holding that agency action is rational where the agency “provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion”
How later courts described this case
- holding that agency action is rational where the agency “provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion”
- holding a rule invalid under the APA where “the Commission made no findings specifically directed to the choice between two vastly different remedies with vastly different consequences to the carriers and the public ... [and failed to] articulate any rational connection between the facts found and the choice made”
- holding that court could not accept “post hoc rationalizations for agency action” and that agency’s discretionary order had to be “upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself”
- holding that under Chenery ‘‘For the courts to substitute their or counsel’s discretion for that of the * * * [agency] is incompatible with the orderly functioning of the process of judicial review.’’
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Commission — not on the Supreme Court's list
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in New York Shipping Ass’n v. Federal Mar. Comm’n, 854 F.2d, 1338
Court of Appeals for the D.C. CircuitAug 9, 1988by statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 650 F.2d 687 (1981)
371 U.S. 156, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962), relied upon by petitioners, is distinguishable from this case.
Distinguished by Civil Aeronautics Board v. Dreyer, 501 F. Supp. 905 (1980)
These consumer protection requirements are the same under both the new and old regulations.12 Accordingly, Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. at 156, 83 S.Ct. at 156, is inapposite because the regulations at issue have not undergone a change.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Clark,
concurring in the result.
Four months after entry of the Commission’s order Congress enacted § 8 (e) as an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 158 (e). Since the language of that section raised serious questions as to the legality of the unions’ “hot cargo” pressures, which in turn raised questions as to any continuation of the “substantial disruption” in service, it appears to me that the District Court should have vacated the order and remanded the case to the Commission for reconsideration in light of the likelihood of changed circumstances. The grant of permanent certification to a new carrier in an area where there are existing certifications is a drastic remedy to which resort should not be made except in the most compelling circumstances.
For this reason I concur in the Court’s reversal and remand to the District Court. In view of the lapse of time and the fact that the conduct which caused the disruption of service has been outlawed † by Congress, however, it appears that the issue has been mooted, and the Commission may determine that further proceedings would serve no purpose.
Although the effectiveness of the § 8 (e) ban on “hot cargo” clauses maj' have been subject to doubt when the District Court adjudicated this case, subsequent cases tend to remove any such doubt. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Local 294., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 298 F. 2d 105 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1961).