finding sufficient intervening circumstances in support of attenuation despite fact that, in addition to defendant's confrontation with untainted evidence, defendant was also informed, prior to confessing, that he had been identified in a concededly illegal lineup
How later courts described this case
- finding sufficient intervening circumstances in support of attenuation despite fact that, in addition to defendant's confrontation with untainted evidence, defendant was also informed, prior to confessing, that he had been identified in a concededly illegal lineup
- handcuffing of man routinely checked by officer when seen walking along road constituted arrest; officer had no reasonable ground to believe defendant was committing or had committed a felony; documents seized at that time should have been suppressed; statements given much later were not fruits of the illegal arrest but of intervening events, and were admissible
- finding intervening event where defendant was confronted with sketch of robbery suspect prepared prior to his arrest and acknowledged sketch resembled him
- finding intervening event where defendant confronted with sketch of robbery suspect prepared prior to his arrest and acknowledged sketch resembled him
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Hobson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 191 (1983)
Other authorities relied upon by defendant (People v. Shaver (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 709, 396 N.E. 2d 643; People v. Gabbard (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 88, 398 N.E.2d 574) are distinguishable.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I disagree with the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the documents seized from the defendant after his arrest should have been suppressed. In my judgment, sufficient evidence was presented during the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress to support the trial court’s finding that there was probable cause for the arrest. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 107 — 2(c), as defined in People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 528 .) A trial court’s determination as to probable cause should not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous, which it seems to me it is not. People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 505 , citing People v. Dailey (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 239 ; People v. Brooks (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 156 .
It is elementary, of course, that an arrest is supported by probable cause when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge would lead a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person apprehended has commited the offense. (Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103, 111 , 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 64 , 95 S. Ct. 854, 862 ; Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 148 , 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 618 , 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 91 , 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145 , 85 S. Ct. 223, 225 ; People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276 .) In determining whether probable cause existed, this court has emphasized that the totality of facts and circumstances known to the officer when the arrest was made must be considered. (People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 504 .) Moreover, in deciding questions of probable cause courts deal with probabilities which are not technical but which are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 149 , 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 618 , 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1925 ; Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 313 , 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 332 , 79 S. Ct. 329, 333 ; Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160, 175 , 93 L. Ed. 1879 , 1891, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 ; People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 277 ;People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 505 .
The testimony at the hearing indicated that six days prior to the incident the arresting officer had received a report describing a Federal prisoner who had escaped and was believed to be approximately 30 miles from the location of the arrest. Although the description of the escapee varied somewhat from the defendant’s appearance, the police officer testified that the report was on his mind when he drove his car onto the highway shoulder where the defendant had been walking. Moreover, one of the reasons the State troopers stopped persons walking along main highways was to ascertain whether the persons were in need of assistance. For these reasons, the officer stopped the defendant and inquired regarding his destination. When the defendant gave the anomalous answer that he was both going to and coming from Springfield, the officer asked for identification, and the defendant produced only personalized checks. Having seen a driver’s license tucked among the personal checks, the officer asked whether the defendant had any additional identification. When defendant denied that he did and started to place the checks and license in the bag he was carrying, he was arrested.
The officer had testified that the defendant voluntarily approached the squad car after it stopped. While defendant testified the officer beckoned him to the car, the trial court apparently accepted the officer’s statements and found that the defendant acquiesced in the temporary questioning that transpired prior to his arrest. Accordingly, any characterization of that incident as a stop or seizure in the absence of any attempt to detain or restrain the defendant against his will is unsupp or table. (See, e.g., People v. Tilden (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 859, 862 ; People v. Kennedy (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 267, 273 ; People v. Jordan (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 660, 662-63 ; People v. Oritz (1973), 18 Ill. App. 3d 431, 433 ; People v. Hines (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 582, 588 .) Even if regarded as a “stop,” however, the facts supporting it are “based on more substantial facts and circumstances than *** a mere hunch.” (People v. McGowan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 73, 77-78 , citing Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 .) Once the defendant had denied the possession of any identification other than the checks, it seems to me the officer, who had seen a driver’s license, acted quite reasonably in arresting defendant in the belief that an offense had been committed by him.
In my opinion the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized subsequent to the arrest.
MR. JUSTICE RYAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.