The opinion
J-A27031-25
2026 PA Super 33
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.K.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: PHILADELPHIA :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES :
:
:
: No. 947 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000061-2025
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: PHILADELPHIA :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES :
:
:
: No. 948 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000062-2025
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.
CONCURRING OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2026
Constrained as we are by our Supreme Court’s precedent, I agree with
my esteemed colleagues’ decision to vacate the orders denying DHS’s
petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her five-year-old sons,
M.K.L. and M.A.L. (“Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).
However, for the reasons discussed infra, I write separately to stress my
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position that where, as here, the certified record reveals that there is only one
reasonable ultimate outcome of the termination proceedings, delaying the
inevitable is contrary to the involved children’s best interests and the goals of
the Juvenile Act.
In outlining the reasons for its disposition, the Majority concludes that
the trial court erred both by (1) failing to conduct the bifurcated legal analysis
required by § 2511, see Majority Opinion, at 34-35, 39; and (2) misapplying
the law in relation to the second prong of § 2511(a)(8) to determine that DHS
failed to establish that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal no
longer existed. Id. at 48 (“Applied to the correct legal standard under
subsection (a)(8), the juvenile court’s findings, at best, indicate that Mother
has made some progress toward eliminating the conditions.”); see also In re
I.J., 972 A.2d at 11 (providing our inquiry is focused upon whether predicate
conditions have been “remedied” such that “reunification of parent and child
is imminent at the time of the hearing”).
Considering the foregoing errors, DHS requests that we reverse the trial
court order and terminate Mother’s parental rights. See DHS brief at 51
(“Reversal is necessary to protect [the Children’s] right to stability, security,
and emotional well-being.”). The Child Advocate also supports reversal in
anticipation of adoption. See Children’s brief at 33 (“[T]he Child Advocate
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision and
terminate the parental rights of Mother and allow the children to achieve
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permanence in the safe and nurturing home of their Grandmother.”)1
However, relying upon our High Court’s prior admonishments in Interest of
S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021), and Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d
1085, 1117 (Pa. 2023) (quoting S.K.L.R. (appellate courts “are not in a
position to make the close calls based on fact-specific determinations”)), the
Majority declines the invitation to reverse the trial court’s order denying
termination. See Majority Opinion at 54.
I find no fault with the Majority’s measured course of action in refusing
to do so. Nevertheless, it is the opinion of this jurist that delaying permanency
in these dependency-related involuntary termination cases by remanding for
further proceedings, in the face of reversible error, undermines the stated
“‘goal of finding permanency for children in less than two years, absent
compelling reasons,’ in accordance with federal law.” Interest of K.T., 296
A.3d at 1108 (quoting In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa. 2013) (“Following
[the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”)], Pennsylvania adopted
the goal of finding permanency for children in less than two years[.]”))
(cleaned up); see also 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (delineating procedure to
assure that participating agencies proceed with termination when children
have been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months);
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1 Remanding these cases for what amounts to a do-over vitiates this advocacy
for prompt finality.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9) (implementing ASFA consideration in permanency
review hearings).
From my perspective, it is critical to advance the Children’s interest in
permanency because of the fleeting nature of childhood. As the K.T. Court
explained:
Our unanimous decision in T.S.M. also highlighted the importance
of permanency and the need to find stability for dependent children
in a timely fashion. As then-Justice Baer stated so eloquently,
courts considering a termination petition “must keep the ticking
clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant
number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy
development quickly.” Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1107–08 (Pa. 2023).
Mindful that permanence is near to paramount, and considering the
inevitable outcome of this case, on a clean slate I would have simply
acknowledged the trial court’s procedurally-flawed legal analysis and directed
it to grant the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to facilitate
Children’s adoption by S.K., the Paternal Grandmother. Where, as here, the
underlying facts plainly support the termination of parental rights, reversal
avoids the unnecessary delays to permanency associated with remanding for
further proceedings, which, as the K.T. Court noted, may include allowing the
trial court to further develop the record.
