holding that certain her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the juror’s veniremen had been improperly excluded because they views would prevent or substantially impair the performance acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and “affect” their deliberations, but only to the extent that they his oath.” Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 . would view their task with greater gravity
How later courts described this case
- holding that certain her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the juror’s veniremen had been improperly excluded because they views would prevent or substantially impair the performance acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and “affect” their deliberations, but only to the extent that they his oath.” Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 . would view their task with greater gravity
- holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might “affect” their deliberations, but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity
- stating that "if prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of their views about capital punishment on any broader basis than inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the death sentence cannot be carried out."
- describing the Witherspoon rationale as that ”[t]he State ... [has] no valid interest in such a broad-based rule of exclusion, since '[a] man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him ... and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror.’ [Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519, 88 S.Ct. at 1775].”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)
We reject McCree’s suggestion that Witherspoon and Adams have broad applicability outside the special context of capital sentencing,18 and conclude that those two decisions do not support the result reached by the Eighth Circuit here.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Butler v. State, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 30 (1994)
We note that traditional Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), analysis is inapposite to resolution of the propriety of an excusal for cause pursuant to TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN.
Distinguished by Charles Milton v. Raymond K. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent, 744 F.2d 1091 (1984)
We concluded that Adams was inapplicable because no jurors were excluded.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Marshall,
concurring in the judgment.
I continue to believe that the death penalty is, under all circumstances, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314-374 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231-241 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 437-440 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). In addition, I agree with the Court that the exclusion of veniremen in this case violated the doctriné'.of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968). I do not, however, join in the Court’s assumption that the death penalty may ever be imposed without violating the command of the Eighth Amendment that no "cruel and unusual punishments” be imposed. Cf. *52 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 646 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). I join in the judgment of the Court.