holding that agency action is rational where the agency “provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion”
How later courts described this case
- holding that agency action is rational where the agency “provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion”
- holding a rule invalid under the APA where “the Commission made no findings specifically directed to the choice between two vastly different remedies with vastly different consequences to the carriers and the public ... [and failed to] articulate any rational connection between the facts found and the choice made”
- holding that court could not accept “post hoc rationalizations for agency action” and that agency’s discretionary order had to be “upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself”
- holding that under Chenery ‘‘For the courts to substitute their or counsel’s discretion for that of the * * * [agency] is incompatible with the orderly functioning of the process of judicial review.’’
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Commission — not on the Supreme Court's list
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in New York Shipping Ass’n v. Federal Mar. Comm’n, 854 F.2d, 1338
Court of Appeals for the D.C. CircuitAug 9, 1988by statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 650 F.2d 687 (1981)
371 U.S. 156, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962), relied upon by petitioners, is distinguishable from this case.
Distinguished by Civil Aeronautics Board v. Dreyer, 501 F. Supp. 905 (1980)
These consumer protection requirements are the same under both the new and old regulations.12 Accordingly, Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. at 156, 83 S.Ct. at 156, is inapposite because the regulations at issue have not undergone a change.
The opinion
*177 Mr. Justice Goldberg,
with whom
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan join, concurring.
I join in the opinion and add only a few words to state my conviction that the “discriminating awareness of the consequences of its action” required of the Commission by the opinion, inevitably must lead, if any relief is now warranted (which I doubt), to a rejection of the remedy of additional certification in favor of an appropriately limited cease-and-desist order.
As the matter was presented to the Commission and to the District Court, the additional certification, as the facts here plainly demonstrate, involved the Commission in intervention in the underlying labor dispute to a degree unduly trenching upon the Labor Board’s jurisdiction and the rights and duties of the affected parties. Most certainly after the 1959 amendments to the labor law, the Commission, had the case then been remanded to it by the District Court as it should have been, could have entered a cease-and-desist order under which no conflict could or would have arisen between the I. C. C. and the N. L. R. B. in the respective exercise of their powers and in the discharge of their responsibilities. Such a cease- and-desist order should have been appropriately limited to requiring the carriers to provide service in a manner and to the extent compatible with their labor agreements and with both the carriers’ and the union’s rights and duties under federal labor law. That such an order would have been sufficient in practical effect is demonstrated by the fact that both Burlington and Santa Fe, parties to the hot cargo agreements, were able to carry out their duties under the Motor Carrier Act without creating any serious problems under their union agreements or under the National Labor Relations Act. This being so in the absence of a cease-and-desist order, it is difficult to understand why entry of such an order against the carriers would have been ineffective.