Ashcroft v. Iqbal

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v.

IQBAL ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 07–1015. Argued December 10, 2008—Decided May 18, 2009

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, respondent Iqbal,

a Pakistani Muslim, was arrested on criminal charges and detained

by federal officials under restrictive conditions. Iqbal filed a Bivens

action against numerous federal officials, including petitioner

Ashcroft, the former Attorney General, and petitioner Mueller, the

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See Bivens v.

Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388. The complaint al

leged, inter alia, that petitioners designated Iqbal a person “of high

interest” on account of his race, religion, or national origin, in contra

vention of the First and Fifth Amendments; that the FBI, under

Mueller’s direction, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim

men as part of its September-11th investigation; that petitioners

knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject

Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely

on account of the prohibited factors and for no legitimate penological

interest; and that Ashcroft was the policy’s “principal architect” and

Mueller was “instrumental” in its adoption and execution. After the

District Court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds, they invoked the collateral order doctrine to file

an interlocutory appeal in the Second Circuit. Affirming, that court

assumed without discussion that it had jurisdiction and focused on

the standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S.

544, for evaluating whether a complaint is sufficient to survive a mo

tion to dismiss. Concluding that Twombly’s “flexible plausibility

standard” obliging a pleader to amplify a claim with factual allega

tions where necessary to render it plausible was inapplicable in the

context of petitioners’ appeal, the court held that Iqbal’s complaint

2 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Syllabus

was adequate to allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discrimi

natory decisions which, if true, violated clearly established constitu

tional law.

Held:

1. The Second Circuit had subject-matter jurisdiction to affirm the

District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Pp. 6–

10.

(a) Denial of a qualified-immunity claim can fall within the nar

row class of prejudgment orders reviewable under the collateral-order

doctrine so long as the order “turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530. The doctrine’s applicability in this con

text is well established; an order rejecting qualified immunity at the

motion-to-dismiss stage is a “final decision” under 28 U. S. C. §1291,

which vests courts of appeals with “jurisdiction of appeals from all fi

nal decisions of the district courts.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S.

299, 307. Pp. 7–8.

(b) Under these principles, the Court of Appeals had, and this

Court has, jurisdiction over the District Court’s order. Because the

order turned on an issue of law and rejected the qualified-immunity

defense, it was a final decision “subject to immediate appeal.”

Behrens, supra, at 307. Pp. 8–10.

2. Iqbal’s complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for

purposeful and unlawful discrimination. Pp. 11–23.

(a) This Court assumes, without deciding, that Iqbal’s First

Amendment claim is actionable in a Bivens action, see Hartman v.

Moore, 547 U. S. 250, 254, n. 2. Because vicarious liability is inappli

cable to Bivens and §1983 suits, see, e.g., Monell v. New York City

Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 691, the plaintiff in a suit such

as the present one must plead that each Government-official defen

dant, through his own individual actions, has violated the Constitu

tion. Purposeful discrimination requires more than “intent as voli

tion or intent as awareness of consequences”; it involves a

decisionmaker’s undertaking a course of action “ ‘because of,’ not

merely ‘in spite of,’ [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable

group.” Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256,

279. Iqbal must plead sufficient factual matter to show that petition

ers adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a

neutral, investigative reason, but for the purpose of discriminating on

account of race, religion, or national origin. Pp. 11–13.

(b) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[D]etailed factual allegations” are

not required, Twombly, 550 U. S., at 555, but the Rule does call for

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Syllabus

that is plausible on its face,” id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibil

ity when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Id., at 556. Two working principles underlie Twombly.

First, the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as

true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s ele

ments, supported by mere conclusory statements. Id., at 555. Sec

ond, determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is con

text-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience

and common sense. Id., at 556. A court considering a motion to dis

miss may begin by identifying allegations that, because they are

mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While

legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must

be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded fac

tual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then de

termine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Pp. 13–16.

(c) Iqbal’s pleadings do not comply with Rule 8 under Twombly.

Several of his allegations—that petitioners agreed to subject him to

harsh conditions as a matter of policy, solely on account of discrimi

natory factors and for no legitimate penological interest; that

Ashcroft was that policy’s “principal architect”; and that Mueller was

“instrumental” in its adoption and execution—are conclusory and not

entitled to be assumed true. Moreover, the factual allegations that

the FBI, under Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab

Muslim men, and that he and Ashcroft approved the detention policy,

do not plausibly suggest that petitioners purposefully discriminated

on prohibited grounds. Given that the September 11 attacks were

perpetrated by Arab Muslims, it is not surprising that a legitimate

policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals be

cause of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a dispa

rate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the policy’s

purpose was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. Even if the com

plaint’s well-pleaded facts gave rise to a plausible inference that

Iqbal’s arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination, that

inference alone would not entitle him to relief: His claims against pe

titioners rest solely on their ostensible policy of holding detainees

categorized as “of high interest,” but the complaint does not contain

facts plausibly showing that their policy was based on discriminatory

factors. Pp. 16–20.

(d) Three of Iqbal’s arguments are rejected. Pp. 20–23.

(i) His claim that Twombly should be limited to its antitrust

context is not supported by that case or the Federal Rules. Because

Twombly interpreted and applied Rule 8, which in turn governs the

4 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Syllabus

pleading standard “in all civil actions,” Rule 1, the case applies to an

titrust and discrimination suits alike, see 550 U. S., at 555–556, and

n. 14. P. 20.

(ii) Rule 8’s pleading requirements need not be relaxed based

on the Second Circuit’s instruction that the District Court cabin dis

covery to preserve petitioners’ qualified-immunity defense in antici

pation of a summary judgment motion. The question presented by a

motion to dismiss for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the con

trols placed on the discovery process. Twombly, supra, at 559. And

because Iqbal’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled

to discovery, cabined or otherwise. Pp. 20–22.

(iii) Rule 9(b)—which requires particularity when pleading

“fraud or mistake” but allows “other conditions of a person’s mind [to]

be alleged generally”—does not require courts to credit a complaint’s

conclusory statements without reference to its factual context. Rule 9

merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an

elevated pleading standard. It does not give him license to evade

Rule 8’s less rigid, though still operative, strictures. Pp. 22–23.

(e) The Second Circuit should decide in the first instance

whether to remand to the District Court to allow Iqbal to seek leave

to amend his deficient complaint. P. 23.

490 F. 3d 143, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,

joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–1015

_________________

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JAVAID IQBAL ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2009]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Javaid Iqbal is a citizen of Pakistan and a

Muslim. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist

attacks he was arrested in the United States on criminal

charges and detained by federal officials. Respondent

claims he was deprived of various constitutional protec­

tions while in federal custody. To redress the alleged

deprivations, respondent filed a complaint against numer­

ous federal officials, including John Ashcroft, the former

Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Muel­

ler, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI). Ashcroft and Mueller are the petitioners in the case

now before us. As to these two petitioners, the complaint

alleges that they adopted an unconstitutional policy that

subjected respondent to harsh conditions of confinement

on account of his race, religion, or national origin.

