holding that, in considering a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the 2 Moreover, even if Ellison were binding precedent on this Court, its holding comports with the decision of the Magistrate Judge. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s beliefs are sincerely held and they are also religious in nature as explained herein. complaint”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in considering a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the 2 Moreover, even if Ellison were binding precedent on this Court, its holding comports with the decision of the Magistrate Judge. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s beliefs are sincerely held and they are also religious in nature as explained herein. complaint”
- concluding that the petitioner had stated an Eighth Amendment claim where he alleged that prison officials had endangered his life by removing him from hepatitis C medication shortly after he began a year-long treatment regimen, that he was still in need of the treatment, and that prison officials continued to deny him treatment
- stating that under Rule 8(a)(2), “[sjpecific facts are not necessary,” and that a complaint need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that when deciding a motion to dismiss based upon a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), this Court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), abrogated on other grounds, Ashcraft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
I have repeatedly stated that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment historically concerned only injuries relating to a criminal sentence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 861 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25, 42 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 18-20 (1992) (same). But even applying the Court’s flawed Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, “I would draw the line at actual, serious injuries and reject the claim that exposure to the risk of injury can violate the Eighth Amendment.” Helling, supra, at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Consistent with these views, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent.