concluding that the expert testimony supporting the defendant’s claim of a severe mental defect was erroneously excluded because other evidence could establish that the defendant could not understand that his actions were wrong
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the expert testimony supporting the defendant’s claim of a severe mental defect was erroneously excluded because other evidence could establish that the defendant could not understand that his actions were wrong
- holding that Rule 704 forbids psychiatric testimony as to whether defendant charged with bank robbery understood the wrongfulness of his act at the time of the offense
- "A judge may take [an insanity determination] away from the jury ... if the admissible evidence, not including psychiatrists’ opinions, would not permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict of insanity.”
- “A judge may take this decision from the jury, like any other, if the admissible evidence ... would not permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict of insanity.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANION, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
This case presents a most difficult puzzle involving the relationship among 18 U.S.C. § 17 , Fed.R.Evid. 704(b) and Fed.R.Evid. 403. I agree with the district court that to permit counsel “to get up and make an argument that the defendant was insane at the time of the occurrence when the defendant’s own psychiatrist says the defendant doesn’t meet the criteria for Section 17 ... is nonsense.” Nonetheless, I must join my colleagues in reversing West’s conviction because, under Rule 704(b), Dr. Jeckel’s opinion that West was not legally insane alone cannot be grounds to foreclose West from presenting any evidence on his insanity defense.
I do not agree, however, that Dr. Jeckel’s testimony could never be properly excluded under Rule 403. Although Congress only forbade psychiatrists from expressing their ultimate conclusions and did not bar them from testifying, this congressional scheme should not be used to nullify Rule 403.
In addition, I think it is important to remember that neither the government nor the district court will be powerless on retrial to point out the weaknesses of Dr. Jeckel's testimony to the jury. Rule 704(b) does not prohibit psychiatrists from “ ‘presenting and explaining their diagnoses, such as whether the defendant had a severe mental disease or defect and what the characteristics of such disease or defect, if any, may have been.’ ” United States v. Davis, 835 F.2d 274, 276 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2874 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988) (quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 230) (emphasis in original). Thus, a skilled attorney can avoid some of the pernicious effects of Rule 704(b) by asking a psychiatrist whether the ability to discern right from wrong is a characteristic of the defendant’s illness. Id.; see also United States v. Kristiansen, 901 F.2d 1463, 1466 (8th Cir.1990). On retrial, for example, the government could ask Dr. Jeckel: “Does a finding that a person suffers from schi-zoaffective disorder, in and of itself, indicate that a person is unable to understand the wrongfulness of his acts?” The government could even go on to explore what particular characteristics of schizoaf-fective disorder render a person able or unable to ■ appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts. Such questions are merely questions about the characteristics of the mental disease, 1 as opposed to subjective questions leading to conclusions about the defendant’s personal knowledge, intent or ability.
As Judge Cudahy points out, the district court can help ameliorate the seemingly inequitable result that Rule 704(b) necessitates through careful jury instructions. The jury could be instructed that Dr. Jeck-el’s testimony went only to the issue of *1252 whether West had a mental disorder and that they must determine whether, as a result of that mental disorder, West was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts.
. On the other hand, the government cannot get around Rule 704(b) by asking a hypothetical question based on the particular facts in the case which clearly identifies West and is specifically structured to elicit Dr. Jeckel’s opinion on the "ultimate issue.” United States v. Manley, 893 F.2d 1221, 1223-34 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 259 , 112 L.Ed.2d 216 (1990); United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 331-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 , 107 S.Ct. 1981 , 95 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987).