In the District Court petitioners raised the defense of

qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the suit, con­

tending the complaint was not sufficient to state a claim

against them. The District Court denied the motion to

dismiss, concluding the complaint was sufficient to state a

2 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

claim despite petitioners’ official status at the times in

question. Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal in

the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court,

without discussion, assumed it had jurisdiction over the

order denying the motion to dismiss; and it affirmed the

District Court’s decision.

Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal could, if

proved, demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct by some

governmental actors. But the allegations and pleadings

with respect to these actors are not before us here. This

case instead turns on a narrower question: Did respon­

dent, as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual

matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that petition­

ers deprived him of his clearly established constitutional

rights. We hold respondent’s pleadings are insufficient.

I

Following the 2001 attacks, the FBI and other entities

within the Department of Justice began an investigation

of vast reach to identify the assailants and prevent them

from attacking anew. The FBI dedicated more than 4,000

special agents and 3,000 support personnel to the en­

deavor. By September 18 “the FBI had received more

than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public.” Dept.

of Justice, Office of Inspector General, The September 11

Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on

Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation

of the September 11 Attacks 1, 11–12 (Apr. 2003) (herein­

after OIG Report), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/

0306/full.pdf?bcsi_scan_61073EC0F74759AD=0&bcsi_scan

_filename=full.pdf (as visited May 14, 2009, and available

in Clerk of Court’s case file).

In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than

1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks in par­

ticular or to terrorism in general. Id., at 1. Of those indi­

viduals, some 762 were held on immigration charges; and

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

a 184-member subset of that group was deemed to be “of

‘high interest’ ” to the investigation. Id., at 111. The high­

interest detainees were held under restrictive conditions

designed to prevent them from communicating with the

general prison population or the outside world. Id., at

112–113.

Respondent was one of the detainees. According to his

complaint, in November 2001 agents of the FBI and Im­

migration and Naturalization Service arrested him on

charges of fraud in relation to identification documents

and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Iqbal v.

Hasty, 490 F. 3d 143, 147–148 (CA2 2007). Pending trial

for those crimes, respondent was housed at the Metropoli­

tan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York.

Respondent was designated a person “of high interest” to

the September 11 investigation and in January 2002 was

placed in a section of the MDC known as the Administra­

tive Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU). Id.,

at 148. As the facility’s name indicates, the ADMAX SHU

incorporates the maximum security conditions allowable

under Federal Bureau of Prison regulations. Ibid.

ADMAX SHU detainees were kept in lockdown 23 hours a

day, spending the remaining hour outside their cells in

handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer

escort. Ibid.

Respondent pleaded guilty to the criminal charges,

served a term of imprisonment, and was removed to his

native Pakistan. Id., at 149. He then filed a Bivens action

in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis­

trict of New York against 34 current and former federal

officials and 19 “John Doe” federal corrections officers.

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403

U. S. 388 (1971). The defendants range from the correc­

tional officers who had day-to-day contact with respondent

during the term of his confinement, to the wardens of the

MDC facility, all the way to petitioners—officials who

4 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

were at the highest level of the federal law enforcement

hierarchy. First Amended Complaint in No. 04–CV–1809

(JG)(JA), ¶¶10−11, App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a (hereinafter

Complaint).

The 21-cause-of-action complaint does not challenge

respondent’s arrest or his confinement in the MDC’s gen­

eral prison population. Rather, it concentrates on his

treatment while confined to the ADMAX SHU. The com­

plaint sets forth various claims against defendants who

are not before us. For instance, the complaint alleges that

respondent’s jailors “kicked him in the stomach, punched

him in the face, and dragged him across” his cell without

justification, id., ¶113, App. to Pet. for Cert. 176a; sub­

jected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when

he posed no safety risk to himself or others, id., ¶¶143–

145, App. to Pet. for Cert. 182a; and refused to let him and

other Muslims pray because there would be “[n]o prayers

for terrorists,” id., ¶154, App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a.

The allegations against petitioners are the only ones

relevant here. The complaint contends that petitioners

designated respondent a person of high interest on ac­

count of his race, religion, or national origin, in contraven­

tion of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitu­

tion. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI], under the

direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained

thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investiga­

tion of the events of September 11.” Id., ¶47, at 164a. It

further alleges that “[t]he policy of holding post-

September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions

of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was

approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in

discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Id.,

¶69, at 168a. Lastly, the complaint posits that petitioners

“each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously

agreed to subject” respondent to harsh conditions of con­

finement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate

penological interest.” Id., ¶96, at 172a–173a. The plead­

ing names Ashcroft as the “principal architect” of the

policy, id., ¶10, at 157a, and identifies Mueller as “instru­

mental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementa­

tion.” Id., ¶11, at 157a.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state sufficient allegations to show their own involvement

in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. The Dis­

trict Court denied their motion. Accepting all of the alle­

gations in respondent’s complaint as true, the court held

that “it cannot be said that there [is] no set of facts on

which [respondent] would be entitled to relief as against”

petitioners. Id., at 136a–137a (relying on Conley v. Gib

son, 355 U. S. 41 (1957)). Invoking the collateral-order

doctrine petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal in the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

While that appeal was pending, this Court decided Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), which

discussed the standard for evaluating whether a complaint

is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

The Court of Appeals considered Twombly’s applicabil­

ity to this case. Acknowledging that Twombly retired the

Conley no-set-of-facts test relied upon by the District

Court, the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussed at length

how to apply this Court’s “standard for assessing the

adequacy of pleadings.” 490 F. 3d, at 155. It concluded

that Twombly called for a “flexible ‘plausibility standard,’

which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some

factual allegations in those contexts where such amplifica­

tion is needed to render the claim plausible.” Id., at 157–

158. The court found that petitioners’ appeal did not

present one of “those contexts” requiring amplification. As

a consequence, it held respondent’s pleading adequate to

allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discriminatory

decisions which, if true, violated clearly established consti­

6 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

tutional law. Id., at 174.

Judge Cabranes concurred. He agreed that the major­

ity’s “discussion of the relevant pleading standards re­

flect[ed] the uneasy compromise . . . between a qualified

immunity privilege rooted in the need to preserve the

effectiveness of government as contemplated by our consti­

tutional structure and the pleading requirements of Rule

8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., at 178

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Judge

Cabranes nonetheless expressed concern at the prospect of

subjecting high-ranking Government officials—entitled to

assert the defense of qualified immunity and charged with

responding to “a national and international security emer­

gency unprecedented in the history of the American Re­

public”—to the burdens of discovery on the basis of a

complaint as nonspecific as respondent’s. Id., at 179.

