Explaining that "[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim” from the definitions in the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and explaining that "Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.” (Internal citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- Explaining that "[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim” from the definitions in the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and explaining that "Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.” (Internal citations omitted)
- holding that “the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance’ ” and therefore relying in part on guidance in the Justice Department’s Title II Assistance Manual (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944))
- holding that an individual In this case, Holiday has presented sufficient evidence that doctor’s unsupported belief that a patient’s HIV status would allow a jury to conclude that Dr. Dowlen failed to rendered her a health risk was not dispositive under the undertake the individualized determination that the ADA ADA
- finding statute’s meaning “settled” where Office of Legal Counsel opinion, twelve judicial decisions, and multiple federal agencies interpreted term consistently and “[a]ll indications [we]re that Congress was well aware of th[at] position” when it incorporated that term into the statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Rambo v. Delta Airlines Inc., 10 F. App'x 579 (2001)
Bragdon is inapplicable because it dealt with the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which differs dramatically from the Plan's definition.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with The Chief Justice that respondent’s claim of disability should be evaluated on an individualized basis and that she has not proved that her asymptomatic HIV status substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. In my view, the act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part of the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the representative major life activities of *665 all persons — “caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working” — listed in regulations relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See 45 CFR §84.3 (j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR § 41.31 (b)(2) (1997). Based on that conclusion, there is no need to address whether other aspects of intimate or family relationships not raised in this ease could constitute major life activities; nor is there reason to consider Whether HIV status would impose a substantial limitation on one’s ability to reproduce if reproduction were a major life activity.
I join in Part II of The Chief Justice’s opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which concludes that the Court of Appeals failed to properly determine whether respondent’s condition posed a direct threat. Accordingly, I agree that a remand is necessary on that issue.