As this case is exemplary of what I consider a manifestly unreasonable
decision calling for reversal, I summarize the following facts as applied to the
appropriate legal analysis. DHS removed Children from Mother’s care based
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upon allegations that she abused M.K.L. physically, resulting in a black eye
and facial lacerations. See N.T., 3/13/25 at 11. The allegation of abuse was
determined to be founded. Id. 13 (“The [c]ourt’s going to take judicial notice
that the Court found [Mother] as a perpetrator of child abuse at the last listing
as to M.K.L.”). Hence, concerns about Mother’s anger management and
mental health problems have permeated this case from the outset.
During the termination hearing, Mother’s aggression emerged as she
persistently interrupted the testimony of Sheena Lowe, the CUA case manager
assigned to the Children. Mother provided a running commentary of
Ms. Lowe’s testimony, interrupted the proceedings seventy times, and
engaged in several profanity-laced emotional outbursts. At one point, Mother
so heatedly protested Ms. Lowe’s testimony, speaking over counsel, the trial
court, and the security officer, that the court instructed the Sherrif’s Office to
escort Mother from the courtroom. The following excerpt underscores the
tirade that preceded Mother’s ejection:
MS. LOWE: There were additional issues concerning [Mother’s]
home, that it was a lot of clutter, and the home was in a state of
disarray and there wasn’t any food in the refrigerator and very
little food in the cabinets.
THE MOTHER: Oh my god.
....
THE MOTHER: That’s fucking retarded. Like –
MS. LOWE: That was from my review of the record.
THE COURT: Okay.
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THE MOTHER: Oh my gosh.
....
THE MOTHER: Like this is unfair because that’s not even true.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE MOTHER: Like this is retarded. Like you all just saying
anything.
....
THE MOTHER: No, because now they’re just saying anything.
COURT OFFICER: Stop screaming out.
THE COURT: [Mother], you got to –
THE MOTHER: Like that’s not even true. Like I’ll -- I’ll tell you if
that’s true. Like that’s really retarded.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE MOTHER: Like she’s just saying anything. That wasn’t even
in the report originally. I had safety hazards. Fucking radiators
weren’t covered, stuff like that. What do you mean no food in the
cabinets and stuff? Like oh my gosh.
....
THE COURT: All right, [Mother]. You’re going to have your
opportunity, [Mother]. Go ahead, [DHS Counsel].
[DHS Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY [DHS Counsel]:
Q. Do you have concerns that [M]other is or was using substances
at any point?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you elaborate on why you have those concerns?
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A. I have those concerns based off of –
....
THE MOTHER: This is crazy. They just want to terminate. You
all just want to terminate me at this point.
THE COURT: [Mother], that’s enough, [Mother].
THE MOTHER: Like this is retarded. They’re going to do it
anyway. It’s okay. This is you all world.
....
THE MOTHER: That’s it. That’s -- this is retarded. I’ve never
been around you using any substance. Are you -- are you serious?
....
THE MOTHER: You’re really trying to terminate me right now[?]
[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Let me do the objecting.
THE MOTHER: She just -- like she just literally -- that’s false.
....
THE MOTHER: That is so false.
....
THE MOTHER: Oh my god. Like this is what I’m talking about.
....
THE MOTHER: Like, ma’am, you’re just saying anything on that
stand, and you are lying. You are lying. You know you are. How
can she do that, yo. How could she do that. She know damn well
that’s a lie. Oh my god. Ma’am.
THE COURT: Okay. Let the record reflect it is now 2:49:32,
[M]other has left the courtroom because [M]other had another
outburst. She was escorted out by the sheriffs. She’s permitted
back in if and when she can resume proper court behavior.
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N.T., 3/15/25, at 16-20.
Even after Mother ostensibly regained her composure and returned to
the hearing, she eventually resumed berating Ms. Lowe about her testimony:
BY [DHS COUNSEL]:
Q. Have you witnessed the boys initiating any affection towards
their mother?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And have you witnessed the boys –
THE MOTHER: This lady --You’re a bitch. That’s what you are.