Reluctant to vindicate that concern as a member of the

Court of Appeals, ibid., Judge Cabranes urged this Court

to address the appropriate pleading standard “at the

earliest opportunity.” Id., at 178. We granted certiorari,

554 U. S. ___ (2008), and now reverse.

II

We first address whether the Court of Appeals had

subject-matter jurisdiction to affirm the District Court’s

order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Respondent

disputed subject-matter jurisdiction in the Court of Ap­

peals, but the court hardly discussed the issue. We are

not free to pretermit the question. Subject-matter juris­

diction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be consid­

ered when fairly in doubt. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546

U. S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535

U. S. 625, 630 (2002)). According to respondent, the Dis­

trict Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss

is not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. We

disagree.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

A

With exceptions inapplicable here, Congress has vested

the courts of appeals with “jurisdiction of appeals from all

final decisions of the district courts of the United States.”

28 U. S. C. §1291. Though the statute’s finality require­

ment ensures that “interlocutory appeals—appeals before

the end of district court proceedings—are the exception,

not the rule,” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 309 (1995),

it does not prevent “review of all prejudgment orders.”

Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299, 305 (1996). Under the

collateral-order doctrine a limited set of district-court

orders are reviewable “though short of final judgment.”

Ibid. The orders within this narrow category “are imme­

diately appealable because they ‘finally determine claims

of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted

in the action, too important to be denied review and too

independent of the cause itself to require that appellate

consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi­

cated.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan

Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949)).

A district-court decision denying a Government officer’s

claim of qualified immunity can fall within the narrow

class of appealable orders despite “the absence of a final

judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530 (1985).

This is so because qualified immunity—which shields

Government officials “from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab­

lished statutory or constitutional rights,” Harlow v. Fitz

gerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982)—is both a defense to

liability and a limited “entitlement not to stand trial or

face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell, supra, 472

U. S., at 526. Provided it “turns on an issue of law,” id., at

530, a district-court order denying qualified immunity

“ ‘conclusively determine[s]’ ” that the defendant must bear

the burdens of discovery; is “conceptually distinct from the

merits of the plaintiff’s claim”; and would prove “effec­

8 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id.,

at 527−528 (citing Cohen, supra, at 546). As a general

matter, the collateral-order doctrine may have expanded

beyond the limits dictated by its internal logic and the

strict application of the criteria set out in Cohen. But the

applicability of the doctrine in the context of qualified­

immunity claims is well established; and this Court has

been careful to say that a district court’s order rejecting

qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage of a

proceeding is a “final decision” within the meaning of

§1291. Behrens, 516 U. S., at 307.

B

Applying these principles, we conclude that the Court of

Appeals had jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ appeal. The

District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dis­

miss turned on an issue of law and rejected the defense of

qualified immunity. It was therefore a final decision

“subject to immediate appeal.” Ibid. Respondent says

that “a qualified immunity appeal based solely on the

complaint’s failure to state a claim, and not on the ulti­

mate issues relevant to the qualified immunity defense

itself, is not a proper subject of interlocutory jurisdiction.”

Brief for Respondent Iqbal 15 (hereinafter Iqbal Brief). In

other words, respondent contends the Court of Appeals

had jurisdiction to determine whether his complaint avers

a clearly established constitutional violation but that it

lacked jurisdiction to pass on the sufficiency of his plead­

ings. Our opinions, however, make clear that appellate

jurisdiction is not so strictly confined.

In Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250 (2006), the Court

reviewed an interlocutory decision denying qualified im­

munity. The legal issue decided in Hartman concerned

the elements a plaintiff “must plead and prove in order to

win” a First Amendment retaliation claim. Id., at 257,

n. 5. Similarly, two Terms ago in Wilkie v. Robbins, 551

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

Opinion of the Court

U. S. 537 (2007), the Court considered another interlocu­

tory order denying qualified immunity. The legal issue

there was whether a Bivens action can be employed to

challenge interference with property rights. 551 U. S., at

549, n. 4. These cases cannot be squared with respon­

dent’s argument that the collateral-order doctrine restricts

appellate jurisdiction to the “ultimate issu[e]” whether the

legal wrong asserted was a violation of clearly established

law while excluding the question whether the facts

pleaded establish such a violation. Iqbal Brief 15. Indeed,

the latter question is even more clearly within the cate­

gory of appealable decisions than the questions presented

in Hartman and Wilkie, since whether a particular com­

plaint sufficiently alleges a clearly established violation of

law cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded.

In that sense the sufficiency of respondent’s pleadings is

both “inextricably intertwined with,” Swint v. Chambers

County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 51 (1995), and “directly

implicated by,” Hartman, supra, at 257, n. 5, the qualified

immunity defense.

Respondent counters that our holding in Johnson, 515

U. S. 304, confirms the want of subject-matter jurisdiction

here. That is incorrect. The allegation in Johnson was

that five defendants, all of them police officers, unlawfully

beat the plaintiff. Johnson considered “the appealability

of a portion of” the District Court’s summary judgment

order that, “though entered in a ‘qualified immunity’ case,

determine[d] only” that there was a genuine issue of mate­

rial fact that three of the defendants participated in the

beating. Id., at 313.

In finding that order not a “final decision” for purposes

of §1291, the Johnson Court cited Mitchell for the proposi­

tion that only decisions turning “ ‘on an issue of law’ ” are

subject to immediate appeal. 515 U. S., at 313. Though

determining whether there is a genuine issue of material

fact at summary judgment is a question of law, it is a legal

10 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

question that sits near the law-fact divide. Or as we said

in Johnson, it is a “fact-related” legal inquiry. Id., at 314.

To conduct it, a court of appeals may be required to con­

sult a “vast pretrial record, with numerous conflicting

affidavits, depositions, and other discovery materials.”

Id., at 316. That process generally involves matters more

within a district court’s ken and may replicate inefficiently

questions that will arise on appeal following final judg­

ment. Ibid. Finding those concerns predominant, John

son held that the collateral orders that are “final” under

Mitchell turn on “abstract,” rather than “fact-based,”

issues of law. 515 U. S., at 317.

The concerns that animated the decision in Johnson are

absent when an appellate court considers the disposition

of a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient plead­

ings. True, the categories of “fact-based” and “abstract”

legal questions used to guide the Court’s decision in John

son are not well defined. Here, however, the order deny­

ing petitioners’ motion to dismiss falls well within the

latter class. Reviewing that order, the Court of Appeals

considered only the allegations contained within the four

corners of respondent’s complaint; resort to a “vast pretrial

record” on petitioners’ motion to dismiss was unnecessary.

Id., at 316. And determining whether respondent’s com­

plaint has the “heft” to state a claim is a task well within

an appellate court’s core competency. Twombly, 550 U. S.,

at 557. Evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint is not a

“fact-based” question of law, so the problem the Court

sought to avoid in Johnson is not implicated here. The

District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dis­

miss is a final decision under the collateral-order doctrine

over which the Court of Appeals had, and this Court has,

jurisdiction. We proceed to consider the merits of peti­

tioners’ appeal.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)

11

Opinion of the Court

III

In Twombly, supra, at 553–554, the Court found it

necessary first to discuss the antitrust principles impli­

cated by the complaint. Here too we begin by taking note

of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of

unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled

to assert the defense of qualified immunity.

In Bivens—proceeding on the theory that a right sug­

gests a remedy—this Court “recognized for the first time

an implied private action for damages against federal

officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional

rights.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S.

