concluding that the expert testimony supporting the defendant’s claim of a severe mental defect was erroneously excluded because other evidence could establish that the defendant could not understand that his actions were wrong
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the expert testimony supporting the defendant’s claim of a severe mental defect was erroneously excluded because other evidence could establish that the defendant could not understand that his actions were wrong
- holding that Rule 704 forbids psychiatric testimony as to whether defendant charged with bank robbery understood the wrongfulness of his act at the time of the offense
- "A judge may take [an insanity determination] away from the jury ... if the admissible evidence, not including psychiatrists’ opinions, would not permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict of insanity.”
- “A judge may take this decision from the jury, like any other, if the admissible evidence ... would not permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict of insanity.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with Judge Baker that “it is outrageous to say that a psychiatrist ... should testify in support of an insanity defense when the physician says that under the definition of the statute ... there is no insanity_ There is no causative relationship, and the doctor says so right out....” The procedure is outrageous and seems to me to defy common sense. But Congress apparently mandated this procedure when it allowed psychiatrists to testify at length about the mental condition of defendants but forbade the doctors to indicate their “ultimate” conclusions.
*1251 This seems to me also to be a close call on the issue raised by Federal Rule of Evidence 403. It certainly may be argued that Dr. Jeckel’s testimony would be so confusing that its impact on the jury would be more prejudicial than probative. But as the majority points out, psychiatric testimony, focusing on esoteric disease concepts and employing incomprehensible language, is frequently confusing. And despite the potential to confuse, Congress did not bar psychiatrists from testifying; it merely forbade them to express their ultimate conclusions. It seems to me impermissible to use Rule 403 in effect to nullify the congressional scheme. In addition, it is clear that Dr. Jeckel’s testimony would be highly probative of the severity of the mental defect or disease — a necessary element of the insanity defense. Perhaps the jury should be instructed that the psychiatrist’s testimony is primarily directed at this point and the jury remains the sole judge of the elements of an insanity defense, including the ability to tell right from wrong.