The opinion
J-A27031-25
2026 PA Super 33
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.K.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: PHILADELPHIA :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES :
:
:
: No. 947 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000061-2025
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: PHILADELPHIA :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES :
:
:
: No. 948 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000062-2025
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.
OPINION BY BECK, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2026
In these consolidated cases, Philadelphia Department of Human
Services (“DHS”) appeals from the orders entered by the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas (“juvenile court”) denying its petitions to involuntarily
terminate the parental rights of S.L. (“Mother”) to M.K.L. and M.A.L. (together,
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“Children”), twins born in January 2021.1 DHS argues that the juvenile court
abused its discretion by determining that DHS failed to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Mother’s rights should be terminated pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) of the Adoption Act. Because we
conclude that the juvenile court misapplied the law when considering whether
DHS met its burden under section 2511(a)(8), we vacate the orders and
remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.
Procedural History
On February 19, 2025, twenty-six months after DHS removed Children
from Mother’s care, DHS filed the instant petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights. DHS sought termination under section 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act, which provide as follows:
(a) General rule. --The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either
has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim
to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
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1 DHS also filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of
Children’s father, V.W. (“Father”). DHS did not proceed with its petition
because Father agreed to relinquish his parental rights voluntarily on the day
of the hearing. See N.T., 3/13/2025, at 5. The certified record does not
indicate the status of Father’s parental rights. Father has not participated in
this appeal.
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physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of
the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a
period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available
to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable
period of time and termination of the parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations. --The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b).
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Hearings on the petitions occurred on March 13, 2025, conducted by the
same juvenile court judge who presided over Children’s ongoing dependency
matter pursuant to the Juvenile Act.2 DHS presented the testimony of Sheena
Lowe (“Lowe”), a Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager at NET
Community Care assigned to the family by DHS. While Lowe was testifying,
DHS admitted—without objection—Children’s dependency court dockets,
which reflect the juvenile court’s orders entered throughout their dependency
case. N.T., 3/13/2025, at 10; see DHS Exhibit 1. We summarize DHS’s
evidence to provide context for its arguments. 3
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2 In Philadelphia County, the family court division of the court of common
pleas has jurisdiction over termination proceedings. 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 711, 713;
see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (court of common pleas has original jurisdiction
over involuntary termination matters to be exercised through appropriate
division); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(i) (same judge who presided over dependency
proceedings in family court may be assigned to orphans’ court division for
purpose of hearing termination proceedings).
3 We must sua sponte ensure that the juvenile court: (1) complied with its
statutory duty to appoint counsel to represent a child’s legal interests in
contested termination of parental rights proceedings pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2313(a) and (2) performed the requisite conflict determination prior to
appointing a single attorney to represent a child’s best and legal interests. In
re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020). Children were
represented at the hearing by Attorney Lauren Ferguson of the Support Center
for Child Advocates, who represented Children as guardian ad litem in their
dependency matter. No order of appointment appears in the certified record.
The juvenile court interrupted DHS’s presentation of evidence to address
Children’s representation. N.T., 3/13/2025, at 37-38. Attorney Ferguson
informed the Court that Children’s positions were not ascertainable because
they were “essentially non-verbal,” and could only articulate simple single
words like “dog.” Id. at 38. The juvenile court announced that it was
appointing Attorney Ferguson to represent Children as counsel in the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Evidentiary Record
DHS Exhibit 1: Juvenile Court Orders
According to the shelter order, DHS removed Children in December 2022
pursuant to an order of protective custody. See DHS Exhibit 1 (Shelter Order,
12/2/2022). Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court found that
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termination proceeding. Id. Attorney Ferguson argued in support of DHS’s
petition before the juvenile court and on appeal.
When a child’s preferred outcome is not ascertainable, a court may
appoint a single attorney to represent the child’s best and legal interests. In
re. T.S., 192 A.3d. 1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018). Performing the required conflict
determination and appointing counsel after the hearing already began,
however, is inconsistent with the procedure described by K.M.G. See Matter
of Adoption of A.C.M., 333 A.3d 704, 709 (Pa. Super. 2025) (emphasizing
both the “relative ease” of a juvenile court’s duty pursuant to section 2313(a)
and its importance due to the “critical rights … at stake”) (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, because Children were represented at the hearing, we decline
to emphasize form over substance in this case. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1090
n.19.
Also of note is this Court’s request for trial courts and counsel to
“prominently” feature information regarding compliance with K.M.G. in the
opinion and briefs on appeal. A.C.M., 333 A.3d at 709 n.7. To that end,
Children note in their brief that Attorney Ferguson served in a dual role without
conflict, asserting that “all counsel consented to the Child Advocate serving in
this dual role prior to the start of the hearing.” Children’s Brief at 6 n.3. While
we appreciate counsel highlighting the issue, whether all counsel consent to a
dual role appointment has no bearing upon section 2313(a) compliance
pursuant to K.M.G. The failure to appoint a separate attorney to represent
the child’s legal interests constitutes structural error, the issue is non-
waivable, and the right belongs to the child, not to other parties. K.M.G., 240
A.3d at 1235 (citations omitted). Additionally, because it is the juvenile
court’s duty to appoint counsel for a child pursuant to section 2313(a) as
construed by K.M.G., the juvenile court, not the attorney, “must determine
whether counsel can represent the dual interests before appointing an
individual to serve as GAL/Counsel for a child.” Id. at 1236.
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remaining in Mother’s care would be contrary to Children’s welfare. Id. It
transferred temporary physical and legal custody to DHS, allowing DHS to
place Children in kinship care with S.K. (“Paternal Grandmother”). Id. The
court permitted Mother to visit Children at DHS with “line of sight, line of
hearing” supervision. Id.
Following a hearing on February 21, 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated
Children dependent under the Juvenile Act. Id. (Adjudication Order,
2/21/2023).4 The juvenile court transferred legal custody to DHS, noting that
Children, who remained in kinship care, were attending early intervention
services and were up to date or scheduled for medical and dental
appointments. Id. The court ordered that visitation continue under the
previously ordered restrictive conditions. Id. The juvenile court expressly
deferred making findings regarding child abuse until a later hearing. Id. It
found that Mother’s home was “not appropriate” and there was no proof of
her employment. Id. The juvenile court ordered DHS to refer Mother to the
Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for a dual diagnosis assessment to evaluate
mental health and substance abuse and for Mother to submit to three random
urine screens by the next court date. Id. It also ordered DHS to refer Mother
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4 The juvenile court found that the evidence presented by DHS was clear and
convincing and substantiated the allegations in the petitions to adjudicate
Children dependent, noting that its findings of fact were in the record. DHS
Exhibit 1 (Adjudication Order, 2/21/2023). In the termination matter,
however, DHS introduced neither the dependency petitions nor a transcript
containing the court’s findings.
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to the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for “parenting, housing, and
employment” and to refer her to “family school.” Id. Finally, the court
ordered Mother to complete “anger management.” Id.
Ultimately, the juvenile court did not rule upon DHS’s allegations of child
abuse until DHS presented evidence at a December 2024 permanency review
and aggravated circumstances hearing several months prior to the termination
hearing.5 Following its consideration of reports by Dr. Michelle Dominguez
and DHS Investigator Jacqueline Staggers-Field, as well as photographs of
M.K.L., the juvenile court found that Mother was the perpetrator of child abuse
pursuant to the Child Abuse Act. Id. (Permanency Review Order,
12/18/2024). Because it found that M.K.L. was a “victim of physical abuse
resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual violence or aggravated neglect by the
parent,” the court determined that aggravated circumstances existed
regarding Mother. Id. (Aggravated Circumstances Order, 12/18/2024). It
did not relieve DHS of making reasonable efforts to reunify Children with
Mother. Id.
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5 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6341(c.1) (providing for a hearing to address agency’s
allegations of aggravated circumstances regarding a dependent child), 6302
(defining aggravated circumstances in relevant part as when the “child or
another child of the parent has been the victim of physical abuse resulting in
serious bodily injury, sexual violence or aggravated physical neglect by the
parent”). Beyond orders continuing the adjudication hearing twice for further
investigation and a post-adjudication order continuing a hearing because
DHS’s physician witness was unavailable, the record does not explain why a
hearing to resolve the allegations did not occur until December 2024. See id.
(Juvenile Court Orders, 1/4/2023, 2/6/2023, 5/24/2023).