61, 66 (2001). Because implied causes of action are disfa­

vored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens

liability “to any new context or new category of defen­

dants.” 534 U. S., at 68. See also Wilkie, 551 U. S., at

549 –550. That reluctance might well have disposed of

respondent’s First Amendment claim of religious discrimi­

nation. For while we have allowed a Bivens action to

redress a violation of the equal protection component of

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see

Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we have not found

an implied damages remedy under the Free Exercise

Clause. Indeed, we have declined to extend Bivens to a

claim sounding in the First Amendment. Bush v. Lucas,

462 U. S. 367 (1983). Petitioners do not press this argu­

ment, however, so we assume, without deciding, that

respondent’s First Amendment claim is actionable under

Bivens.

In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the

implied cause of action is the “federal analog to suits

brought against state officials under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42

U. S. C. §1983.” Hartman, 547 U. S., at 254, n. 2. Cf.

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 609 (1999). Based on the

rules our precedents establish, respondent correctly con­

cedes that Government officials may not be held liable for

12 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a

theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal Brief 46 (“[I]t is un­

disputed that supervisory Bivens liability cannot be estab­

lished solely on a theory of respondeat superior”). See

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S.

658, 691 (1978) (finding no vicarious liability for a munici­

pal “person” under 42 U. S. C. §1983); see also Dunlop v.

Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269 (1812) (a federal official’s

liability “will only result from his own neglect in not prop­

erly superintending the discharge” of his subordinates’

duties); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. 507, 515–516 (1888)

(“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the mis­

feasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or

negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or

servants or other persons properly employed by or under

him, in the discharge of his official duties”). Because

vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and §1983

suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,

has violated the Constitution.

The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will

vary with the constitutional provision at issue. Where the

claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the

First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear

that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant

acted with discriminatory purpose. Church of Lukumi

Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 540–541 (1993)

(First Amendment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229,

240 (1976) (Fifth Amendment). Under extant precedent

purposeful discrimination requires more than “intent as

volition or intent as awareness of consequences.” Person

nel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279

(1979). It instead involves a decisionmaker’s undertaking

a course of action “ ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ [the

action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Ibid.

It follows that, to state a claim based on a violation of a

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

Opinion of the Court

clearly established right, respondent must plead sufficient

factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and im­

plemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral,

investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating

on account of race, religion, or national origin.

Respondent disagrees. He argues that, under a theory

of “supervisory liability,” petitioners can be liable for

“knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ use of

discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions

among detainees.” Iqbal Brief 45–46. That is to say,

respondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his

subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the

supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this

argument. Respondent’s conception of “supervisory liabil­

ity” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that

petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds

of their agents. In a §1983 suit or a Bivens action—where

masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—the

term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicari­

ous liability, each Government official, his or her title

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own miscon­

duct. In the context of determining whether there is a

violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified

immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to

impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitu­

tional discrimination; the same holds true for an official

charged with violations arising from his or her superin­

tendent responsibilities.

IV

A

We turn to respondent’s complaint. Under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” As the Court held in Twombly, 550

U. S. 544, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does

14 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully­

harmed-me accusation. Id., at 555 (citing Papasan v.

Allain, 478 U. S. 265, 286 (1986)). A pleading that offers

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” 550 U. S., at

555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.,

at 557.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must con­

tain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570. A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reason­

able inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon­

duct alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard is not

akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlaw­

fully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).

Two working principles underlie our decision in

Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inappli­

cable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclu­

sory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for

the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the

factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the

hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it

does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed

with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a com­

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 15

Opinion of the Court

plaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a

motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the

Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experi­

ence and common sense. 490 F. 3d, at 157–158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a

motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying plead­

ings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are

not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal con­

clusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Our decision in Twombly illustrates the two-pronged

approach. There, we considered the sufficiency of a com­

plaint alleging that incumbent telecommunications pro­

viders had entered an agreement not to compete and to

forestall competitive entry, in violation of the Sherman

Act, 15 U. S. C. §1. Recognizing that §1 enjoins only anti­

competitive conduct “effected by a contract, combination,

or conspiracy,” Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube

Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 775 (1984), the plaintiffs in Twombly

flatly pleaded that the defendants “ha[d] entered into a

contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive

entry . . . and ha[d] agreed not to compete with one an­

other.” 550 U. S., at 551 (internal quotation marks omit­

ted). The complaint also alleged that the defendants’

“parallel course of conduct . . . to prevent competition” and

inflate prices was indicative of the unlawful agreement

alleged. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

16 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

The Court held the plaintiffs’ complaint deficient under

Rule 8. In doing so it first noted that the plaintiffs’ asser­

tion of an unlawful agreement was a “ ‘legal conclusion’ ”

and, as such, was not entitled to the assumption of truth.

Id., at 555. Had the Court simply credited the allegation

of a conspiracy, the plaintiffs would have stated a claim

for relief and been entitled to proceed perforce. The Court

next addressed the “nub” of the plaintiffs’ complaint—the

well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation of parallel

behavior—to determine whether it gave rise to a “plausi­

ble suggestion of conspiracy.” Id., at 565–566. Acknowl­

edging that parallel conduct was consistent with an

unlawful agreement, the Court nevertheless concluded

that it did not plausibly suggest an illicit accord because it

was not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely

explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behav­

ior. Id., at 567. Because the well-pleaded fact of parallel

conduct, accepted as true, did not plausibly suggest an

unlawful agreement, the Court held the plaintiffs’ com­

plaint must be dismissed. Id., at 570.

B

Under Twombly’s construction of Rule 8, we conclude

that respondent’s complaint has not “nudged [his] claims”

of invidious discrimination “across the line from conceiv­

able to plausible.” Ibid.

We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in

the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of

truth. Respondent pleads that petitioners “knew of, con­

doned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject

[him]” to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter of

policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or

national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.”

Complaint ¶96, App. to Pet. for Cert. 173a–174a. The

complaint alleges that Ashcroft was the “principal archi­

tect” of this invidious policy, id., ¶10, at 157a, and that

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 17

Opinion of the Court

Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting and executing it,

id., ¶11, at 157a. These bare assertions, much like the

pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing

more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a

constitutional discrimination claim, 550 U. S., at 555,

namely, that petitioners adopted a policy “ ‘because of,’ not

merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable

group.” Feeney, 442 U. S., at 279. As such, the allegations

are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.

Twombly, supra, 550 U. S., at 554–555. To be clear, we do

not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they

are unrealistic or nonsensical. We do not so characterize

them any more than the Court in Twombly rejected the

plaintiffs’ express allegation of a “ ‘contract, combination or

conspiracy to prevent competitive entry,’ ” id., at 551,

because it thought that claim too chimerical to be main­

tained. It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allega­

tions, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that

disentitles them to the presumption of truth.