COURT OFFICER: Ma’am, ma’am.
THE MOTHER: No, she’s a bitch. Yeah, that’s on the record,
yeah.
COURT OFFICER: (inaudible)
THE MOTHER: You all can terminate, do whatever you want.
COURT OFFICER: Ma’am, ma’am, calm down.
THE MOTHER: That’s -- that’s some bullshit, my boys don’t show
me no affection[?] They don’t say mommy and all of that[?] I
love you, none of that, right? This is retarded. Let’s just get
through it. Let’s go. Come on. I really don’t care at this point. I
really don’t. I gave it my fucking all. And for her to just sit up
there like I’ve been just sitting back as a mom, not doing nothing
is just really retarded, down to the fact that my boys don’t even
love me or show me affection. Down to the part where do they
show -- no, they don’t. You all, like this is --this is cruel. This is
so freaking harsh. Like this is crazy, but okay.
....
THE MOTHER: Oh my gosh.
COURT OFFICER: Calm down.
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....
THE MOTHER: My heart is hurt and I can’t keep doing this. This
is my last court date, I swear to god. I gave it my all. I cannot
see this lady again or any – I don’t care what happens. I just got
to – I got to get out of this. Oh my god, oh my god, oh my god.
I try. Oh my god, oh my god. Oh my god.
Id. at 39-40.
Mother’s belligerence highlights the fact that her mental health problems
and chronic inability to manage her anger persist, notwithstanding the trial
court’s finding that DHS did not establish that Mother failed to address the
conditions that led to the Children’s removal. Indeed, the court’s orders
entered from the bench following the hearing soundly refute this would-be
finding that Mother had, in fact, addressed these conditions. As to Mother’s
problems with her mental health and anger management, the court ordered,
“Mom is to continue with mental health treatment at JFK. . . . Mom is to
attend anger management. Mom’s visits are weekly supervised at the agency,
line of sight, line of hearing.” N.T., 3/15/25, at 59.
As noted by the Majority, the trial court’s orders “strongly suggest that
. . . the juvenile court believed that Mother had not remedied the conditions
that led to Children’s removal.” Majority Opinion at 49. Hence, the trial
court’s finding of fact is not supported by the record, and insofar as the
certified record demonstrates that DHS established the second prong of
§ 2511(a)(8) by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court committed
reversible error in denying relief on that basis. Thus, but for being constrained
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to remand these cases, I would see no reason for the court to revisit this
prong.
Finally, while the needs-and-welfare analysis required by the third prong
of § 2511(a)(8) is legally distinct from its particularized counterpart outlined
in § 2511(b), insofar as the latter expressly concerns the child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, like the trial court
and Majority, I address these analyses collectively. See Majority Opinion at
57 (referencing both § 2511 (a)(8) and § 2511 (b) in stating that the needs
and welfare analysis shall be in accordance with K.T.).
Our Supreme Court delineated this inquiry as follows:
[C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,
placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare above concerns for the parent.
Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must
be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law
regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.
Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include
intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As
further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs
and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always
consider. The courts must consider whether the children are in a
pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent,
the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not
always an easy task.
Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105-06 (cleaned up).
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The extent of the “bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321,
324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). It is the trial court’s province to “consider
the totality of the circumstances when performing a needs and welfare
analysis.” Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 839 (Pa.Super. 2022). This Court
has clarified that it is “within the discretion of the [trial] court to prioritize the
safety and security” of children “over their bonds with their parents.” Id. We
will not disturb such an assessment if the trial court’s factual findings are
supported by the record. Id.
Instantly, the trial court proffered from the bench the following rationale
for denying the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights:
The [c]ourt found that [the] testimony today was lacking in
specifics as to mother’s shortcomings. The [c]ourt found that [it]
. . . is unable to clearly and convincingly decide that . . . [M]other’s
rights should be terminated based on the evidence that I have in
front of me today. That coupled with the testimony that mom
shares a healthy strong bond with the children leads me to the
only conclusion that the Court can come to is . . . to deny DHS’[s]
petition.