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Between the adjudication hearing and aggravated circumstances
hearing, the juvenile court monitored the case at five permanency review
hearings. See id. (Permanency Review Orders, 5/24/2023, 9/20/2023,
2/24/2024, 9/9/2024,6 12/18/2024).7 During that time, the juvenile court
found that Children were doing well in Paternal Grandmother’s care; receiving
early intervention services and occupational, physical, and speech therapy; on
a waiting list to be evaluated for autism; and up to date with their medical
needs. Id. (Permanency Review Orders, 5/24/2023, 9/9/2024). Although
the juvenile court continually found that DHS made reasonable efforts towards
reunifying Mother and Children, Mother never achieved reunification or
progressed beyond weekly contact with Children with line-of-sight and line-
of-hearing supervision. See id. (Permanency Review Orders, 5/24/2023,
9/20/2023, 2/24/2024, 9/9/2024).
During Children’s over two years in kinship care, the juvenile court
expressly reiterated its directive four times for Mother to undergo a dual
diagnosis assessment, monitoring, and random urine screens and it twice
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6 Curiously, the order indicates that “[n]o evidence [was] presented to the
court,” despite several specific factual findings in the order. Id. (Permanency
Review Order, 9/9/2024).
7 None of these orders include findings by the juvenile court regarding
Mother’s compliance with services nor her progress in rectifying the issues
that brought Children into care. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(2), (3); see also In
Int. of C.K., 165 A.3d 935, 943 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2017) (observing that the
Juvenile Act requires the juvenile court to make both findings at each
permanency review hearing).
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directed Mother to undergo urine screens “forthwith.” Id. (Permanency
Review Orders, 5/24/2023, 9/20/2023, 2/24/2024, 9/9/2024). Several
orders indicate that Mother was enrolled in mental health treatment at JFK,
with one order clarifying that the treatment did not address substance abuse
and another indicating that Mother signed a release of information. Id.
(Permanency Review Orders, 9/20/2023; 2/24/2024, 9/9/2024). The court
ordered JFK to provide a treatment plan and progress report several times.
Id. (Permanency Review Orders, 9/20/2023, 2/24/2024, 9/9/2024).
Regarding parenting, Mother completed a court-ordered parenting class
in December 2023. Id. (Permanency Review Order, 2/24/2024). Mother then
attended family school twice a week; it went well initially, but the school
ultimately discharged her unsuccessfully. Id.
Mother completed court-ordered anger management services in
December 2023. Id. Notably, after she completed anger management, CUA
suspended Mother’s visits and they moved to DHS. Id. (Permanency Review
Order 9/9/2024). After an initial visit at DHS that went well, Mother became
“irate” regarding DHS’s provision of snacks to Children at the second visit. Id.
Specifically, she “knocked over the snacks and made a mess,” before having
to be escorted out. Id. As a result, visits were suspended at DHS. Id.
Regarding housing, the court ordered CUA to assist Mother with housing
referrals in September 2023, found that Mother had “inappropriate” housing
in February 2024, and ordered CUA to refer Mother to ARC for housing and for
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Mother to obtain and maintain stable housing in September 2024. Id.
(Permanency Review Orders, 9/20/2023, 2/24/2024, 9/9/2024). As for
financial stability, Mother completed a money management class and Mother
was employed at a home health agency for a time, but as of the February
2024 hearing, she had not provided DHS with paystubs to verify her
employment since September 2023. See id. (Permanency Review Orders,
9/20/2023, 2/24/2024). The court ordered Mother to maintain and provide
proof of her employment in September 2024. Id. (Permanency Review Order,
9/9/2024).
Regarding Mother’s cooperation with CUA, Mother did not attend the
February 2024 hearing, and the juvenile court ordered her to make her
whereabouts known and to provide CUA with an address. Id. (Permanency
Review Hearing, 2/24/2024). In September 2024, the juvenile court ordered
“Mother to avail [sic] to CUA and comply with CUA case planning.” Id.
In the last permanency review order entered prior to the termination
hearing, in addition to the child abuse finding, the Juvenile Court found that
DHS made reasonable efforts to finalize Children’s permanency plan,
maintained the placement goal as reunification with Mother, and ordered
Children to remain committed to DHS and placed in kinship care. Id.
(Permanency Review Order, 12/18/2024).
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Lowe’s Testimony
Lowe was DHS’s only witness to testify at the termination hearing. At
the inception of her testimony, Lowe testified that she reviewed the case file,
records, and history to familiarize herself with the case history when CUA first
assigned her to the case in April 2024. N.T., 3/15/2025, at 9. In response to
a question by DHS’s solicitor asking whether CUA was “required to keep an
electronic case record and document all events that occur at or near the time
when those events happened,” Lowe responded affirmatively. Id. at 9-10.
Through Lowe’s review of CUA’s records,8 she learned that DHS removed
Children from Mother’s care in December 2022 after M.K.L. presented at the
emergency room with a black eye and a laceration next to his eye that needed
stitches and DHS received a CPS report. See id. at 9, 11. Mother’s counsel
objected to hearsay when Lowe began describing the report, prompting the
juvenile court to ask Lowe if she observed the injuries. Id. at 11. Lowe
responded no, but she reviewed the information documented in CUA’s records.
Id. at 11. The solicitor argued both that Lowe could testify from CUA’s
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8 As we discuss in more detail when relevant, Mother’s counsel objected
multiple times during Lowe’s testimony, asserting that Lowe did not have
personal knowledge and/or was testifying to hearsay. See Pa.Rs.E. 602 (“A
witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own
testimony.”); 801(c), 802 (prohibiting introduction of an out-of-court
statement made by a declarant offered “to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement,” unless exception applies).
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business records as a hearsay exception and that DHS was offering the
information to establish why Children came into care, not the veracity. 9 See
id. at 11-12. In response to the latter argument, Mother’s counsel questioned
the relevance of the information. Id. at 12. DHS’s solicitor then requested
that the juvenile court take judicial notice that it had founded Mother as a
perpetrator of child abuse “at the last listing.” Id. at 13. The court did so,
and Lowe began explaining that there were “old scars” on both Children when
Mother’s attorney objected again. Id. The solicitor reiterated her belief that
the business records exception to hearsay applied and argued that DHS did
not need to present the testimony of the physician who opined that M.K.L.
suffered child abuse as it was a “termination hearing.” Id. at 14. The court
conducted a sidebar off the record. Id. When questioning resumed regarding
additional reasons why Children came into care, Mother’s counsel objected to
hearsay and lack of personal knowledge, and DHS’s solicitor again invoked the
business records exception. Id. at 15-16. Without expressly addressing the
business records exception argument, the juvenile court permitted Lowe “to
testify as to what her understanding was of the issues in this case once she
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9 Rule 803(6) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence excepts from hearsay
“[a] record (which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation in any
form) of an act, event or condition” if the record meets certain specific
conditions, “all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian
or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule
902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification,” and “the opponent
does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate
a lack of trustworthiness.” Pa.R.E. 803(6).
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reviewed the file.” Id. at 16. Lowe responded that DHS had “additional issues
concerning [Mother’s] home, that it was a lot of clutter, and the home was in
a state of disarray and there wasn’t any food in the refrigerator and very little
food in the cabinets.” Id.10 Lowe did not offer any further testimony
regarding the inception of the case.
Lowe testified that CUA typically conducts a single case plan (“SCP”)
meeting at the outset of the case and again at six-month intervals. Id. at 23.
She responded affirmatively when asked if meetings have been held for this
case. Id. She was not asked, nor did she offer, the dates of the meetings or
if Mother attended. See id. Lowe did not recall what SCP objectives CUA
established for Mother at the outset of the case. Id. at 24-25.11 She testified
that when she took over the case, Mother’s SCP objectives were to: (1) comply
with CUA, including meeting monthly with Lowe and visiting Children; (2)
maintain employment; (3) obtain housing; (4) comply with court orders,
which directed Mother’s participation in a dual diagnosis assessment and
random drug screens; and (5) address mental health concerns. Id. at 24.
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10 Mother’s counsel objected to the answer as “speculation,” but the juvenile
court never ruled upon the objection because Mother interrupted Lowe’s
testimony to interject her own assertion. Id. at 17.
11 Lowe was not asked, nor did she explain, what an SCP objective is or how
it relates to the termination matter. Based upon the context, it appears that
she is referring to the goals CUA developed based upon the concerns it had
regarding the family’s safety and the objectives CUA expected the parent to
achieve in order for CUA to recommend reunification.
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According to Lowe, to facilitate reunification, each month CUA holds a
monthly meeting with a parent known as an “SP28 visit.” Id. at 27. The
purposes of the meetings are to share information about the case, provide
updates concerning the children to the parent, and review the SCP objectives
and the status of the objectives. Id. Throughout the eleven months Lowe
was assigned to the case, Mother attended the monthly meetings three times,
including one held the Monday before the termination hearing and two prior
to the filing of the petition. See id. at 29. On other occasions, Mother would
initially agree to meet, but when Lowe followed up, Mother did not answer her
phone, reply to her messages, or appear at the meeting location. Id. at 29-
30.