We next consider the factual allegations in respondent’s

complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an enti­

tlement to relief. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI],

under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and

detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its

investigation of the events of September 11.” Complaint

¶47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a. It further claims that

“[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in

highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they

were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants

ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks

after September 11, 2001.” Id., ¶69, at 168a. Taken as

true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners’

purposefully designating detainees “of high interest”

because of their race, religion, or national origin. But

given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly

establish this purpose.

18 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab

Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in

good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist

group. Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—

Osama bin Laden—and composed in large part of his Arab

Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a

legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and

detain individuals because of their suspected link to the

attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on

Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was

to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respon­

dent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely law­

ful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain

aliens who were illegally present in the United States and

who had potential connections to those who committed

terrorist acts. As between that “obvious alternative ex­

planation” for the arrests, Twombly, supra, at 567, and the

purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to

infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.

But even if the complaint’s well-pleaded facts give rise

to a plausible inference that respondent’s arrest was the

result of unconstitutional discrimination, that inference

alone would not entitle respondent to relief. It is impor­

tant to recall that respondent’s complaint challenges

neither the constitutionality of his arrest nor his initial

detention in the MDC. Respondent’s constitutional claims

against petitioners rest solely on their ostensible “policy of

holding post-September-11th detainees” in the ADMAX

SHU once they were categorized as “of high interest.”

Complaint ¶69, App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a. To prevail on

that theory, the complaint must contain facts plausibly

showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of

classifying post-September-11 detainees as “of high inter­

est” because of their race, religion, or national origin.

This the complaint fails to do. Though respondent

alleges that various other defendants, who are not before

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 19

Opinion of the Court

us, may have labeled him a person of “of high interest” for

impermissible reasons, his only factual allegation against

petitioners accuses them of adopting a policy approving

“restrictive conditions of confinement” for post-September­

11 detainees until they were “ ‘cleared’ by the FBI.” Ibid.

Accepting the truth of that allegation, the complaint does

not show, or even intimate, that petitioners purposefully

housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU due to their race,

religion, or national origin. All it plausibly suggests is

that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the

aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep

suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions avail­

able until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activ­

ity. Respondent does not argue, nor can he, that such a

motive would violate petitioners’ constitutional obliga­

tions. He would need to allege more by way of factual

content to “nudg[e]” his claim of purposeful discrimination

“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly,

550 U. S., at 570.

To be sure, respondent can attempt to draw certain

contrasts between the pleadings the Court considered in

Twombly and the pleadings at issue here. In Twombly,

the complaint alleged general wrongdoing that extended

over a period of years, id., at 551, whereas here the com­

plaint alleges discrete wrongs—for instance, beatings—by

lower level Government actors. The allegations here, if

true, and if condoned by petitioners, could be the basis for

some inference of wrongful intent on petitioners’ part.

Despite these distinctions, respondent’s pleadings do not

suffice to state a claim. Unlike in Twombly, where the

doctrine of respondeat superior could bind the corporate

defendant, here, as we have noted, petitioners cannot be

held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a

constitutionally protected characteristic. Yet respondent’s

complaint does not contain any factual allegation suffi­

cient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state

20 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

of mind. His pleadings thus do not meet the standard

necessary to comply with Rule 8.

It is important to note, however, that we express no

opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent’s com­

plaint against the defendants who are not before us.

Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal alleges serious

official misconduct that we need not address here. Our

decision is limited to the determination that respondent’s

complaint does not entitle him to relief from petitioners.

C

Respondent offers three arguments that bear on our

disposition of his case, but none is persuasive.

1

Respondent first says that our decision in Twombly

should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an

antitrust dispute. Iqbal Brief 37–38. This argument is

not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly de­

termined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in anti­

trust, the decision was based on our interpretation and

application of Rule 8. 550 U. S., at 554. That Rule in turn

governs the pleading standard “in all civil actions and

proceedings in the United States district courts.” Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in Twombly expounded the

pleading standard for “all civil actions,” ibid., and it ap­

plies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike. See 550

U. S., at 555–556, and n. 3.

2

Respondent next implies that our construction of Rule 8

should be tempered where, as here, the Court of Appeals

has “instructed the district court to cabin discovery in such

a way as to preserve” petitioners’ defense of qualified

immunity “as much as possible in anticipation of a sum­

mary judgment motion.” Iqbal Brief 27. We have held,

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 21

Opinion of the Court

however, that the question presented by a motion to dis­

miss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn

on the controls placed upon the discovery process.

Twombly, supra, at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a

claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if

groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process

through careful case management given the common

lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking

discovery abuse has been on the modest side” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach

is especially important in suits where Government-official

defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified

immunity. The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity

doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation,

including “avoidance of disruptive discovery.” Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 236 (1991) (KENNEDY, J., concurring

in judgment). There are serious and legitimate reasons for

this. If a Government official is to devote time to his or

her duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsi­

ble policies, it is counterproductive to require the substan­

tial diversion that is attendant to participating in litiga­

tion and making informed decisions as to how it should

proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that

officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms

of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and re­

sources that might otherwise be directed to the proper

execution of the work of the Government. The costs of

diversion are only magnified when Government officials

are charged with responding to, as Judge Cabranes aptly

put it, “a national and international security emergency

unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.”

490 F. 3d, at 179.

It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery

for petitioners can be deferred while pretrial proceedings

continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when

22 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

discovery as to the other parties proceeds, it would prove

necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate

in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a

misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their

position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves sub­

ject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from

the burdens of discovery.

We decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading

requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals

promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery. That

promise provides especially cold comfort in this pleading

context, where we are impelled to give real content to the

concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who

must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous

performance of their duties. Because respondent’s com­

plaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to dis­

covery, cabined or otherwise.

3

Respondent finally maintains that the Federal Rules

expressly allow him to allege petitioners’ discriminatory

intent “generally,” which he equates with a conclusory

allegation. Iqbal Brief 32 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9).

It follows, respondent says, that his complaint is suffi­

ciently well pleaded because it claims that petitioners

discriminated against him “on account of [his] religion,

race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penologi­

cal interest.” Complaint ¶96, App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a–

173a. Were we required to accept this allegation as true,

respondent’s complaint would survive petitioners’ motion

to dismiss. But the Federal Rules do not require courts to

credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without refer­

ence to its factual context.

It is true that Rule 9(b) requires particularity when

pleading “fraud or mistake,” while allowing “[m]alice,

intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 23

Opinion of the Court

[to] be alleged generally.” But “generally” is a relative

term. In the context of Rule 9, it is to be compared to the

particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake.

Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discrimina­

tory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It does

not give him license to evade the less rigid—though still

operative—strictures of Rule 8. See 5A C. Wright & A.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1301, p. 291 (3d

ed. 2004) (“[A] rigid rule requiring the detailed pleading of

a condition of mind would be undesirable because, absent

overriding considerations pressing for a specificity re­

quirement, as in the case of averments of fraud or mis­

take, the general ‘short and plain statement of the claim’

mandate in Rule 8(a) . . . should control the second sen­

tence of Rule 9(b)”). And Rule 8 does not empower re­

spondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action,

affix the label “general allegation,” and expect his com­

plaint to survive a motion to dismiss.

