holding that at the college level, unlike the high school level, an adult's constitutional right to wear his hair as he chooses supersedes the state’s right to intrude by imposing an "appearance code” on would-be junior college students
How later courts described this case
- holding that at the college level, unlike the high school level, an adult's constitutional right to wear his hair as he chooses supersedes the state’s right to intrude by imposing an "appearance code” on would-be junior college students
- adopting presumption that state’s interests in education and educational environment did not rationally justify hair-length regulation at junior college, although under Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), those interests presumptively could rationally justify dress and grooming regulations in high schools
- disapproving enforcement of a junior hair length case. The only thing about college's grooming code and stating, “the place where the line it that borders on the serious to me of permissible hairstyle regulation is drawn is between the is the idea that anyone should think high school door and the college gate”
- holding that at the college level such interests are not sufficient to warrant a similar intrusion on the liberty interests of college students
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DYER, Circuit Judge,
with whom GEWIN, COLEMAN, AINSWORTH and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that Lansdale has a Fourteenth Amendment right to wear his hair as long as he pleases, in violation of the College’s “Dress Code.” It has no authoritative support and, in my opinion, is contrary to the rationale of Karr v. Schmidt, 5 Cir. 1972, 460 F.2d 609 , en banc.
In Karr we said no less than five times that a substantial constitutional question was not presented in a haircut case.
Believing, as did Mr. Justice Black, that appellee Karr’s asserted right to *666 be free of school regulations governing the length of his hair is one that is not cognizable in federal courts, we reverse with direction that the case be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Id. at 611 .
Is there a constitutionally protected right to wear one’s hair in a public high school in the length and style that suits the wearer? We hold that no such right is to be found within the plain meaning of the Constitution.
Id. at 613 .
It is our firm belief that this asserted freedom [to wear hair in school at the length that suits the student] does not rise to the level of fundamental significance which would warrant our recognition of such a substantive constitutional right.
Id. at 615 .
* * * [0]ur holding [is] that there is no substantial constitutional right to wear hair in the fashion that suits the wearer * * *.
Id. at 616 .
[Our decision] reflects recognition of the inescapable fact that neither the Constitution nor the federal judiciary it created were conceived to be keepers of the national conscience in every matter great and small.
Id. at 618 .
What we said in Karr is equally applicable here. “By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values” (emphasis supplied) Epperson v. Arkansas, 1968, 393 U.S. 97, 104 , 89 S.Ct. 266, 270 , 21 L.Ed.2d 228 .
The Court is attempting to make law by a coup de main that articulates constitutional consequences dependent upon a line arbitrarily drawn between high schools and junior colleges in the face of contrary precedent.