Regarding Mother’s mental health, over objection by Mother’s counsel,
Lowe testified that she has concerns about Mother’s mental health because
she “has some diagnoses” and “there have been times where [Mother] hasn’t
consistently addressed her mental health.” Id. at 21. Over another objection
by Mother’s counsel, Lowe testified that she personally had concerns that
Mother was using substances because she sent Mother for nine random drug
screens that, according to CEU, Mother failed to complete. Id. at 18-20.
Mother was last at the CEU in January 2024. Id. Lowe notified Mother about
the screens through email or text message. Id. at 25. CUA referred Mother
for a dual diagnosis assessment at CEU, which was also ordered by the
juvenile court, but Mother never submitted to the assessment. Id. at 22-23.
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Mother’s only explanation to Lowe regarding her refusal to submit to the
assessment and screens was that it was either not a good time or that she
attempted to go another time. Id. at 25.
Regarding housing, Lowe testified that CUA referred Mother to housing
services at DHS and ARC and Mother is “on a number of housing lists,” but
she does not have housing “appropriate” for reunification. Id. at 31. In
December 2023, Mother completed services at ARC regarding “parenting,
housing, and anger management.” Id. at 26. Mother initially participated in
ARC services for workplace development, financial, and housing services, but
she did not complete the services, resulting in ARC’s closure of her case on
February 28, 2025. Id. The record does not clarify why Mother participated
in housing services at ARC twice. As for employment, when Mother met with
Lowe at the SP28 meeting shortly before the termination hearing, she told
Lowe that she was working at a “temp agency” but did not provide Lowe with
verification or her paystubs upon Lowe’s request. Id. at 32-33. Mother
reported working at another agency several months ago, and she likewise had
not provided verification with her paystubs upon CUA’s request at that time.
Id. at 33-34.
Lowe testified that Mother’s visits are currently supervised at DHS and
they have never been expanded over the two years Children have been in
care. Id. at 34. Lowe stated she does not know why Mother’s visits were
supervised by line of sight and hearing. Id. at 46. Mother previously visited
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at NET, the CUA agency that employs Lowe, but the visits moved to DHS in
March 2024 after Mother told NET’s guard that she was using the bathroom
but she “came out and loitered around our office and went to some staff’s
offices” instead. Id. at 35. According to Lowe, Mother consistently visits for
two hours a week, except for an interlude in December 2024 until the end of
January 2025. Id. at 35-36. During that time, Mother stopped participating
and Lowe was unable to reach Mother. Id. at 36. Visits resumed in February
2025, and Mother told Lowe that she had checked herself into “Friends
Hospital.” Id. at 37. DHS did not provide any further information regarding
the nature of this hospital admission.
Lowe personally supervised approximately six visits. Id. at 36. By her
assessment, “[o]verall the visits go generally well. [Mother] usually brings
some type of snack or she brings a toy to the visit with her, and she interacts
with [Children]. Sometimes they sing nursery rhymes and such together.”
Id. at 37. Mother initiates affection with Children by “go[ing] up to them” and
hugging and kissing them. Id. at 37. Lowe has not witnessed Children
initiating any affection with Mother during her visits. Id. at 39-41.
Based upon Lowe’s observations of Children’s interactions with Paternal
Grandmother, she believes that Children have “a close relationship with their
grandma. They are happy to see her, like when I bring them back from visits
and such. They do jump up on her lap and stuff. They seem really well
bonded and comfortable with grandmom.” Id. at 42. Paternal Grandmother
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is willing to adopt Children. Id. In Lowe’s opinion, Children have a “parent-
child relationship” with Paternal Grandmother, that appears to be “healthy,”
and that she is “safe and loving” towards them. Id. at 43. In Lowe’s opinion,
Children are “closely bonded” with their “Gran Gran,” to whom they look to
take care of them and to address needs like fear, hurt, and loneliness. Id.
Lowe believes that Children would suffer “irreparable harm” if Children
were removed from Paternal Grandmother’s care, but they would not suffer
“irreparable harm” if the court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 43.
When asked what the basis for her opinion was, Lowe responded that she has
observed “a lot of growth” in Children’s development; that they need and
receive services including speech, physical therapy, and occupational
therapy;12 that Paternal Grandmother is meeting their basic needs such as
food, clothing, and providing a “safe, clean, secure home.” Id. at 44. In
contrast, “Mother does not have the proper housing to accommodate them,”
nor does she “have the proper supports, such as an income, that is needed
for the children to be in a safe and secure home.” Id. The solicitor asked
Lowe if it was in Children’s “best interest that the goal be changed to
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12 On cross-examination by Children’s counsel, Lowe added that Paternal
Grandmother set up these services for them. Id. at 45.
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adoption”—presumably referring to the permanency goal in Children’s
dependency matter—and Lowe responded, “yes.” Id.13
On cross-examination by Children’s counsel regarding what she has
observed between Mother and Children at visits, Lowe testified that Mother
and Children have a bond that seems “healthy” and Mother’s visits have not
been cut short.14 Id. at 45-46. Attorney Feguson also questioned whether
Lowe had reasons other than Mother’s housing and income instability that
caused her to believe that Children would not be irreparably harmed if
Mother’s rights were terminated; Lowe responded, “No.” Id. at 47.
On cross-examination by Mother’s counsel, Lowe responded
affirmatively to the question of whether the “original germinating complaint”
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13 Although DHS apparently filed a petition to change Children’s permanency
goal, there is no indication that this was a combined goal change and
termination of parental rights hearing. See N.T., 3/13/2025, at 5 (solicitor
informing the juvenile court that DHS filed petitions to terminate rights and
change the permanency goal to adoption, but requesting that the court
proceed with the hearing pertaining to the petition to terminate Mother’s
rights); Juvenile Court Opinion, 5/30/2025, at 1 (describing the hearing as a
termination proceeding). Although there is interrelation between the two
matters, they remain separate and distinct legally. See Interest of S.S., 252
A.3d 681, 688 (Pa. Super. 2021) (noting that termination proceedings are
often interrelated to dependency proceedings, but the proceedings remain
“distinct” with their own docket numbers and records, and—except for the
County of Philadelphia—in different divisions of the court of common pleas);
In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 339–40 (Pa. Super. 2002) (noting that the
jurisdiction to address matters in dependency and termination of parental
rights are derived from different statutes).
14 The latter testimony was in direct conflict with the juvenile court’s finding
in the September 2024 permanency review.
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was abuse. Id. at 47. Mother’s counsel then questioned whether there had
been any abuse since Children’s removal from her care, and Lowe responded
that she has not observed any abuse to Children since she was assigned to
the case, pointing out in later testimony that Children have remained in
kinship care throughout the case. Id. at 48. Lowe agreed with Mother’s
counsel that if Mother obtained appropriate housing, reunification could be
considered. Id. at 49.
On redirect examination, Lowe agreed with DHS’s counsel that housing
was not the only barrier to reunification because Mother has not alleviated
concerns regarding substance abuse and mental health. Id. at 51. Mother
interjected, proclaiming that Lowe “had a mental health letter in her purse”
and questioning how mental health could be a barrier “if it’s completed.” Id.
On re-redirect examination, the solicitor asked Lowe if the failure to obtain
dual diagnosis assessment and undergo screens had been an issue since the
beginning of the case. Id. at 53. Lowe responded that they were since she
had the case. Id. The solicitor pressed further, asking her again if the
concerns had remained “unalleviated” since even before Lowe was on the
case. Id. In response, Lowe merely stated that Mother “did obtain housing
for a period of time and then she lost that housing.” Id.
Notably, the transcript reflects that Mother interrupted Lowe’s testimony
(and the proceedings in general) almost seventy times by interjecting her own
answers to questions asked of Lowe; cursing; declaring her opinion of the
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proceedings or the testimony; hurling personal insults at Lowe; and generally
ranting. The judge or the court officer repeatedly instructed Mother to stop
speaking when she was not testifying, to “[s]top screaming out,” and to
“[c]alm down,” but Mother’s disruptive behavior persisted. See id. at 17-20,
22, 27-28, 29-30, 32, 39-40, 51. When Lowe was explaining why she believed
Mother was using substances, the trial court indicated that the sheriffs had to
escort Mother out of the courtroom for a period “because [she] had another
outburst.” Id. at 18-20.
Mother’s Testimony
Following the close of DHS’s case, Mother testified on her own behalf.
N.T., 3/13/2025, at 54-57. Mother asserted that she did not attend a dual
diagnosis assessment or treatment because she “did not get the proper
referral at first. There was a lot of the issue with the referral, from my
understanding, and that’s all I know about that.” Id. at 54. She testified that
she had been to the CEU on the “scheduled days” and “given urine.” Id.
