holding—where the district court found, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict to the contrary, that the defendant used a firearm and used that finding to increase the guidelines range sentence—that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- holding—where the district court found, notwithstanding the jury’s verdict to the contrary, that the defendant used a firearm and used that finding to increase the guidelines range sentence—that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence” (emphasis added)
- finding “[t]he notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to ...” “longstanding procedural requirements enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence”
- holding that sentence enhancements are not construed as additional punishment for the previous crime of which the defendant was not convicted; rather, they act to increase a sentence “because of the manner in which [the defendant] committed the crime of conviction”
- holding that establishing that known drug dealer resided in motel was acquittal on a 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) offense did not prevent the sufficient to show probable cause to search motel room for sentencing court from considering under USSG § 2D1.1 drug paraphernalia
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled implicitly by Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) — not on the Supreme Court's list
137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017), overruled United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148
Reported overruled by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list
543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), overruled Watts.
Questioned — as noted by a later court
We are cognizant that United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) has been called into question and criticized by several lower federal courts in the wake of U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
medium confidence
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Cortes-Medina, 810 F.3d 62 (2016)
Here, however, Watts is inapposite: the sentencing court did not use dismissed or acquitted conduct in its sentencing calculus.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
concurring.
I join the Court’s per curiam opinion while noting that it poses no obstacle to the Sentencing Commission itself deciding whether or not to enhance a sentence on the basis of conduct that a sentencing judge concludes did take place, but in respect to which a jury acquitted the defendant.
In telling judges in ordinary cases to consider “all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § lB1.3(a)(2) (Nov. 1995) (USSG), the Guidelines recognize the fact that before their creation sentencing judges often took account, not only of the precise conduct that made up *159 the offense of conviction, but of certain related conduct as well. And I agree with the Court that the Guidelines, as presently written, do not make an exception for related conduct that was the basis for a different charge of which a jury acquitted that defendant. To that extent, the Guidelines’ policy rests upon the logical possibility that a sentencing judge and a jury, applying different evidentiary standards, could reach different factual conclusions.
This truth of logic, however, is not the only pertinent policy consideration. The Commission in the past has considered whether the Guidelines should contain a specific exception to their ordinary “relevant conduct” rules that would instruct the sentencing judge not to base a sentence enhancement upon acquitted conduct. United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 57 Fed. Reg. 62832 (1992) (proposed USSG § 1131.3(c)). Given the role that juries and acquittals play in our system, the Commission could decide to revisit this matter in the future. For this reason, I think it important to specify that, as far as today’s decision is concerned, the power to accept or reject such a proposal remains in the Commission’s hands.