V

We hold that respondent’s complaint fails to plead suffi­

cient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful

discrimination against petitioners. The Court of Appeals

should decide in the first instance whether to remand to

the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to

amend his deficient complaint.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

SOUTER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–1015

_________________

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JAVAID IQBAL ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2009]

JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE

GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

This case is here on the uncontested assumption that

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S.

388 (1971), allows personal liability based on a federal

officer’s violation of an individual’s rights under the First

and Fifth Amendments, and it comes to us with the ex­

plicit concession of petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller that

an officer may be subject to Bivens liability as a supervisor

on grounds other than respondeat superior. The Court

apparently rejects this concession and, although it has no

bearing on the majority’s resolution of this case, does away

with supervisory liability under Bivens. The majority then

misapplies the pleading standard under Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), to conclude that

the complaint fails to state a claim. I respectfully dissent

from both the rejection of supervisory liability as a cogni­

zable claim in the face of petitioners’ concession, and from

the holding that the complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I

A

Respondent Iqbal was arrested in November 2001 on

charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and

2 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

fraud in relation to identification documents, and was

placed in pretrial detention at the Metropolitan Detention

Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F. 3d

143, 147–148 (CA2 2007). He alleges that FBI officials

carried out a discriminatory policy by designating him as a

person “ ‘of high interest’ ” in the investigation of the Sep­

tember 11 attacks solely because of his race, religion, or

national origin. Owing to this designation he was placed

in the detention center’s Administrative Maximum Special

Housing Unit for over six months while awaiting the fraud

trial. Id., at 148. As I will mention more fully below,

Iqbal contends that Ashcroft and Mueller were at the very

least aware of the discriminatory detention policy and

condoned it (and perhaps even took part in devising it),

thereby violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights.1

Iqbal claims that on the day he was transferred to the

special unit, prison guards, without provocation, “picked

him up and threw him against the wall, kicked him in the

stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across

the room.” First Amended Complaint in No. 04–CV–1809

(JG) (JA), ¶113, App. to Pet. for Cert. 176a (hereinafter

Complaint). He says that after being attacked a second

time he sought medical attention but was denied care for

two weeks. Id., ¶¶187–188, at 189a. According to Iqbal’s

complaint, prison staff in the special unit subjected him to

unjustified strip and body cavity searches, id., ¶¶136–140,

at 181a, verbally berated him as a “ ‘terrorist’ ” and “ ‘Mus­

lim killer,’ ” id., ¶87, at 170a–171a, refused to give him

adequate food, id., ¶91, at 171a–172a, and intentionally

turned on air conditioning during the winter and heating

during the summer, id., ¶84, at 170a. He claims that

——————

1 Iqbal

makes no claim against Ashcroft and Mueller based simply on

his right, as a pretrial detainee, to be free from punishment prior to an

adjudication of guilt on the fraud charges. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U. S. 520, 535 (1979).

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

SOUTER, J., dissenting

prison staff interfered with his attempts to pray and en­

gage in religious study, id., ¶¶153–154, at 183a–184a, and

with his access to counsel, id., ¶¶168, 171, at 186a–187a.

The District Court denied Ashcroft and Mueller’s motion

to dismiss Iqbal’s discrimination claim, and the Court of

Appeals affirmed. Ashcroft and Mueller then asked this

Court to grant certiorari on two questions:

“1. Whether a conclusory allegation that a cabinet­

level officer or other high-ranking official knew of,

condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly

unconstitutional acts purportedly committed by sub­

ordinate officials is sufficient to state individual­

capacity claims against those officials under Bivens.

“2. Whether a cabinet-level officer or other high­

ranking official may be held personally liable for the

allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials

on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they

had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly

carried out by such subordinate officials.” Pet. for

Cert. I.

The Court granted certiorari on both questions. The first

is about pleading; the second goes to the liability standard.

In the first question, Ashcroft and Mueller did not ask

whether “a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking

official” who “knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a

plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts committed by

subordinate officials” was subject to liability under Bivens.

In fact, they conceded in their petition for certiorari that

they would be liable if they had “actual knowledge” of

discrimination by their subordinates and exhibited “ ‘de­

liberate indifference’ ” to that discrimination. Pet. for

Cert. 29 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 837

(1994)). Instead, they asked the Court to address whether

Iqbal’s allegations against them (which they call conclu­

sory) were sufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), and in particu­

4 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

lar whether the Court of Appeals misapplied our decision

in Twombly construing that rule. Pet. for Cert. 11–24.

In the second question, Ashcroft and Mueller asked this

Court to say whether they could be held personally liable

for the actions of their subordinates based on the theory

that they had constructive notice of their subordinates’

unconstitutional conduct. Id., at 25–33. This was an odd

question to pose, since Iqbal has never claimed that

Ashcroft and Mueller are liable on a constructive notice

theory. Be that as it may, the second question challenged

only one possible ground for imposing supervisory liability

under Bivens. In sum, both questions assumed that a

defendant could raise a Bivens claim on theories of super­

visory liability other than constructive notice, and neither

question asked the parties or the Court to address the

elements of such liability.

The briefing at the merits stage was no different.

Ashcroft and Mueller argued that the factual allegations

in Iqbal’s complaint were insufficient to overcome their

claim of qualified immunity; they also contended that they

could not be held liable on a theory of constructive notice.

Again they conceded, however, that they would be subject

to supervisory liability if they “had actual knowledge of

the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification

of suspects as being ‘of high interest’ and they were delib­

erately indifferent to that discrimination.” Brief for Peti­

tioners 50; see also Reply Brief for Petitioners 21–22.

Iqbal argued that the allegations in his complaint were

sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2) and Twombly, and conceded

that as a matter of law he could not recover under a theory

of respondeat superior. See Brief for Respondent Iqbal 46.

Thus, the parties agreed as to a proper standard of super­

visory liability, and the disputed question was whether

Iqbal’s complaint satisfied Rule 8(a)(2).

Without acknowledging the parties’ agreement as to the

standard of supervisory liability, the Court asserts that it

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

SOUTER, J., dissenting

must sua sponte decide the scope of supervisory liability

here. Ante, at 11–13. I agree that, absent Ashcroft and

Mueller’s concession, that determination would have to be

made; without knowing the elements of a supervisory

liability claim, there would be no way to determine

whether a plaintiff had made factual allegations amount­

ing to grounds for relief on that claim. See Twombly, 550

U. S., at 557–558. But deciding the scope of supervisory

Bivens liability in this case is uncalled for. There are

several reasons, starting with the position Ashcroft and

Mueller have taken and following from it.

