holding that admission of the defendant’s criminal history under a state recidivist statute does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because “the evidence is ... almost always of a purely documentary kind, and in [the case at hand] there is no claim that its presentation was in any way inflammatory.” 385 U.S. at 562, 87 S.Ct. at 652
How later courts described this case
- holding that admission of the defendant’s criminal history under a state recidivist statute does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because “the evidence is ... almost always of a purely documentary kind, and in [the case at hand] there is no claim that its presentation was in any way inflammatory.” 385 U.S. at 562, 87 S.Ct. at 652
- holding that the admission of improper propensity evidence violates due process if there is a reasonable probability that the evidence affected the verdict
- holding that evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt
- holding that evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement, so long as the jury was instructed it could not be used for purposes of determining guilt
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Alonzo Thomas v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, 587 F.2d 695 (1979)
The lower court, deciding that Spencer was inapplicable, held that a constitutional error was committed.
Distinguished by William H. Haggard v. C. Murray Henderson, Warden, John Taylor Aldridge v. C. Murray Henderson, Warden, 382 F.2d 288 (1967)
For this reason, counsel argues, the Spencer decision is distinguishable and inapposite here.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,
dissenting.
I join the opinion of The Chief Justice insofar as that opinion would reverse in Nos. 68 and 69. I would, *588 however, also reverse in No. 70. It seems to me that the constitutional error here involved undermined “the very integrity of the fact-finding process,” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639 , and I would therefore apply the rule retroactively. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 ; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 .