holding—where the district court found, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict to the contrary, that the defendant used a firearm and used that finding to increase the guidelines range sentence—that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- holding—where the district court found, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict to the contrary, that the defendant used a firearm and used that finding to increase the guidelines range sentence—that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence” (emphasis added)
- finding “[t]he notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to ...” “longstanding procedural requirements enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence”
- holding that sentence enhancements are not construed as additional punishment for the previous crime of which the defendant was not convicted; rather, they act to increase a sentence “because of the manner in which [the defendant] committed the crime of conviction”
- holding that establishing that known drug dealer resided in motel was acquittal on a 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) offense did not prevent the sufficient to show probable cause to search motel room for sentencing court from considering under USSG § 2D1.1 drug paraphernalia
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled implicitly by Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) — not on the Supreme Court's list
137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017), overruled United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148
Reported overruled by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list
543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), overruled Watts.
Questioned — as noted by a later court
We are cognizant that United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) has been called into question and criticized by several lower federal courts in the wake of U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
medium confidence
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Cortes-Medina, 810 F.3d 62 (2016)
Here, however, Watts is inapposite: the sentencing court did not use dismissed or acquitted conduct in its sentencing calculus.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
dissenting.
A case can be made for summary reversal here, based on such factors as the conflict between the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the rationale of this Court in Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), and, to a lesser extent, in Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389 (1995); the conflict the Ninth Circuit created, without considering en banc its departure from the rule followed in all other Circuits; and the lack of any clear authority to constrain the sentencing judge as the Court of Appeals seeks to do.
On the other hand, it must be noted the cases raise a question of recurrent importance in hundreds of sentencing proceedings in the federal criminal system. We have not decided a case on this precise issue, for it involves not just prior criminal history but conduct underlying a charge for which the defendant was acquitted. At several points the per cu-riam opinion shows hesitation in confronting the distinction between uncharged conduct and conduct related to a charge for which the defendant was acquitted. The distinction ought to be confronted by a reasoned course of argument, not by shrugging it off.
At the least it ought to be said that to increase a sentence based on conduct underlying a charge for which the defendant was acquitted does raise concerns about undercutting the verdict of acquittal, concerns noted by Justice Stevens and the other federal judges to whom he refers in his dissent. If there is no clear answer but to acknowledge a theoretical contradiction from which we cannot escape because of overriding practical considerations, at least we ought to say so. *171 Finally, as Justice Stevens further points out, the effect of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 on this question deserves careful exploration. This is illustrated by the fact that Justices Scalia and Breyer each find it necessary to issue separate opinions setting forth differing views on the role of the Sentencing Commission.
For these reasons the cases should have been set for full briefing and consideration on the oral argument calendar. From the Court’s failure to do so, I dissent.