First, Ashcroft and Mueller have, as noted, made the

critical concession that a supervisor’s knowledge of a

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct and deliberate

indifference to that conduct are grounds for Bivens liabil­

ity. Iqbal seeks to recover on a theory that Ashcroft and

Mueller at least knowingly acquiesced (and maybe more

than acquiesced) in the discriminatory acts of their subor­

dinates; if he can show this, he will satisfy Ashcroft and

Mueller’s own test for supervisory liability. See Farmer,

supra, at 842 (explaining that a prison official acts with

“deliberate indifference” if “the official acted or failed to

act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious

harm”). We do not normally override a party’s concession,

see, e.g., United States v. International Business Machines

Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855 (1996) (holding that “[i]t would

be inappropriate for us to [e]xamine in this case, without

the benefit of the parties’ briefing,” an issue the Govern­

ment had conceded), and doing so is especially inappropri­

ate when, as here, the issue is unnecessary to decide the

case, see infra, at 8. I would therefore accept Ashcroft and

Mueller’s concession for purposes of this case and proceed

to consider whether the complaint alleges at least knowl­

edge and deliberate indifference.

Second, because of the concession, we have received no

briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory

6 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

liability, much less the full-dress argument we normally

require. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 676–677 (1961)

(Harlan, J., dissenting). We consequently are in no posi­

tion to decide the precise contours of supervisory liability

here, this issue being a complicated one that has divided

the Courts of Appeals. See infra, at 7–8. This Court

recently remarked on the danger of “bad decisionmaking”

when the briefing on a question is “woefully inadequate,”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at

14), yet today the majority answers a question with no

briefing at all. The attendant risk of error is palpable.

Finally, the Court’s approach is most unfair to Iqbal.

He was entitled to rely on Ashcroft and Mueller’s conces­

sion, both in their petition for certiorari and in their mer­

its briefs, that they could be held liable on a theory of

knowledge and deliberate indifference. By overriding that

concession, the Court denies Iqbal a fair chance to be

heard on the question.

B

The majority, however, does ignore the concession.

According to the majority, because Iqbal concededly can­

not recover on a theory of respondeat superior, it follows

that he cannot recover under any theory of supervisory

liability. Ante, at 13. The majority says that in a Bivens

action, “where masters do not answer for the torts of their

servants,” “the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer,”

and that “[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government

official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for

his or her own misconduct.” Ibid. Lest there be any mis­

take, in these words the majority is not narrowing the

scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens

supervisory liability entirely. The nature of a supervisory

liability theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under

certain conditions, for the wrongdoing of his subordinates,

and it is this very principle that the majority rejects.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

SOUTER, J., dissenting

Ante, at 19 (“[P]etitioners cannot be held liable unless they

themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected

characteristic”).

The dangers of the majority’s readiness to proceed with­

out briefing and argument are apparent in its cursory

analysis, which rests on the assumption that only two

outcomes are possible here: respondeat superior liability,

in which “an employer is subject to liability for torts com­

mitted by employees while acting within the scope of their

employment,” Restatement (Third) of Agency §2.04 (2005),

or no supervisory liability at all. The dichotomy is false.

Even if an employer is not liable for the actions of his

employee solely because the employee was acting within

the scope of employment, there still might be conditions to

render a supervisor liable for the conduct of his subordi­

nate. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Meléndez-Rivera, 431 F. 3d 1,

14 (CA1 2005) (distinguishing between respondeat supe­

rior liability and supervisory liability); Bennett v. East­

pointe, 410 F. 3d 810, 818 (CA6 2005) (same); Richardson

v. Goord, 347 F. 3d 431, 435 (CA2 2003) (same); Hall v.

Lombardi, 996 F. 2d 954, 961 (CA8 1993) (same).

In fact, there is quite a spectrum of possible tests for

supervisory liability: it could be imposed where a supervi­

sor has actual knowledge of a subordinate’s constitutional

violation and acquiesces, see, e.g., Baker v. Monroe Twp.,

50 F. 3d 1186, 1994 (CA3 1995); Woodward v. Worland,

977 F. 2d 1392, 1400 (CA10 1992); or where supervisors

“ ‘know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it,

condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might

see,’ ” International Action Center v. United States, 365

F. 3d 20, 28 (CADC 2004) (Roberts, J.) (quoting Jones v.

Chicago, 856 F. 2d 985, 992 (CA7 1988) (Posner, J.)); or

where the supervisor has no actual knowledge of the

violation but was reckless in his supervision of the subor­

dinate, see, e.g., Hall, supra, at 961; or where the supervi­

sor was grossly negligent, see, e.g., Lipsett v. University of

8 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

Puerto Rico, 864 F. 2d 881, 902 (CA1 1988). I am unsure

what the general test for supervisory liability should be,

and in the absence of briefing and argument I am in no

position to choose or devise one.

Neither is the majority, but what is most remarkable

about its foray into supervisory liability is that its conclu­

sion has no bearing on its resolution of the case. The

majority says that all of the allegations in the complaint

that Ashcroft and Mueller authorized, condoned, or even

were aware of their subordinates’ discriminatory conduct

are “conclusory” and therefore are “not entitled to be

assumed true.” Ante, at 17. As I explain below, this con­

clusion is unsound, but on the majority’s understanding of

Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standards, even if the majority ac­

cepted Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession and asked

whether the complaint sufficiently alleges knowledge and

deliberate indifference, it presumably would still conclude

that the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts and must

be dismissed.2

II

Given petitioners’ concession, the complaint satisfies

Rule 8(a)(2). Ashcroft and Mueller admit they are liable

for their subordinates’ conduct if they “had actual knowl­

edge of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classi­

fication of suspects as being ‘of high interest’ and they

were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination.” Brief

for Petitioners 50. Iqbal alleges that after the September

11 attacks the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

“arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men,”

Complaint ¶47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, that many of

——————

2 If I am mistaken, and the majority’s rejection of the concession is

somehow outcome determinative, then its approach is even more unfair

to Iqbal than previously explained, see supra, at 6, for Iqbal had no

reason to argue the (apparently dispositive) supervisory liability

standard in light of the concession.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

SOUTER, J., dissenting

these men were designated by high-ranking FBI officials

as being “ ‘of high interest,’ ” id., ¶¶48, 50, at 164a, and

that in many cases, including Iqbal’s, this designation was

made “because of the race, religion, and national origin of

the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the

detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,”

id., ¶49. The complaint further alleges that Ashcroft was

the “principal architect of the policies and practices chal­

lenged,” id., ¶10, at 157a, and that Mueller “was instru­

mental in the adoption, promulgation, and implementa­

tion of the policies and practices challenged,” id., ¶11.

According to the complaint, Ashcroft and Mueller “knew

of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to

subject [Iqbal] to these conditions of confinement as a

matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race,

and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological

interest.” Id., ¶96, at 172a–173a. The complaint thus

alleges, at a bare minimum, that Ashcroft and Mueller

knew of and condoned the discriminatory policy their

subordinates carried out. Actually, the complaint goes

further in alleging that Ashcroft and Muller affirmatively

acted to create the discriminatory detention policy. If

these factual allegations are true, Ashcroft and Mueller

were, at the very least, aware of the discriminatory policy

being implemented and deliberately indifferent to it.