Mother indicated that the ARC program director told her she “did not have to
complete” ARC’s workforce development and housing program because she
“already did it.” Id. Mother claimed that she was never referred to DHS for
housing. Id. at 54. She receives a paycheck every Friday by the temp agency
and she is willing to provide paystubs. Id. at 55. Mother acknowledged that
housing is a barrier to reunification, but she claims that she “did the best that
I could when I had the homecare job. I was paying for a room on the side,
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but other than me physically doing it on my own, paying for a room, I haven’t
gotten a single referral or any help as far as the housing program. And they
know I need it right now.” Id. at 56.
Regarding her visits, Mother insisted that she resumed visiting Children
in January 2025, not February as Lowe indicated. Id. at 55. Mother described
the visits as “good,” noting that they sing and she brings snacks, toys, and
clothes for Children. Id. at 55-56. Mother believes that she and Children
“have a bond” and that she is “there for them.” Id. at 56.
Denial of Petition and Rationale
The juvenile court immediately denied the termination petitions
following the close of evidence. N.T., 3/13/2025, at 59. It then entered orders
presumably pertaining to Children’s dependency matter, even though it was
presiding over a termination of parental rights hearing. Id.15 The juvenile
court ordered Children to remain in kinship placement and permitted Mother
to visit Children weekly at DHS with line of sight, line of hearing supervision.
N.T., 3/13/2025, at 59. It ordered Mother to: (1) go to the CEU for a dual
diagnosis evaluation and three random screens; (2) “continue mental health
treatment at JFK”; (3) provide proof of employment to CUA; (4) obtain
housing; and (5) to attend anger management. Id. The juvenile court
____________________________________________
15 DHS does not challenge the juvenile court’s authority to enter these orders
at the termination hearing. Instead, as we discuss infra, DHS contends they
support its argument that the orders contradict the juvenile court’s factual
findings and conclusions of law in the termination matter.
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ordered JFK to provide a treatment plan and progress report prior to the next
listing and for CUA to refer Mother to “DHS housing and PHMC housing.” Id.
Upon DHS’s request, the juvenile court provided its rationale on the
record. It asserted that DHS did not present “any evidence … as to [Mother’s]
mental health or her … compliance therein.” Id. at 59. It described “no CEU
since 1/24” as a “thing[] working against mom,” presumably referencing the
evidence establishing that Mother did not present to the CEU for a dual
diagnosis evaluation or drug screen despite being ordered to do so since the
outset of the case. Id. The court then described the evidence it “heard”: that
Mother attended “every visit,” “completed parenting, housing, and anger
management,” and “started workforce, finance, and housing.” Id. at 60. It
“heard that the main barriers to reunification are housing and income,” then
said it “heard the barriers to reunification are no CEU, no mental health, and
no housing.” Id. Further, it “heard” that Mother’s visits with Children “go
well,” with Mother bringing “snacks or toys” and Children “sing[ing] together,”
and Mother and Children have a “healthy bond.” Id. The juvenile court stated
that although DHS’s argument in support of termination was compelling, the
testimony did not match the argument. Id. at 66. The juvenile court was
troubled by the lack of “specifics as to [M]other’s shortcomings,” preventing
it from “clearly and convincingly” deciding that Mother’s rights should be
terminated, as well as evidence regarding Mother and Children’s healthy
strong bond. Id. at 66-67.
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The juvenile court elaborated further in its Rule 1925 opinion,
concluding that DHS failed to meet its burden of proving “Mother’s inability to
remedy the conditions that brought the Children into care.” Juvenile Court
Opinion, 5/30/2025, at 4. It stated that DHS “presented the testimony of a
single witness with limited familiarity with the Children and Mother” and the
“record and testimony … failed to demonstrate Mother's ongoing inability to
provide care for or control of the Children by clear and convincing evidence.”
Id.
Noting that Lowe reviewed CUA’s file prior to testifying, the court found
that her testimony established that Children “were removed from Mother’s
care in December of 2022 due to a physical abuse allegation and other
concerns regarding the home.” Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/30/2025, at 4-5
(citing N.T., 3/13/2025, at 8-11). It observed Lowe’s testimony regarding
Mother’s SCP objectives—including that she did not recall what they were at
the outset—and stated that “DHS’s failure to call a witness with familiarity of
the parts of this case that preceded Ms. Lowe’s involvement, and Ms. Lowe’s
lack of knowledge in this area, raised questions that caused the [juvenile
c]ourt concern.” Id. at 5. The juvenile court found that Lowe’s testimony
“proved that Mother had been moderately compliant with her SCP objectives,”
highlighting Mother’s completion of a “parenting class, housing class, and
anger management therapy,” as well as her attendance at “some of her SCP
meetings” and consistent visits with Children. The juvenile court found that
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Lowe “was unable to rebut Mother’s claim that she is employed at a temporary
employment agency.” Id. It acknowledged Mother’s failure to “provide
random urinalysis as ordered” and found that “she clearly lacks suitable
housing.” Id. While testimony supported a finding that Mother was on
“housing lists,” DHS “never explained … what exactly this means or if DHS or
other agencies were actively assisting Mother achieve this important
objective.” Id.
From Lowe’s testimony, the juvenile court inferred that Mother’s visits
with Children were “appropriate and positive experiences for everyone,”
highlighting that Mother brings snack and toys, Mother and Children sang
nursery rhymes together, and Mother “initiated affection with Children by
kissing and hugging them in an appropriate manner.” Id. at 5-6. The court
determined that Mother’s interactions with Children were proper and
appropriate, emphasizing the absence of “testimony elicited that showed that
Lowe or any other CUA visitation personnel ever had to redirect or coach
mother during her time with the Children,” as well as Lowe’s testimony “that
Mother and Children enjoy a healthy bond.” Id. at 6. The juvenile court
expressly discussed the needs and welfare evidence supporting DHS’s case,
citing Lowe’s testimony that Children share a close relationship and bond with
their current caregiver, as well as the caregiver’s provision of a “safe, loving,
healthy relationship” and that she ensures “Children attend the services they
need.” Id. It recognized Lowe’s opinion that Children would “suffer harm” if
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they were removed from Paternal Grandmother as well as her belief that they
would not suffer “irreparable harm” if the court terminated Mother’s parental
rights. Id. Nevertheless, the court found
Lowe’s advocacy for the termination of Mother’s parental rights
seemed to hinge on the fact that Mother currently lacks suitable
housing and is financially insecure. N.T., 3/13/2025, at 44. On
cross-examination, Lowe admitted that this was the case. She
stated that money and housing were the reasons that she believed
[Children] would not be irreparably harmed and that if Mother had
housing, reunification could be considered. Id. at 47-49. This
court does not take the prospect of terminating a someone’s [sic]
parental rights lightly and DHS’s burden in these matters is a
significant one. DHS elected to present the testimony of one
witness who has limited exposure to this case and to its
participants. Rather than document a list of the evidence that
DHS failed to present either because of indifference or the lack of
its existence, the court will focus on what was in fact presented.
This case became known to authorities due to an allegation of
abuse. There are no other allegations of abuse concerning these
Children, or Mother, before or after the filing of this case. Mother
has visited with Children consistently. There is no evidence that
she ever appeared high, drunk, or even late to any visits or that
the visits were anything other than appropriate. Mother
completed some, but not all[, of] her SCP objectives. This court
does not fill out a scorecard when deciding whether to grant or
deny a petition to terminate parental rights, but rather accords
each factor the appropriate weight that it deserves in the process.
The breadth of information the court considers in deciding these
matters is limited to the evidence that the parties present. In this
case, the party bearing the burden, DHS, elected to present a case
deficient in both quality and quantity, and this court cannot
terminate one’s parental rights on a record so devoid of real
evidence. DHS failed to meet its burden of proof, making it
unclear to this court whether termination of mother’s parental
rights were in the child’s best interests.
Id. at 4-7 (cleaned up).
In its comments on the record, written order denying the petition, and
Rule 1925 opinion, the juvenile court did not expressly articulate whether its
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denial was based upon grounds, needs and welfare, or both. Id. at 59-60.
Its written order denying the petition indicated that “[s]uch disposition having
been determined to be best suited to the protection and physical, mental and
moral welfare of the child,” see Juvenile Court Order, 3/13/2025, at 1, but its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion indicated a more ambiguous or equivocal conclusion:
“DHS failed to meet its burden of proof, making it unclear to this court whether
termination of mother’s parental rights were in the child’s best interests.” See
Juvenile Court Opinion, 5/30/2025, at 7.
