2d 246 .’ Also it is proper to recognize in judging whether there was probable cause that ‘[p] olice officers often must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them, and the reasonableness of their conduct must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to prevent crime and to catch criminals.’ People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 19 .”
Applying this to the factual situation here, the trial court was not manifestly in error, even though I might have viewed the totality of circumstances differently.
The Illinois State Police, for example, in order to help motorists in distress or to facilitate public safety, has the policy of investigating pedestrians on a public highway. The defendant, a white male about 6 feet tall and carrying a gas-mask bag, was walking south on U.S. 66, towards Springfield, when he was spotted by Acup. At the time, there was a police bulletin, circulating in Acup’s area, which described an escaped Federal prisoner: white male, 5 feet 9 inches tall, 150 pounds, wearing jeans and army fatigue jacket, and carrying a backpack. That description is not so vague as the majority states. The defendant, walking along the highway and seen from a passing car, would not unreasonably fit that description: 5 feet 9 inches tall and a backpack, in the abstract, is not far removed from 6 feet and a gas-mask bag, in the concrete. According to Acup’s testimony, the defendant answered he was coming from and going to Springfield; the defendant identified himself with a checkbook; the defendant said he had no further identification although Acup noticed an Illinois driver’s license. The defendant was then arrested. I agree with the appellate court dissent ( 67 Ill. App. 3d 945, 951 ) that similarity between the dispatch’s description and the defendant’s appearance existed, and that the majority opinions here and in the appellate court have “become bogged down in a morass of details.” 67 Ill. App. 3d 945, 951 .
The totality of the facts and circumstances, known to Acup, justified the arrest. Accordingly, the evidence seized by authorities was also properly admitted by the trial court. I agree that the subsequent confession by — and the lineup identification of — the defendant were admissible. In determining that the arrest was invalid, however, the majority has utilized somewhat tortuous reasoning to uphold the admissibility of the defendant’s inculpatory statements. For these reasons, I would affirm the circuit court of Sangamon County; and I dissent in part and concur in part.
MR. JUSTICE RYAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.