Ashcroft and Mueller argue that these allegations fail to

satisfy the “plausibility standard” of Twombly. They

contend that Iqbal’s claims are implausible because such

high-ranking officials “tend not to be personally involved

in the specific actions of lower-level officers down the

bureaucratic chain of command.” Brief for Petitioners 28.

But this response bespeaks a fundamental misunder­

standing of the enquiry that Twombly demands. Twombly

does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to

consider whether the factual allegations are probably true.

We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take

10 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court

may be. See Twombly, 550 U. S., at 555 (a court must

proceed “on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”); id., at 556

(“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes

a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is

improbable”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319,

327 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dis­

missals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual

allegations”). The sole exception to this rule lies with

allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as

we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s

recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel. That is

not what we have here.

Under Twombly, the relevant question is whether,

assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff has

stated a ground for relief that is plausible. That is, in

Twombly’s words, a plaintiff must “allege facts” that,

taken as true, are “suggestive of illegal conduct.” 550

U. S., at 564, n. 8. In Twombly, we were faced with allega­

tions of a conspiracy to violate §1 of the Sherman Act

through parallel conduct. The difficulty was that the

conduct alleged was “consistent with conspiracy, but just

as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competi­

tive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common

perceptions of the market.” Id., at 554. We held that in

that sort of circumstance, “[a]n allegation of parallel con­

duct is . . . much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a

§1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim,

but without some further factual enhancement it stops

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).

Here, by contrast, the allegations in the complaint are

neither confined to naked legal conclusions nor consistent

with legal conduct. The complaint alleges that FBI offi­

cials discriminated against Iqbal solely on account of his

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

SOUTER, J., dissenting

race, religion, and national origin, and it alleges the

knowledge and deliberate indifference that, by Ashcroft

and Mueller’s own admission, are sufficient to make them

liable for the illegal action. Iqbal’s complaint therefore

contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id., at 570.

I do not understand the majority to disagree with this

understanding of “plausibility” under Twombly. Rather,

the majority discards the allegations discussed above with

regard to Ashcroft and Mueller as conclusory, and is left

considering only two statements in the complaint: that

“the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER,

arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . .

as part of its investigation of the events of September 11,”

Complaint ¶47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, and that “[t]he

policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly

restrictive conditions of confinement until they were

‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants

ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks

after September 11, 2001,” id., ¶69, at 168a. See ante, at

17. I think the majority is right in saying that these

allegations suggest only that Ashcroft and Mueller “sought

to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions

available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist

activity,” ante, at 19, and that this produced “a disparate,

incidental impact on Arab Muslims,” ante, at 18. And I

agree that the two allegations selected by the majority,

standing alone, do not state a plausible entitlement to

relief for unconstitutional discrimination.

But these allegations do not stand alone as the only

significant, nonconclusory statements in the complaint, for

the complaint contains many allegations linking Ashcroft

and Mueller to the discriminatory practices of their subor­

dinates. See Complaint ¶10, App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a

(Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the discrimina­

tory policy); id., ¶11 (Mueller was “instrumental” in adopt­

12 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

ing and executing the discriminatory policy); id., ¶96, at

172a–173a (Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and

willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh

conditions “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]

religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate

penological interest”).

The majority says that these are “bare assertions” that,

“much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount

to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the ele­

ments’ of a constitutional discrimination claim” and there­

fore are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Ante, at 17

(quoting Twombly, supra, at 555). The fallacy of the ma­

jority’s position, however, lies in looking at the relevant

assertions in isolation. The complaint contains specific

allegations that, in the aftermath of the September 11

attacks, the Chief of the FBI’s International Terrorism

Operations Section and the Assistant Special Agent in

Charge for the FBI’s New York Field Office implemented a

policy that discriminated against Arab Muslim men, in­

cluding Iqbal, solely on account of their race, religion, or

national origin. See Complaint ¶¶47–53, App. to Pet. for

Cert. 164a–165a. Viewed in light of these subsidiary

allegations, the allegations singled out by the majority as

“conclusory” are no such thing. Iqbal’s claim is not that

Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully

and maliciously agreed to subject” him to a discriminatory

practice that is left undefined; his allegation is that “they

knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to

subject” him to a particular, discrete, discriminatory policy

detailed in the complaint. Iqbal does not say merely that

Ashcroft was the architect of some amorphous discrimina­

tion, or that Mueller was instrumental in an ill-defined

constitutional violation; he alleges that they helped to

create the discriminatory policy he has described. Taking

the complaint as a whole, it gives Ashcroft and Mueller

“ ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

SOUTER, J., dissenting

which it rests.’ ” Twombly, 550 U. S., at 555 (quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 47 (1957) (omission in

original)).

That aside, the majority’s holding that the statements it

selects are conclusory cannot be squared with its treat­

ment of certain other allegations in the complaint as non­

conclusory. For example, the majority takes as true the

statement that “[t]he policy of holding post-September­

11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confine­

ment until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by

Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in

the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Complaint ¶69,

App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a; see ante, at 17. This statement

makes two points: (1) after September 11, the FBI held

certain detainees in highly restrictive conditions, and (2)

Ashcroft and Mueller discussed and approved these condi­

tions. If, as the majority says, these allegations are not

conclusory, then I cannot see why the majority deems it

merely conclusory when Iqbal alleges that (1) after Sep­

tember 11, the FBI designated Arab Muslim detainees as

being of “ ‘high interest’ ” “because of the race, religion, and

national origin of the detainees, and not because of any

evidence of the detainees’ involvement in supporting

terrorist activity,” Complaint ¶¶48–50, App. to Pet. for

Cert. 164a, and (2) Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, con­

doned, and willfully and maliciously agreed” to that dis­

crimination, id., ¶96, at 172a. By my lights, there is no

principled basis for the majority’s disregard of the allega­

tions linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates’

discrimination.

I respectfully dissent.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–1015

_________________

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JAVAID IQBAL ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2009]

JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting.

I agree with JUSTICE SOUTER and join his dissent. I

write separately to point out that, like the Court, I believe

it important to prevent unwarranted litigation from inter

fering with “the proper execution of the work of the Gov

ernment.” Ante, at 21. But I cannot find in that need

adequate justification for the Court’s interpretation of Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The law, after all,

provides trial courts with other legal weapons designed to

prevent unwarranted interference. As the Second Circuit

explained, where a Government defendant asserts a quali

fied immunity defense, a trial court, responsible for man

aging a case and “mindful of the need to vindicate the

purpose of the qualified immunity defense,” can structure

discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing un

warranted burdens upon public officials. See Iqbal v.

Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2007). A district court, for

example, can begin discovery with lower level government

defendants before determining whether a case can be

made to allow discovery related to higher level govern

ment officials. See ibid. Neither the briefs nor the Court’s

opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these

alternative case-management tools inadequate, either in

general or in the case before us. For this reason, as well

2 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

BREYER, J., dissenting

as for the independently sufficient reasons set forth in

JUSTICE SOUTER’s opinion, I would affirm the Second

Circuit.