Issues on Appeal
DHS filed the instant appeal, raising five issues for our review: 16
[1]. Did the juvenile court commit reversible error by admitting
testimony regarding earlier events in the case and then refusing
to consider that evidence for lack of personal knowledge in
denying the petitions?
[2]. Did the juvenile court commit reversible error by failing to
perform the required bifurcated analysis under 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a) and (b)?
[3]. Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in denying the
petitions where the material factual findings supporting the denial
are not supported by competent evidence?
[4]. Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion and commit an error
of law in denying the petitions to terminate parental rights where
competent evidence clearly and convincingly established each of
the four grounds pled for termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)?
[5]. Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion and commit an error
of law in denying the petitions to terminate parental rights where
____________________________________________
16 Both DHS and the trial court complied with Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925.
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competent evidence clearly and convincingly established that it is
in the children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental
rights and the juvenile court failed to consider Children’s bonds
with their pre-adoptive kinship provider?
DHS Brief at 5-6 (name designations altered; issues reordered for ease of
disposition).
Standard and Scope of Review and Legal Framework
In reviewing a juvenile court’s denial of an agency’s petitions to
terminate a parent’s rights involuntarily, we adhere to the following standard:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
[juvenile] court if they are supported by the record, but it does
not require the appellate court to accept the [juvenile] court’s
inferences or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings
are supported, we must determine whether the [juvenile] court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.
In re Adoption of G.W., 342 A.3d 68, 83-84 (Pa. Super. 2025) (en banc)
(quoting In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (Pa. 2021)). In our
review, we are cognizant that terminating a parent’s rights to a child “is among
the most powerful legal remedies that the judicial system possesses.” Id. at
84 (quoting Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1129 (Pa. 2021)).
“Because [juvenile] courts are on the front lines assessing the credibility of
witnesses and weighing competing and often challenging evidence, it is
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paramount that, in reviewing [juvenile] courts’ decisions in this arena,
appellate courts defer to [juvenile] courts’ first-hand observations as they
relate to factual determinations.” Id.
The Adoption Act requires a bifurcated process when considering a
petition to terminate an individual’s parental rights. Id. at 82-83. “Courts
must begin by first considering whether a parent’s conduct warrants
termination under section 2511(a) prior to shifting its focus to whether
termination best serves the child’s needs and welfare.” Id. at 83. The
petitioner only needs to prove one of the eleven distinct grounds under
subsection (a) to shift the focus to section 2511(b), which then requires the
court to determine whether termination serves the child’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare. In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969, 979
(Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). The party seeking termination must prove the
elements of section 2511 by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence
that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact
to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.” Matter of Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 48-49 (Pa.
Super. 2024) (citation omitted). This Court may affirm the juvenile court’s
decision to terminate parental rights pursuant to any one subsection of section
2511(a), as well as subsection (b). In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 992 (Pa. Super.
2013).
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As for evidentiary issues in termination of parental rights hearings, the
“decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound
discretion of the [juvenile] court,” and this Court “will not disturb these rulings
absent an abuse of discretion.” In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1166–67
(Pa. 2018). Nevertheless, if a juvenile court admits evidence that is not
competent over the objection of the other party, the objecting party raises the
issue on appeal, and this Court decides that the evidentiary error has any
impact upon the order, this Court must vacate and remand for a new hearing.
Id.
Issue 1: Failure to Consider Evidence Admitted at the Hearing
DHS first argues that the juvenile court erred by sua sponte refusing to
consider Lowe’s testimony to events outside her personal knowledge that it
admitted at the hearing pursuant to the business records exception to the rule
against hearsay. DHS’s Brief at 22-30. DHS asserts that the juvenile court’s
retroactive exclusion of evidence undermined due process. Id. at 22-24. It
likens the situation to one in which this Court granted a new criminal trial
based upon the trial court’s erroneous and prejudicial sua sponte mid-trial
reversal of a pretrial ruling that breathalyzer test results were inadmissible
after defense counsel had detrimentally relied on this ruling in his opening
statement. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Metzer, 634 A.2d 228, 235-36
(Pa. Super. 1993)). From DHS’s perspective, the only history of the case Lowe
did not know was “why the court [had] ordered line-of-sight and line-of-
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hearing supervision,” and the dependency docket indicated that the juvenile
court ordered this restriction at the shelter hearing upon removal and
maintained it throughout the case. Id. at 21 n.1. It contends that it met the
prerequisites for the business record exception to hearsay and emphasizes its
essential need to rely upon such an exception, citing staff turnover, its role in
assuming custody of and overseeing the care of children for several years,
and its statutory duty to present information to the juvenile court regularly.
See DHS’s Brief at 24-27.
Neither the record nor the juvenile court’s opinion supports DHS’s
contention. First, despite DHS’s emphasis on its critical need to rely upon the
business record exception to the exclusion of hearsay evidence, the witness
DHS elected to present at the termination hearing rarely appeared to rely
upon any information DHS may have maintained in its record at the hearing.
For example, when asked by the solicitor on the second round of redirect
examination about whether Mother’s issues with housing, dual diagnosis, and
random screens have remained “issues from the beginning,” Lowe expressly
confined her response to the year that she had been on the case instead of
responding based upon information in DHS’s case file. N.T., 3/13/2025, at
53. She repeatedly disclaimed any knowledge of information that would have
been contained in the record, including Mother’s SCP objectives at the time of
Children’s adjudication of dependency and why line-of-sight visits were
ordered. See id. at 24-25, 46.
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Second, nothing in the juvenile court’s rationale suggests that it refused
to consider any of Lowe’s testimony. To the contrary, the juvenile court found
that the “record and testimony” DHS presented failed to meet its burden.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 5/30/2025, at 4. In so holding, it expressly relied
upon the testimony Lowe provided—in particular, her emphasis upon Mother’s
lack of “proper housing to accommodate [Children]” and “proper supports,
such as income” as the only reasons why Mother cannot provide “a safe and
secure home” to Children, as well as her acquiescence that the agency could
consider reunification if Mother obtained appropriate housing—despite clear
contrary evidence contained in both the historical and current dependency
orders entered by the juvenile court. See id. at 6 (citing N.T., 3/13/2025, at
44, 47-49). In the juvenile court’s opinion, DHS’s case was “deficient in both
quality and quantity” because it elected to present only “the testimony of a
single witness with limited familiarity with the Children and Mother.” See id.
at 4, 7. In an apparent recognition that Lowe’s testimony did not comport
with the documented history of the case, the juvenile court lamented Lowe’s
“lack of knowledge” concerning “the parts of this case that preceded [her]
involvement … [which] raised questions that caused the [juvenile c]ourt
concern.” Id. at 5. In other words, the juvenile court did consider Lowe’s
testimony and concluded that it did not clearly and convincingly persuade the
court to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
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In contrast to DHS’s argument that the juvenile court “improperly
nullified admissible evidence after the close of evidence and entry of
judgment,” see DHS’s Brief at 30, we conclude instead that the juvenile court
considered the evidence and concluded that DHS did not meet its burden of
proving that it should terminate Mother’s parental rights. As the underlying
basis of DHS’s argument that the juvenile court nullified evidence after
admitting it fails, no relief is due to DHS regarding its first issue. 17
Issue 2: Failure to Conduct Statutory Legal Analysis
Next, DHS argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct the
bifurcated legal analysis required by section 2511(a) and (b). DHS’s Brief at
30-32. Specifically, DHS contends that the juvenile court erred by not
analyzing the evidence under any subsection of 2511(a) before “summarily
concluded that the record was ‘devoid of real evidence.’” Id. at 32.
____________________________________________
17 Although we need not and do not decide today whether DHS satisfied the
requirements of the business record exception, we caution the agency that in
contrast to the specific information offered in cases discussing the satisfaction
of the exception, DHS’s method of establishing the presumption of
trustworthiness in its records merely consisted of several leading questions by
the solicitor seeking affirmative responses from Lowe. See N.T., 3/13/2025,
at 9-10; compare, e.g., Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v. Wicker, 206 A.3d
474, 482-83 (Pa. 2019). Furthermore, although not precedential, this Court
has reasoned that neither Rule 803(6) nor the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act “permits a witness to testify as to the contents of a record that
is not present, or being offered for admission, merely because he or she
purports to have read that record at an unspecified time in the past,” and
explained that a witness’ interpretation of what a record said lacks the same
indicia of reliability as a written original or duplicate document entered into
the evidentiary record pursuant to the business records exception. In re T.B.,
266 A.3d 609, **7-8 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision).
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DHS is correct that the juvenile court’s legal analysis appears to have
ignored the distinct subsections of section 2511(a) and considered grounds,
or possibly grounds along with needs and welfare, en masse instead. As
stated above, before the juvenile court analyzes whether termination of
parental rights serves a child’s welfare pursuant to section 2511(b), the
bifurcated statutory analysis requires the court to first analyze whether the
petitioner proved one or more of the grounds alleged in its petition under
subsection (a). C.M., 255 A.3d at 359. Section 2511(a) “provides eleven
enumerated grounds describing particular conduct of a parent which would
warrant involuntary termination.” Id.; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-
(11). These grounds “are not interchangeable,” and “our Supreme Court has
emphasized time and again that we must hew closely to the statutory
language” in analyzing matters under the Adoption Act. G.W., 342 A.3d at
85-86 (citing Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023); In re Adoption
of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827-28 (Pa. 2012)).
