holding that at the college level, unlike the high school level, an adult's constitutional right to wear his hair as he chooses supersedes the state’s right to intrude by imposing an "appearance code” on would-be junior college students
How later courts described this case
- holding that at the college level, unlike the high school level, an adult's constitutional right to wear his hair as he chooses supersedes the state’s right to intrude by imposing an "appearance code” on would-be junior college students
- adopting presumption that state’s interests in education and educational environment did not rationally justify hair-length regulation at junior college, although under Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), those interests presumptively could rationally justify dress and grooming regulations in high schools
- disapproving enforcement of a junior hair length case. The only thing about college's grooming code and stating, “the place where the line it that borders on the serious to me of permissible hairstyle regulation is drawn is between the is the idea that anyone should think high school door and the college gate”
- holding that at the college level such interests are not sufficient to warrant a similar intrusion on the liberty interests of college students
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SIMPSON, Circuit Judge,
with whom WISDOM and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges, join in whole and Chief Judge JOHN R. BROWN joins in part, concurring specially:
I concur in the result here reached by the Court for the cogent reasons expressed by Judge Wisdom in his dissent (which I joined) in Karr v. Schmidt, 5 Cir. 1972 en banc, 460 F.2d 609 and further for the reasons recently well-stated by Judge Tuttle in his special concurrence in Sherling, a minor, etc. et al., v. Townley, Individually and as Superintendent of the Irving Independent School District, et al., 5 Cir. 1972, 464 F.2d 587 .
I have as much difficulty as does Judge Dyer (see separate dissent, p. 13) in reconciling this decision with Karr v. Schmidt. I agree with him that the majority opinion here makes “constitutional consequences dependent upon a line arbitrarily drawn between high schools and junior colleges."
I think the constitutionally protected right of a 17 year old junior college freshman with respect to his choice of hair length may not be logically demonstrated to differ from that of a 17 or 18 year old high school junior or senior. To me this false dichotomy simply emphasizes the inherent fallacy of the majority position in Karr v. Schmidt. I would not, as would Judge Dyer, follow Karr v. Schmidt. I would repudiate it, and instead, as suggested by Judge Tut-tle in Sherling v. Townley, supra, adopt “a per se rule that no such regulation” (of hair length) “can stand under the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that such regulations create a classification of citizens totally unrelated to the objectives of the operation of high schools.” 1
This Court en bane strained mightily and conscientiously over these two cases. The net result of the effort is unfortunately not a glorious one. Our stance as a court emerges as unsatisfactory — because it is arbitrary and inconsistent— to members of the Court with directly opposing views. Surely these are grounds for re-examination of both decisions.
. And of course, junior and senior colleges and universities as well.