rejecting a request for a self-defense instruction because ―[t]he theory fragments the testimony in a selective process . . . so attenuated as to strain credulity to the breaking point‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- rejecting a request for a self-defense instruction because ―[t]he theory fragments the testimony in a selective process . . . so attenuated as to strain credulity to the breaking point‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding the surgical removal of a bullet “reasonable and proper”, under the circumstances of the case
- “We are not impressed by the effort of counsel to conjure up a case of self-defense from the theory that Crowder perjured himself in his testimony, and that a shooting in self-defense may be inferred from various wisps of evidence.”
- discussing the significance of a presentation of the evidence to "a neutral and detached magistrate"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I concur in Part II of the dissenting opinion written by Judge Robinson. As to the issue of unreasonable search, I do not feel that I can say in all cases a minor surgical procedure is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. That is why I declined to vote for a prerogative writ when this matter was before Judge McGowan and myself as a motions panel. I am clear that a surgical procedure is unreasonable unless it is authorized by a judge after a hearing, for reasons touched on by Judge McGowan, and I am also clear that the prosecution must make a strong affirmative case that the surgical procedure is necessary in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. No such showing was made here, in my view. The prosecution may have thought it convenient to extract the bullet as part of an investigation, but that is not enough. Here there was no proffer beyond an indication that extraction of the bullet would show Crowder was present at the scene of the crime. This surgery was not necessary to establish that fact. *
The prosecutor had Sandra Toomer’s testimony that there had been shots while Crowder was in the office of the deceased, that Crowder told her he had been shot, and that she observed Crowder’s wounds. The prosecution could have caused Crowder to identify his wound, by exhibiting himself to the jury, and to a doctor who would give testimony.
The prosecution might even claim the benefit of a “missing evidence” instruction if Crowder declined to permit the surgical excision.