holding that, in considering a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the 2 Moreover, even if Ellison were binding precedent on this Court, its holding comports with the decision of the Magistrate Judge. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s beliefs are sincerely held and they are also religious in nature as explained herein. complaint”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in considering a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the 2 Moreover, even if Ellison were binding precedent on this Court, its holding comports with the decision of the Magistrate Judge. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s beliefs are sincerely held and they are also religious in nature as explained herein. complaint”
- concluding that the petitioner had stated an Eighth Amendment claim where he alleged that prison officials had endangered his life by removing him from hepatitis C medication shortly after he began a year-long treatment regimen, that he was still in need of the treatment, and that prison officials continued to deny him treatment
- stating that under Rule 8(a)(2), “[sjpecific facts are not necessary,” and that a complaint need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that when deciding a motion to dismiss based upon a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), this Court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), abrogated on other grounds, Ashcraft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
The opinion
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WILLIAM ERICKSON v. BARRY J. PARDUS ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06–7317. Decided June 4, 2007
PER CURIAM.
Imprisoned by the State of Colorado and alleging viola
tions of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protec
tions against cruel and unusual punishment, William
Erickson, the petitioner in this Court, filed suit against
prison officials in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado. He alleged that a liver condition
resulting from hepatitis C required a treatment program
that officials had commenced but then wrongfully termi
nated, with life-threatening consequences. Deeming these
allegations, and others to be noted, to be “conclusory,” the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Dis
trict Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. 198 Fed.
Appx. 694, 698 (2006). The holding departs in so stark a
manner from the pleading standard mandated by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that we grant review.
We vacate the court’s judgment and remand the case for
further consideration.
Petitioner was incarcerated in the Limon Correctional
Facility in Limon, Colorado, where respondents Barry
Pardus and Dr. Anita Bloor were working as prison offi
cials. After Dr. Bloor removed petitioner from the hepati
tis C treatment he had been receiving, petitioner sued
under 42 U. S. C. §1983, complaining, inter alia, that Dr.
Bloor had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by dem
onstrating deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104–105
(1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton
2 ERICKSON v. PARDUS
Per Curiam
infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amend
ment,” and this includes “indifference . . . manifested by
prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or
by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the
treatment once prescribed” (footnotes and internal quota
tion marks omitted)); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509
U. S. 25, 35–37 (1993).
Petitioner based his claim on the following allegations,
which we assume to be true for purposes of review here:
Officials at Colorado’s Department of Corrections (De
partment) diagnosed petitioner as requiring treatment for
hepatitis C. After completing the necessary classes and
otherwise complying with the protocols set forth by the
Department, petitioner began treatment for the disease.
The treatment, which would take a year to complete,
involved weekly self-injections of medication by use of a
syringe. Soon after petitioner began this treatment,
prison officials were unable to account for one of the sy
ringes made available to petitioner (and other prisoners)
for medical purposes. Upon searching, they found it in a
communal trash can, modified in a manner suggestive of
use for injection of illegal drugs. Prisoner Complaint in
Civ. Action No. 05–CV–00405–LTB–MJW (D. Colo.), p. 3
(hereinafter Petitioner’s Complaint).
Prison officials, disbelieving petitioner’s claim not to
have taken the syringe, found that his conduct constituted
a violation of the Colorado Code of Penal Discipline for
possession of drug paraphernalia. Letter from Anthony A.
DeCesaro to William Erickson (Sept. 30, 2004), attached to
Petitioner’s Complaint. This conduct, according to the
officials, led to the “reasonable inference” that petitioner
had intended to use drugs, so the officials removed peti
tioner from his hepatitis C treatment. Ibid. “The success
ful treatment of Hepatitis C is incumbent upon the indi
vidual remaining drug and alcohol free to give the liver a
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Per Curiam
better chance of recovery,” they indicated, ibid., an expla
nation they later offered to defend against petitioner’s
allegations of cruel and unusual punishment, see Defen
dants’ Motion to Dismiss in Civ. Action No. 05–CV–00405–
LTB–MJW, p. 10. Assuming that a person in the course of
this treatment takes illicit drugs, the prison’s protocol
mandates a waiting period of one year followed by a man
datory drug education class lasting six months. Brief in
Opposition 4. Petitioner therefore could face a delay of
some 18 months before he would be able to restart
treatment.
In his complaint petitioner alleged Dr. Bloor had “re
moved [him] from [his] hepatitis C treatment” in violation
of department protocol, “thus endangering [his] life.”
Petitioner’s Complaint 2. Petitioner attached to the com
plaint certain grievance forms. In these he claimed,
among other things, he was suffering from “continued
damage to [his] liver” as a result of the nontreatment.
Colorado Dept. of Corrections Offender Grievance Form
(June 30, 2004). The complaint requested relief including
damages and an injunction requiring that the Department
treat petitioner for hepatitis C “under the standards of the
treatment [protocol] established by [the Department].”
Petitioner’s Complaint 8.
