holding that agency action is rational where the agency “provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion”
How later courts described this case
- holding that agency action is rational where the agency “provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion”
- holding a rule invalid under the APA where “the Commission made no findings specifically directed to the choice between two vastly different remedies with vastly different consequences to the carriers and the public ... [and failed to] articulate any rational connection between the facts found and the choice made”
- holding that court could not accept “post hoc rationalizations for agency action” and that agency’s discretionary order had to be “upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself”
- holding that under Chenery ‘‘For the courts to substitute their or counsel’s discretion for that of the * * * [agency] is incompatible with the orderly functioning of the process of judicial review.’’
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Commission — not on the Supreme Court's list
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in New York Shipping Ass’n v. Federal Mar. Comm’n, 854 F.2d, 1338
Court of Appeals for the D.C. CircuitAug 9, 1988by statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 650 F.2d 687 (1981)
371 U.S. 156, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962), relied upon by petitioners, is distinguishable from this case.
Distinguished by Civil Aeronautics Board v. Dreyer, 501 F. Supp. 905 (1980)
These consumer protection requirements are the same under both the new and old regulations.12 Accordingly, Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. at 156, 83 S.Ct. at 156, is inapposite because the regulations at issue have not undergone a change.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the Court’s judgment setting aside the Commission’s order granting a permanent certificate to a new carrier to compete with existing carriers who but for temporary interruptions caused by lawful labor union activities would adequately meet the needs of commerce. I do not concur, however, in the remand to the Commission for further proceedings. Congress has vested power to regulate the employer-employee relationship in the National Labor Relations Board, not in the Interstate Commerce Commission, and I think the Commission’s grant of a permanent certificate here, which stems wholly from temporary transportation delays owing to a labor dispute within the Labor Board’s jurisdiction and which in effect punishes carriers for honoring their then lawful *175 collective bargaining contracts, amounts to an impermissible encroachment on that Board’s domain. We are not called upon at this time to decide whether the Commission is wholly without power under any and all circumstances to grant temporary relief from a temporary stoppage of commerce in order to remedy acute emergency situations such, for illustration, as a shortage of food or supplies urgently needed in particular localities. It will be time enough to decide what are the powers of the Commission to meet such situations when they arise; it is conceded that they are not presented in this case.
Since it is my view that under the facts here the Commission has no power to grant a permanent certificate to a competitor, I see no reason to direct that this matter be referred back to the Commission for further proceedings. Such a remand assumes that there is some further action by way of a cease-and-desist order the Commission can or should take. My view is that the facts in this record provide no possible basis for permitting the Commission to order the carriers to cease and desist from carrying out their agreement with the unions. Nothing in the Interstate Commerce Act gives the Commission power to prohibit carriers or unions under the circumstances shown by this record from doing that which the Labor Act permits them to do. Moreover, as the Court points out, four months after the Commission’s order Congress outlawed the kind of conduct which here interfered with transportation. Since Congress has, by this enactment, so clearly taken this matter in hand in a way that does not rely for enforcement on the Interstate Commerce Commission, the old Commission proceedings have all the earmarks of mootness, whether technically moot or not. If the union or the truck lines should hereafter violate this new law the Labor Board, backed by the courts, is vested with ample power to force both carriers and unions to obey that law. *176 The Interstate Commerce Commission has enough to do within its congressionally appointed field without stepping over into the field of labor regulation. The Commission should no more than a State * invade regulatory territory Congress has preempted for agencies of its own choice.
Cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959).