N.T., 3/15/25, at 66-67.
Relative to the Children’s needs and welfare, the trial court expanded
its rationale in the Rule 1925(a) Opinion as follows:
Ms. Lowe described Mother’s visits with the Children as what
the [c]ourt interpreted to be appropriate and positive experiences
for everyone. She stated that Mother brings snacks and toys for
the [C]hildren, and that she interacts with them properly. There
was no testimony elicited that showed that Ms. Lowe or any other
CUA visitation personnel ever had to redirect or coach [M]other
during her time with the Children. Ms. Lowe stated that
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sometimes Mother and the Children sang nursery rhymes together
and that Mother initiated affection with the [C]hildren by kissing
and hugging them in an appropriate manner. (N.T. March 13,
2025, Volume 1, Page 35 to 37). Notably, she testified that
Mother and the [C]hildren enjoy a healthy bond. (N.T. March 13,
2025, Volume 1, Page 46).
Ms. Lowe testified that the Children share a close
relationship with the current caregiver and that they are bonded.
She noted that the caregiver provides a safe, loving, healthy
relationship for the [C]hildren and that the caregiver ensures the
children attend the services they need. She stated that she
believes that the Children would suffer harm if they were removed
from the home of the current caregiver. She also said that she
believed there would be no irreparable harm to the Children if
Mother’s parental rights were terminated. (N.T. March 13, 2025,
Volume 1, Page 42 to 44).
Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/25, at 5-6.
Without rejecting Ms. Lowe’s testimony, the trial court proceeded to
criticize the manner in which DHS presented its case, discussed Mother’s
efforts to comply with her SCP objectives, and ultimately found “DHS failed to
meet its burden of proof, making it unclear to this court whether termination
of [M]other’s parental rights were in the child[ren]’s best interests.” Id. at 7.
Considering the evidence presented during the hearing, the trial court’s
needs-and-welfare analysis is flawed. First and foremost, the record does not
sustain the purported existence of a strong or beneficial parent-child bond
between Mother and Children that is worth preserving. Ms. Lowe never
characterized Mother’s connection to the children as a parental bond, and the
trial court’s rationale impermissibly equates Ms. Lowe’s actual testimony
concerning a “healthy bond” to the “necessary and beneficial” parent-child
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bond that is the fundamental concern under the needs and welfare analysis.
It is not. We have explained that a parental bond requires more than a casual
relationship. See In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(“Children often know, love, and sometimes have an enjoyable time with
parents who have little to do with their upbringing[.] The key is whether a
bond has developed.”).
Here, there is no evidence of Mother’s parental bond. Even accepting
the trial court’s findings that the visits went as Mother described, we may still
reject the court’s inference that the bond is meaningful. See In re Adoption
of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021) (providing our “standard of review . . .
does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court's inferences or
conclusions of law.”). The testimony that the trial court relies upon merely
characterizes a relationship in which Mother is affectionate toward the
Children.
However, Mother’s affection for her Children is not dispositive. As DHS
accurately observes, “expressions of affection such as hugging and singing,
while positive, do not, standing alone, demonstrate the existence of a true
parental bond. Rather, they reflect a limited, recreational dynamic that lacks
the hallmarks of parental responsibility.” DHS brief at 48. Stated plainly, the
positive affection that Mother displayed toward her sons throughout two years
of supervised “line-of-sight-and-hearing” visitations, does not constitute a
necessary and beneficial parental bond which “would predictably cause
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extreme emotional consequences or significant, irreparable harm” to the
Children if severed. See Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10 (explaining
that “severance of a necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss
that would predictably cause ‘extreme emotional consequences’ or significant,
irreparable harm”). Even under the trial court’s restrictive supervision,
Mother’s interactions with her sons during visits cannot be interpreted as
anything beyond appropriate.
