holding that admission of the defendant’s criminal history under a state recidivist statute does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because “the evidence is ... almost always of a purely documentary kind, and in [the case at hand] there is no claim that its presentation was in any way inflammatory.” 385 U.S. at 562, 87 S.Ct. at 652
How later courts described this case
- holding that admission of the defendant’s criminal history under a state recidivist statute does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because “the evidence is ... almost always of a purely documentary kind, and in [the case at hand] there is no claim that its presentation was in any way inflammatory.” 385 U.S. at 562, 87 S.Ct. at 652
- holding that the admission of improper propensity evidence violates due process if there is a reasonable probability that the evidence affected the verdict
- holding that evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt
- holding that evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement, so long as the jury was instructed it could not be used for purposes of determining guilt
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Alonzo Thomas v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, 587 F.2d 695 (1979)
The lower court, deciding that Spencer was inapplicable, held that a constitutional error was committed.
Distinguished by William H. Haggard v. C. Murray Henderson, Warden, John Taylor Aldridge v. C. Murray Henderson, Warden, 382 F.2d 288 (1967)
For this reason, counsel argues, the Spencer decision is distinguishable and inapposite here.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring.
If the Constitution gave me a roving commission to impose upon the criminal courts of Texas my own notions of enlightened policy, I would not join the Court’s opinion. For it is clear to me that the recidivist procedures adopted in recent years by many other States 1 — and by Texas herself since January 1 of last year 2 — are far superior to those utilized in the cases now before us. But the question for decision is not whether we applaud or even whether we personally approve the procedures followed in these recidivist eases. The question is whether those procedures fall below the minimum level the Fourteenth Amendment will tolerate. Upon that question I am constrained to join the opinion and judgment of the Court.
See opinion of The Chief Justice, post, at 586, n. II.
See opinion of the Court, ante, at 556, n. 2.