As a practical matter, this means that the court cannot deny the petition
under subsection (a) or skip ahead to consider subsection (b) until it analyzes
and rejects each subsection of (a) alleged in the petition. When appellate
courts review a juvenile court’s legal analysis, we do not look for the recital of
“magic words” in its opinion, but we cannot affirm if the trial court did not
“make clear” that it considered the pertinent legal factors and applied the
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correct legal standard in weighing them. See Int of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114-
15.
Nothing in the juvenile court’s opinion indicates that it analyzed the
petition under each subsection of (a) pled by DHS before denying the petition.
In fact, although the juvenile court cites a case discussing the bifurcated
process, its conclusion asserts that DHS’s failure to meet its burden of proof
made it “unclear to this court whether termination of mother’s parental rights
were in the child’s best interests,” suggesting that the juvenile court may have
erroneously moved directly to subsection (b) without considering whether
termination was warranted under subsection (a). See Juvenile Court Opinion,
3/15/2025, at 3-4, 7. In its comments on the record and in its written opinion,
the juvenile court never cites to the individual subsections of (a), discusses
the elements of any subsection, or cites to pertinent case law applying any
subsection.
This oversight appears to have been based upon the court’s frustration
with DHS’s evidentiary presentation. However, just as the juvenile court could
not disregard the statutory framework to grant a petition based upon its
overall impression of the petitioner’s evidence, a parent’s general lack of
efforts or progress, or its sense that terminating a parent’s rights is best for
the child, a juvenile court also cannot deny the petition based upon its general
dissatisfaction with DHS’s evidentiary presentation. While the juvenile court
is free to ultimately conclude that DHS did not meet its burden based upon
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the evidence that it introduced, the court must only arrive at that conclusion
after analyzing the evidence DHS presented pursuant to each statutory
subsection pled by DHS. See G.W., 342 A.3d at 85-86. In other words, the
court does not merely consider whether the petitioner clearly and convincingly
proved its petition; instead, it considers whether the petitioner proved by clear
and convincing evidence each statutory element pled. See In re T.R., 465
A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. 1983) (“[I]n all proceedings to involuntarily terminate
parental rights … the petitioner must prove the statutory criteria for that
termination by at least clear and convincing evidence.”) (emphasis added);
see also C.M., 255 A.3d at 362 (“[S]uch a significant final decree warrants
the courts’ closest consideration of whether competent evidence clearly and
convincingly proves the precise elements of the grounds at issue, in a
manner ‘so clear, direct, weighty and convincing’ it betrays no hesitance
regarding the truth of the facts in issue.”).
To be clear, we share the juvenile court’s frustration with DHS’s
evidentiary presentation. As the juvenile court aptly observed at the
conclusion of the hearing, DHS’s argument did not wholly match the evidence
it presented—a problem that persists on appeal. In fact, this was a problem
from the outset of the filing of the termination petitions: there is a significant
mismatch between the detailed facts it averred in its petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights and the facts DHS even attempted to prove at the
hearing. To meet its burden, DHS does not need to relitigate every aspect of
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the dependency case, but it cannot simply rely upon the fact that a child has
been in DHS care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months at the time of the
filing of the petition. No matter what occurred in a child’s dependency case,
an agency-petitioner must provide sufficient and competent evidence in the
termination matter to support its case. In re Quick, 559 A.2d 42, 47 (Pa.
Super. 1989).
It is not difficult to understand why the juvenile court found the
testimony of DHS’s sole witness to lack persuasiveness. She often failed to
provide details to support her testimony, did not focus on areas upon which
the juvenile court logically needed to hear evidence, and frequently failed to
connect the dots to assist the factfinder in understanding the bases for
termination. DHS’s sole witness did not know what Mother’s SCP objectives
were at the inception of the case or why the court ordered supervision of visits
with restrictive line-of-sight and line-of-hearing supervision—the very
restrictions relied upon by DHS to demonstrate that Mother was incapable of
parenting outside of these confined parameters.
The juvenile court correctly identified both the seriousness of
terminating parental rights and that DHS bears the burden of introducing
competent evidence that clearly and convincingly supports its petition. See
C.M., 255 A.3d at 358 (recognizing that termination has “far-reaching and
intentionally irreversible consequences for the parents and the child” and
involves potentially competing rights between a parent’s fundamental and
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intrinsic interest in parenting their child and the child’s essential needs for a
parent’s care, protection, and support); A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1171 (holding
that the gravity of decree requires the decision to be based solely on
competent evidence); S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1126 (explaining that any
petitioner seeking “state’s most extreme and permanent measure of
interfering” with parental rights “must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that termination of a parent’s rights is warranted pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511”). As this Court en banc emphasized in G.W., an agency needs to
provide a “clear presentation of evidence that is derived from firsthand sources
(to the extent possible) and that is tightly focused on the precise statutory
elements at hand.” Id. at 95. The clear and convincing evidentiary standard
is not simply best practice; it is a standard derived to protect the constitutional
rights of the family. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-70 (1982);
T.R., 465 A.2d at 643-44.
However, as discussed above, Lowe’s testimony was not the only
evidence presented by DHS. The juvenile court offers no indication that it
considered its own judicial findings in the dependency case introduced into
evidence through DHS Exhibit 1 without objection. It referred in general to
the insufficiency of the “record and testimony,” see Juvenile Court Opinion,
3/13/2025, at 4, but its analysis repeatedly discusses Lowe’s testimony
without mentioning any information in DHS Exhibit 1. Even if it was not
persuaded in whole or in part by Lowe’s testimony, before denying the
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petition, the juvenile court was required to analyze the distinct subsections
based upon all evidence offered by DHS.
As we have recounted, the juvenile court’s decision carries with it grave
consequences, and this is the precise reason that the court must “make clear”
that it considered the pertinent legal factors and applied the correct legal
standard in weighing them before concluding that DHS failed to meet its
evidentiary burden. See Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114-15. It also drives
the policy behind the statutory scheme that directs, when possible, the same
judge who presided over the dependency proceedings to decide the
termination matter. See Quick, 559 A.2d at 47. Unlike a parent-initiated
termination, an agency-initiated case regarding a dependent child involves a
parent who has “already demonstrated an inability to provide proper basic
care” and whom “the trial court often has observed … through multiple
hearings over the course of several months or years.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 369-
70. As this Court has explained when rejecting a parent’s challenge to the
same judge presiding over both cases, “[n]o one is in a better position to
determine whether the parties have fulfilled their mutual responsibilities
toward these goals than the [j]uvenile [c]ourt [j]udge who was involved with
the child from the beginning.” Quick, 559 A.2d at 47. While the “basis for
the termination decision … must stand on its own evidence and be established
by clear and convincing evidence,” assigning the same judge “will assure the
record is full and complete so that termination will not be granted if the agency
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is overreaching, or termination won’t be denied because of a pro forma
presentation.” Id. (emphasis added).
In sum, a juvenile court must evaluate all evidence presented by a
petitioner to consider whether such evidence proves each statutory element
of the subsections of 2511(a) pled by clear and convincing evidence. See
T.R., 465 A.2d at 644. The court may proceed to section 2511(b) only after
it determines that the petitioner’s evidence proves all elements of at least one
subsection of 2511(a). In re K.R., 200 A.3d at 979. If the court finds the
petitioner failed to prove any element of a particular subsection of 2511(a), it
must separately analyze the elements of the other subsections pled before
denying the petition. See G.W., 342 A.3d at 83–84. In either event, the
court’s analysis must “make clear” that it applied the proper legal framework.
See Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114-15. The juvenile court in the case at bar
erred by failing to do so.
Issues 3 and 4: Denial of Petition Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8)
We discuss DHS’s next two issues together as they are interrelated.
