holding—where the district court found, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict to the contrary, that the defendant used a firearm and used that finding to increase the guidelines range sentence—that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- holding—where the district court found, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict to the contrary, that the defendant used a firearm and used that finding to increase the guidelines range sentence—that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence” (emphasis added)
- finding “[t]he notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to ...” “longstanding procedural requirements enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence”
- holding that sentence enhancements are not construed as additional punishment for the previous crime of which the defendant was not convicted; rather, they act to increase a sentence “because of the manner in which [the defendant] committed the crime of conviction”
- holding that establishing that known drug dealer resided in motel was acquittal on a 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) offense did not prevent the sufficient to show probable cause to search motel room for sentencing court from considering under USSG § 2D1.1 drug paraphernalia
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled implicitly by Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) — not on the Supreme Court's list
137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017), overruled United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148
Reported overruled by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list
543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), overruled Watts.
Questioned — as noted by a later court
We are cognizant that United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) has been called into question and criticized by several lower federal courts in the wake of U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
medium confidence
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Cortes-Medina, 810 F.3d 62 (2016)
Here, however, Watts is inapposite: the sentencing court did not use dismissed or acquitted conduct in its sentencing calculus.
The opinion
*158 Justice Scalia,
concurring.
I do not agree with the assertion in Justice Breyer’s concurrence that there is no obstacle to the Sentencing Commission’s reversing today’s outcome by mandating disregard of the information we today hold it proper to consider. Title 28 U. S. C. § 994 (b)(1) requires the Guidelines to be “consistent with all pertinent provisions of title 18, United States Code.” In turn, 18 U. S. C. § 3661 provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” In my view, neither the Commission nor the courts have authority to decree that information which would otherwise justify enhancement of sentence or upward departure from the Guidelines may not be considered for that purpose (or may be considered only after passing some higher standard of probative worth than the Constitution and law's require) if it pertains to acquitted conduct. If the Commission believes that the rules of evidence and proof established by the Constitution and laws are inadequate, it may of course recommend changes to the Congress, cf. 28 U. S. C. § 994 (w).