Three months after filing his complaint, and well before
the District Court entered a judgment against him, peti
tioner filed a Motion for Expedited Review Due to Immi
nent Danger, in Civ. Action No. 05–B–405 (MJW)
(D. Colo.). Indicating it was “undisputed” that he had
hepatitis C, that he met the Department’s standards for
treatment of the disease, and that “furtherance of this
disease can cause irreversible damage to [his] liver and
possible death,” petitioner alleged that “numerous in
mates” in his prison community had died of the disease
and that he was “in imminent danger” himself “due to [the
Department’s] refusal to treat him.” Ibid. He had identi
4 ERICKSON v. PARDUS
Per Curiam
fied similar allegations in an earlier filing, explaining that
“his liver is suffering irreversible damage” due to the
decision to remove him from treatment and that he “will
suffer irreparable damage if his disease goes untreated.”
Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate’s Recommenda
tions in Civ. Action No. 05–CV–00405–LTB–MJW, p. 3.
Respondents answered these filings with a motion to
dismiss. The Magistrate Judge recommended, as relevant,
that the District Court dismiss the complaint on the
ground it failed to allege Dr. Bloor’s actions had caused
petitioner “substantial harm.” Recommendation on De
fendants’ Motion To Dismiss, p. 12. The District Court
issued a short order indicating its agreement with the
Magistrate Judge and dismissing the complaint.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It quoted extensively
from the Magistrate Judge’s discussion of “substantial
harm” before holding that petitioner had made “only
conclusory allegations to the effect that he has suffered a
cognizable independent harm as a result of his removal
from the [hepatitis C] treatment program.” 198 Fed.
Appx., at 698. Acknowledging decisions by courts that
have found Eighth Amendment violations when delays in
medical treatment have involved “life-threatening situa
tions and instances in which it is apparent that delay
would exacerbate the prisoner’s medical problems” (and
that have, moreover, indicated the Eighth Amendment
“protects against future harm to an inmate”), id., at 697
(internal quotation marks omitted), the court nevertheless
found petitioner’s complaint deficient: Petitioner had,
according to the court, failed to “allege that as a result of
the discontinuance of the treatment itself shortly after it
began or the interruption of treatment for approximately
eighteen months he suffered any harm, let alone substan
tial harm, [other] than what he already faced from the
Hepatitis C itself,” id., at 698 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Having reached this conclusion, the court saw
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5
Per Curiam
no need to address whether the complaint alleged facts
sufficient to support a finding that Dr. Bloor had made her
decisions with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id.,
at 697, 698 (internal quotation marks omitted).
It may in the final analysis be shown that the District
Court was correct to grant respondents’ motion to dismiss.
That is not the issue here, however. It was error for the
Court of Appeals to conclude that the allegations in ques
tion, concerning harm caused petitioner by the termina
tion of his medication, were too conclusory to establish for
pleading purposes that petitioner had suffered “a cogniza
ble independent harm” as a result of his removal from the
hepatitis C treatment program. Id., at 698.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific facts are not neces
sary; the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. ___,
___ (2007) (slip op., at 7–8) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U. S. 41, 47 (1957)). In addition, when ruling on a defen
dant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Bell
Atlantic Corp., supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8–9) (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 508, n. 1
(2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319, 327 (1989);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 236 (1974)).
The complaint stated that Dr. Bloor’s decision to remove
petitioner from his prescribed hepatitis C medication was
“endangering [his] life.” Petitioner’s Complaint 2. It
alleged this medication was withheld “shortly after” peti
tioner had commenced a treatment program that would
take one year, that he was “still in need of treatment for
this disease,” and that the prison officials were in the
meantime refusing to provide treatment. Id., at 3, 4. This
alone was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Petitioner, in
6 ERICKSON v. PARDUS
Per Curiam
addition, bolstered his claim by making more specific
allegations in documents attached to the complaint and in
later filings.
The Court of Appeals’ departure from the liberal plead
ing standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2) is even more pro
nounced in this particular case because petitioner has
been proceeding, from the litigation’s outset, without
counsel. A document filed pro se is “to be liberally con
strued,” Estelle, 429 U. S., at 106, and “a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice”).
Whether petitioner’s complaint is sufficient in all re
spects is a matter yet to be determined, for respondents
raised multiple arguments in their motion to dismiss. In
particular, the proper application of the controlling legal
principles to the facts is yet to be determined. The case
cannot, however, be dismissed on the ground that peti
tioner’s allegations of harm were too conclusory to put
these matters in issue. Certiorari and leave to proceed in
forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA would deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WILLIAM ERICKSON v. BARRY J. PARDUS ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06–7317. Decided June 4, 2007
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
I have repeatedly stated that the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment historically
concerned only injuries relating to a criminal sentence.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 861 (1994) (opinion
concurring in judgment); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S.
25, 42 (1993) (dissenting opinion); Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U. S. 1, 18–20 (1992) (dissenting opinion). But even
applying the Court’s flawed Eighth Amendment jurispru
dence, “I would draw the line at actual, serious injuries
and reject the claim that exposure to the risk of injury can
violate the Eighth Amendment.” Helling, supra, at 42
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). Consistent with these views, I
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I
respectfully dissent.