Explaining that "[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim” from the definitions in the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and explaining that "Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.” (Internal citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- Explaining that "[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim” from the definitions in the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and explaining that "Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.” (Internal citations omitted)
- holding that “the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance’ ” and therefore relying in part on guidance in the Justice Department’s Title II Assistance Manual (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944))
- holding that an individual In this case, Holiday has presented sufficient evidence that doctor’s unsupported belief that a patient’s HIV status would allow a jury to conclude that Dr. Dowlen failed to rendered her a health risk was not dispositive under the undertake the individualized determination that the ADA ADA
- finding statute’s meaning “settled” where Office of Legal Counsel opinion, twelve judicial decisions, and multiple federal agencies interpreted term consistently and “[a]ll indications [we]re that Congress was well aware of th[at] position” when it incorporated that term into the statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Rambo v. Delta Airlines Inc., 10 F. App'x 579 (2001)
Bragdon is inapplicable because it dealt with the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which differs dramatically from the Plan's definition.
The opinion
Justice Ginsburg,
concurring.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection, as the description set out in the Court’s opinion documents, ante, at 635-637, has been regarded as a disease limiting life itself. See Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae 20. The disease inevitably pervades life’s choices: education, employment, family and financial undertakings. It affects the need for and, as this case shows, the ability to obtain health care because of the reaction of others to the impairment. No rational legislator, it seems to me apparent, would require nondiscrimination once symptoms become visible but permit discrimination when the disease, though present, is not yet visible. I am therefore satisfied that the statutory and regulatory definitions are well met. HIV infection is “a physical... impairment that substantially limits . . . major life activities,” or is so perceived, 42 U. S. C. §§ 12102 (2)(A), (C), including the afflicted individual’s family relations, employment potential, and ability to care for herself, see 45 CFR § 84.3 (j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR § 41.31 (b)(2) (1997).
I further agree, in view of the “importance [of the issue] to health care workers,” ante, at 654-655, that it is wise to remand, erring, if at all, on the side of caution. By taking this course, the Court ensures a fully informed determina *657 tion whether respondent Abbott’s disease posed “a significant risk to the health or safety of [petitioner Bragdon] that [could not] be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures ... 42 U. S. C. § 12182 (b)(8).