DHS argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the
petitions because DHS presented clear and convincing evidence to meet its
burden. DHS’s Brief at 37-45. Specifically, DHS argues, inter alia, that under
(a)(8), it proved that “Mother failed to address the core issues that led to the
children’s removal, including her untreated mental health conditions,
substance abuse, and chronic inability to manage anger, as demonstrated in
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part by her “volatile behavior during the termination hearing.” Id. at 45. DHS
contends that the juvenile court’s material factual findings in support of denial
are not supported by competent testimony in the record and undercut by its
order at the end of the hearing. Id. at 33-37, 35 n.7. DHS insists that “a
trial court’s factual findings must rest on competent, corroborated testimony
rather than unverified claims.” Id. at 33 (citing C.M., 255 A.3d at 369-70). It
also argues that complying with some SCP objectives does not demonstrate
that Mother resolved “the root problems” and any findings to the contrary are
belied by its order at the end of the hearing. Id. at 35 & n.7.
To terminate parental rights under section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner
must prove: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months
or more; (2) the conditions that led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8); In re C.L.G., 956
A.2d 999, 1008-9 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). In contrast to certain other
provisions of section 2511(a), the court’s focus under subsection (a)(8) is not
whether the parent has tried to change throughout the child’s time in care or
is capable of changing in the future. G.W., 342 A.3d at 87. Rather, the
second prong of subsection (a)(8) requires the court only to discern if the
parent has, in fact, remedied the conditions that led to the child’s removal or
placement. Id. To that end, the relevant inquiry under the second prong of
subsection (a)(8) is “whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at
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the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Further, “the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described [in section 2511(a)(8)] which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b).
In the instant case, Children have been removed from Mother’s care for
over two years—twice as long as the period contemplated by the first prong.
Turning to the second prong, the analysis centers on whether DHS proved that
the conditions that led to the removal or placement of Children continued to
exist. Although the juvenile court did not expressly analyze section
2511(a)(8), it appears to have found, based upon Lowe’s testimony, that DHS
removed Children “due to a physical abuse allegation and other concerns
regarding the home.” Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/13/2025, at 4-5 (citing N.T.,
3/13/2025, at 8-11); see also id. at 7 (“This case became known to
authorities due to an allegation of abuse.”). To the extent that the juvenile
court intended it as such, the record does not support the finding that the
child abuse was a mere allegation or that these two conditions were the only
ones leading to Children’s removal and placement. Although DHS did not
present its case cohesively or in much detail, it did introduce evidence that:
(1) M.K.L. received stitches after appearing at the emergency room with a
laceration next to his eye and a black eye, see N.T., 3/13/2025, at 13; and
(2) in Children’s dependency matter, the juvenile court: (a) found that Mother
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was the perpetrator of child abuse and aggravated circumstances existed, see
DHS Exhibit 1 (Permanency Review and Aggravated Circumstances Order,
12/18/2024); (b) restricted Mother’s contact with Children to visits under “line
of sight, line of hearing” supervision at the shelter hearing and never lifted
the restriction, see generally id.; and (c) found, at the time of Children’s
adjudication, that Mother needed to address concerns related to housing,
employment, drug and alcohol treatment, mental health treatment, parenting,
and anger management, see id. (Adjudication Order, 2/21/2023). Thus, the
record shows that the conditions that led to Children’s removal and placement
were Mother’s infliction of child abuse, lack of appropriate housing, lack of
employment, parenting, drug or alcohol use, mental health, and ability to
control her anger.
As for whether these conditions continue to exist, nothing in the opinion
indicates that the juvenile court analyzed the facts it had before it to make
this determination or that it applied the correct legal construct to do so. The
juvenile court only found that DHS failed to meet its burden of proving
“Mother’s inability to remedy the conditions that brought the Children into
care.” Juvenile Court Opinion, 5/30/2025, at 4 (emphasis added). But it did
not find that Mother had, in fact, remedied the conditions that brought
Children into care, such that reunification of Children with Mother was
imminent. G.W., 342 A.3d at 87. The court is correct that it does not need
to “fill out a scorecard” to make this evaluation, see Juvenile Court Opinion,
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3/13/2025, at 7, but it does need to apply the correct statutory standard to
evaluate the evidence. See G.W., 342 A.3d at 87.
As it pertains to the conditions that led to Children’s removal, the
juvenile court made the following relevant findings:
(1) Child abuse: Mother did not abuse children during her contact with
them, which was at weekly visits under line-of-sight and line-of-
hearing supervision.
(2) Employment: Mother was employed at a temporary agency at the
time of the hearing.
(3) Housing: Mother completed a class and is on housing lists. She
lacks suitable housing.
(4) Substance abuse: Mother did not submit to court ordered random
urinalysis. She did not appear to be under the influence at the
weekly visits.
(5) Mental health: No findings made because of a lack of evidence
presented.
(6) Anger management: Mother completed the service regarding
anger management to which CUA referred her. 18
(7) Parenting: Mother completed a class. She visited consistently.
During her weekly highly supervised visits, she acted
appropriately and without need for redirection.
See Juvenile Court Opinion, 5/30/2025, at 4-7.
Contrary to DHS’s arguments, these findings have support in the record.
For example, DHS’s protestations notwithstanding, see DHS’s Brief at 32, 36,
____________________________________________
18 The juvenile court found that Mother completed “anger management
therapy,” but the record does not indicate any details whether the “anger
management” services Mother completed was indeed therapy, a class
teaching a parent general anger management skills, or something else.
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Lowe’s own testimony supports the juvenile court’s determination that Mother
visited Children consistently, she interacted with Children properly, and the
visits were positive for all involved. In response to the solicitor’s query about
the general nature of the visits, Lowe testified (based upon her knowledge of
the case and her observation of approximately six visits) that “[o]verall the
visits go generally well,” and described positive interactions between Mother
and Children. See N.T., 3/13/2025, at 37. Mother visited in a largely
consistent fashion for almost two years under close supervision, yet Lowe
described only two concerns about the visits: once Mother claimed to use the
bathroom but “loitered around [NET’s] office” instead; another time Mother
failed to remain in contact and stopped visiting in December 2024 and January
2025. See id. at 35-37. DHS presented neither the testimony of other visit
supervisors nor evidence of other concerns. As such, based upon Lowe’s
testimony and the absence of evidence regarding concerns or the need for
parenting redirection, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that
Mother’s visits went well and displayed her ability to parent appropriately. The
caveat is, of course, that Mother demonstrated this only in a highly supervised
setting for two hours a week.
The case relied upon by DHS to poke holes in the factual support for the
juvenile court’s findings is inapposite. In C.M., the parent testified credibly
that she wanted her father to adopt her children because she believed she had
a fatal medical condition. See C.M., 255 A.2d at 369. After explaining why
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specificity and corroboration are crucial in a private termination case between
two parents offering only their own subjective testimony, the Supreme Court
determined that this evidence, while credible, was not competent to establish
that the prognosis of her rare, relatively unknown health condition, which had
not interfered with her parenting to date, was fatal. See id. at 369-70.
Without corroborating evidence offered by the petitioner-mother, who bore
the burden of proof in the termination case she filed against the other parent,
our Supreme Court held that the orphans’ court abused its discretion by using
such evidence to conclude that Mother proved that the circumstances were
“unusual” and children’s best interests warranted severance of the children’s
father’s rights. Id.
In contrast, in the instant case, Mother was not the petitioner in a
private parent versus parent case, she did not bear the burden of proof, and
her testimony that she was currently employed was competent, if believed, to
establish that she was in fact employed. While this Court or another factfinder
may have been more skeptical of Mother’s claim because of repeated findings
that she failed to verify her employment throughout Children’s dependency
case, it is not an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to find that Mother
was employed based upon her testimony. Again, however, this factual finding
only holds so much weight based upon the testimony—that Mother was
employed at a temporary agency at the time of the termination hearing,
without any details about dates, hours, and wages, is hardly dispositive of any
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ultimate issue in this case. The juvenile court’s point seems to be more that
it is DHS who carries the burden of proof; if the agency wants to rely upon a
parent’s failure to obtain or maintain employment as a basis for termination,
or to discredit a parent’s testimony about something within her personal
knowledge, it needs to offer evidence to support its claim and how it relates
to the question of her ability to maintain her parental rights.
DHS argues that the juvenile court determined that “Mother’s finances
and housing were the primary barriers to reunification” and that such
conclusion “lacks support from competent evidence.” DHS’s Brief at 34, 35-
36 n.7. We disagree that the juvenile court made this specific finding.
Instead, the juvenile court was summarizing the evidence DHS presented to
support its termination petitions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
stated that it “heard that the main barriers to reunification are housing and
income.” N.T., 3/13/2025, at 60. In its opinion, it observed that Lowe’s
“advocacy for the termination of Mother’s parental rights seemed to hinge on
the fact that Mother currently lacks suitable housing and is financially
insecure,” citing to Lowe’s explanation for why Children would not be
irreparably harmed if the court granted termination. Juvenile Court Opinion,
5/30/2025, at 6 (citing N.T., 3/13/2025, at 44, 47-49).