Furthermore, the court’s analysis ignored its findings that the Children
are closely bonded with Paternal Grandmother, whom the court acknowledges
provides a safe, loving, healthy relationship for the Children, and satisfies their
needs, including their speech, occupational, and physical therapy services.
Indeed, the Children, both of whom are essentially non-verbal, have thrived
in the care of Paternal Grandmother, with whom they have shared a parent-
child relationship, for what is now three years, more than one-half of their
lives. Critically, notwithstanding the trial court’s emphasis on the Children’s
genial relationship with Mother, the certified record supports no inference
other than that they would be harmed if removed from their pre-adoptive
home with Paternal Grandmother. See N.T., 3/15/25, at 43.
Hence, I believe that it is manifestly unreasonable for the trial court to
have found that DHS failed to meet its burden as to the termination of Mother’s
parental rights. Mother’s feelings of affection for the Children do not preclude
the termination of her parental rights. As of the date of the hearing, the
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Children had been placed with Paternal Grandmother for approximately
twenty-six months and they are entitled to the safety, security, permanency,
and stability that she provides as a pre-adoptive resource. Manifestly, viewed
from the Children’s perspective and mindful of their specific needs,
terminating Mother’s parental rights supports their developmental, physical,
and emotional welfare. The trial court’s recitation of Ms. Lowe’s testimony
confirms as much and DHS was not required to present expert testimony or a
bonding evaluation under the facts of this case. See In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d
322, 328 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“[W]hen evaluating a parental bond, the court is
not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can
offer evaluations as well.” (cleaned up)).
Overall, it is clear to this jurist that delaying the permanency of M.K.L.
and M.A.L. in order for the trial court to revisit Mother’s progress toward
managing her anger and remedying her mental health problems simply
prolongs the inevitable, while depriving the children of their sought-after
permanency, and placing them at risk of harm. This reality is evinced both by
Mother’s shocking manifestation of her inability to overcome her anger issues
during the termination hearing and the continued need for line-of-sight-and-
hearing supervision during her weekly visits with the Children.
Fundamentally, I respectfully disagree with the core idea that appellate
courts should extend a special deference toward trial courts in terminating
parental rights that we do not extend to those courts in other matters that
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focus on the best interest of children. See e.g., Interest of K.B., 331 A.3d
50, 58 (Pa.Super. 2025) (reversing denial of dependency petition and
directing the court to adjudicate the child dependent); Interest of J.B., 296
A.3d 1234, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2023) (reversing juvenile court’s denial of
petitions for goal change and remanding for juvenile court to change
permanency goals to adoption); Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60-61
(Pa.Super. 2023) (“Ultimately, [in child custody cases] the test is whether the
trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of
record.”).
Rather than unnecessarily prolonging the Children’s deprivation of
permanency in this case, but for the trial court’s flawed analysis in the first
instance, I would reverse, as manifestly unreasonable, the orders denying
DHS’s petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to the
Children notwithstanding the apprehensions our Supreme Court noted in
S.K.L.R., and K.T. See e.g., Interest of K.H., 324 A.3d 1222, 2024 WL
3373094 (Pa.Super. 2024) (non-precedential decision) (“We reverse the trial
court’s order denying termination of Father’s parental rights [because]
remand for further proceedings is not necessary.” (citing Hanna v. Key
Computer Sys., Inc., 562 A.2d 327, 329 (Pa.Super. 1989) (“We have not
. . . simply engaged in the substitution of our judgment for that of the trial
court. Rather, we have a deep and serious difference of opinion with the trial
court as to the effect of the application of the law to the facts of the case[.]”)).
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Accordingly, while I agree that binding precedent directs us to remand
the instant cases for the trial court to perform a proper analysis of §
2511(a)(8) and § 2511(b), mechanically remanding agency-initiated
termination of parental rights cases in the face of reversible error and the
fleeting stage of childhood is, in my view, contrary to the Juvenile Act’s stated
objective to expediently achieve permanency for dependent children. See
Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 42; In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269; 42
Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9).
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