Explaining that "[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim” from the definitions in the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and explaining that "Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.” (Internal citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- Explaining that "[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim” from the definitions in the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and explaining that "Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.” (Internal citations omitted)
- holding that “the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance’ ” and therefore relying in part on guidance in the Justice Department’s Title II Assistance Manual (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944))
- holding that an individual In this case, Holiday has presented sufficient evidence that doctor’s unsupported belief that a patient’s HIV status would allow a jury to conclude that Dr. Dowlen failed to rendered her a health risk was not dispositive under the undertake the individualized determination that the ADA ADA
- finding statute’s meaning “settled” where Office of Legal Counsel opinion, twelve judicial decisions, and multiple federal agencies interpreted term consistently and “[a]ll indications [we]re that Congress was well aware of th[at] position” when it incorporated that term into the statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Rambo v. Delta Airlines Inc., 10 F. App'x 579 (2001)
Bragdon is inapplicable because it dealt with the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which differs dramatically from the Plan's definition.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring.
The Court’s opinion demonstrates that respondent’s HIV infection easily falls within the statute’s definition of “disability.” Moreover, the Court’s discussion in Part III of the relevant evidence has persuaded me that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. I do not believe petitioner has sustained his burden of adducing evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on the significance of the risk posed by treating respondent in his office. The Court of Appeals reached that conclusion after a careful and extensive study of the record; its analysis on this question was perfectly consistent with the legal reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court; and the latter opinion itself explains that petitioner relied on data that were inconclusive and speculative at best, see ante, at 653-654. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136 (1997).
*656 There are not, however, five Justices who agree that the judgment should be affirmed. Nor does it appear that there are five Justices who favor a remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in either Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court or the opinion of The Chief Justice. Because I am in agreement with the legal analysis in Justice Kennedy’s opinion, in order to provide a judgment supported by a majority, I join that opinion even though I would prefer an outright affirmance. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring in result).