In other words, the court recounted DHS’s own witness testimony that
the court should terminate Mother’s parental rights because Mother does not
have stable housing or income. The juvenile court did not pull this out of thin
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air. When asked why she believed terminating Mother’s parental rights would
not cause Children irreparable harm, Lowe responded with the ways in which
Paternal Grandmother was meeting their needs and enhancing their growth,
but regarding Mother, Lowe said only that she lacked “proper housing to
accommodate” Children and did not have “proper supports, such as income,
that is needed for the children to be in a safe and secure home.” N.T.,
3/13/2025, at 44. Children’s counsel provided Lowe another opportunity to
expand upon her answer as to other reasons Children would not be irreparably
harmed by terminating Mother’s parental rights, but Lowe responded that
there was no other reason. Id. at 46-47. Lowe also agreed on cross-
examination that if Mother obtained appropriate housing, DHS could consider
reunification. Id. at 49. It was not until DHS’s solicitor posed a leading
question on redirect that Lowe agreed Mother’s substance abuse and mental
health were also barriers to reunification. Id. at 51. Even then, when the
solicitor asked if Mother’s “issues” with housing, substance abuse, and mental
health “have remained unalleviated” over the two years the case had been
open, Lowe focused her answer only on housing. See id. at 53.
It is easy to understand why Lowe’s answers concerned the juvenile
court. Subsection (b) prohibits terminating parental rights “solely on the basis
of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income,
clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). DHS’s evidence did not fully explain why Mother lacked
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housing, what Mother did or did not do to obtain housing, and why her current
housing was not appropriate for Children. Likewise, it presented evidence only
that Mother was not consistently employed; it did not explain whether her lack
of income was within her control. Lowe’s testimony downplayed the most
serious potential safety concerns in the dependency matter: Mother’s initial
abuse of one of the children, as well as her anger management, mental health,
and substance abuse concerns. Common sense dictates that the dependency
court would not maintain intense supervision restrictions of a parent with her
children for two years because that parent has unstable housing and income.
Thus, lack of support in the record is not our concern with juvenile
court’s findings; it is, as DHS alternatively recognizes, that these findings do
not establish that the conditions that led to Children’s removal no longer exist.
Applied to the correct legal standard under subsection (a)(8), the juvenile
court’s findings, at best, indicate that Mother has made some progress toward
eliminating the conditions.19 However, “[t]he law is clear that a finding that
____________________________________________
19 Although Lowe’s testimony failed to expressly link the SCP objectives to
conditions leading to removal, the SCP objectives she testified to are largely
consistent with the directives ordered by the court at the adjudication hearing.
Compare N.T., 3/13/2025, at 24-25 (testifying that CUA set objectives
related to cooperation with CUA, visitation, employment, housing, substance
abuse, and mental health), with DHS Exhibit 1 (Adjudication Order,
2/21/2023) (issuing orders concerning visitation, employment, housing,
substance abuse, mental health, parenting, and anger management). In its
Rule 1925 opinion, the juvenile court expressly found that “Lowe’s testimony
proved that Mother had been moderately compliant with her SCP objectives”
and that “Mother completed some, but not all her SCP objectives.” Id. at 7.
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a parent ‘was making progress toward remedying the conditions,’ is legally
insufficient to preclude termination under (a)(8).” G.W., 342 A.3d at 88
(citation omitted). We therefore agree with DHS that the juvenile court erred
by applying an incorrect legal standard to analyze (a)(8).
We further agree that the juvenile court abused its discretion in applying
its factual findings to the incorrect legal standard to conclude that DHS failed
to meet its burden. To the extent the juvenile court’s assertion that the
“record and testimony … failed to demonstrate Mother’s ongoing inability to
provide care for or control of the Children by clear and convincing evidence”
suggests that it analyzed the case under section 2511(a)(8) and decided that
the conditions that led to Children’s removal no longer existed, see Juvenile
Court Opinion, 5/30/2025, at 4, this conclusion is belied by the court’s orders
entered at the conclusion of the termination hearing. Therein, the juvenile
court ordered Mother to complete directives related to drug and alcohol use,
mental health, anger management, employment, housing, and parenting.
N.T., 3/13/2025, at 59. It did not increase the frequency of Mother’s visitation
or lessen the restrictive supervision. Id. These orders strongly suggest that
reunification was not imminent and that the juvenile court believed that
Mother had not remedied the conditions that led to Children’s removal. In
fact, the orders entered at the termination hearing essentially mirror the
orders entered at the adjudication hearing two years prior.
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We therefore conclude that although there is some support in the record
for most of the court’s factual findings, the juvenile court erred as a matter of
law by not applying the correct legal standard under subsection (a)(8). We
recognize that DHS’s evidentiary presentation complicated the juvenile court’s
ability to assess whether DHS clearly and convincingly proved the second
element of (a)(8), but its failure to consider all the evidence presented by DHS
in reaching its decision—including its own orders—constituted an abuse of
discretion. See Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114-15, G.W., 342 A.3d at 83–84.
Issue 5: Needs and Welfare
In its final issue, DHS argues that, in addition to prematurely addressing
whether termination best serves Children’s needs and welfare, the juvenile
court applied the wrong standard to make this assessment because the court
did not consider Children’s bond with Paternal Grandmother and found that
Mother and Children had a “parental bond” as opposed to a fun relative
relationship at visits. Id. at 47-48. DHS contends that it proved through
Lowe’s “unrebutted testimony” that “terminating Mother’s parental rights
would not result in irreparable harm” and that terminating Mother’s rights
served Children’s needs and welfare because it protects their relationship with
Paternal Grandmother and ability to continue flourishing developmentally and
emotionally. Id. at 50.
Furthermore, DHS argues that the juvenile court’s finding that Children
share a healthy bond with Mother is not supported by competent evidence.
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DHS’s Brief at 34. In making this argument, DHS criticizes the testimony of
its own witness, arguing that Lowe’s characterization of the bond as one that
seemed healthy was not supported by any substantive evidence. Id. DHS’s
argument rests heavily upon the testimony it elicited indicating that Mother
initiated affection toward Children but Children “never initiated affection in
return,” despite evidence it says demonstrates that Children initiate affection
with Paternal Grandmother. Id. at 35. It also criticizes the juvenile court for
“interpret[ing]” Lowe’s testimony as an indication that the visits are
“appropriate and positive experiences for everyone.” Id. at 47.
The third prong of section 2511(a)(8) requires a determination of
whether “termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). Unlike the second prong of
(a)(8), which focuses on the behavior of the parent, the third prong of section
2511(a)(8) specifically “accounts for the needs of the child.” C.L.G., 956 A.2d
at 1008-09. Likewise, section 2511(b) requires courts to consider whether
termination of parental rights serves a child’s needs and welfare from each
child’s perspective, placing the child’s “developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” Int. of K.T.,
296 A.3d at 1105-06. Our Supreme Court has cautioned that “the law
regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied mechanically
but instead always with an eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare
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of the particular children involved.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268-69 (Pa.
2013).
When determining whether the petitioner met its burden to prove that
termination best serves a child’s needs and welfare, the juvenile court must
consider, at a minimum, the factors delineated by our Supreme Court in K.T.,
all of which are of “‘primary’ importance in the [s]ection 2511(b) analysis” and
“may contribute equally to the determination of a child's specific
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Int. of K.T., 296
A.3d at 1109.
The juvenile court must determine whether the parent and child share
an emotional bond and assess whether the bond is “necessary and beneficial”
to the child, such that “maintaining the bond serves the child's developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. If a bond exists, the court
must ascertain the effect upon the child of severing the bond. Id. Because
the severing of any parent-child bond may be emotionally painful for a child,
the juvenile court cannot preclude termination based solely on evidence of an
“adverse” or “detrimental” impact to the child or truncate its analysis at this
finding. Id. at 1110-11. Instead, focusing upon the “child’s development,
and mental and emotional health,” the juvenile court should assess whether
severing the bond “is the kind of loss that would predictably cause extreme
emotional consequences or significant, irreparable harm” to the child. Id.
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The parent-child bond, however, is “but one part of the overall
subsection (b) analysis.” Id. The court must also consider:
the child’s need for permanency and length of time in foster care
consistent with [the Juvenile Act,] 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9) and
[ASFA], 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(5)(C), (E); whether the child is in a
preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether
the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort,
security, safety, and stability.
Id.
When conducting “a full subsection (b) analysis focused upon the child,”
the juvenile court has “discretion to place appropriate weight on each factor
present in the record.” Id. at 1113. However, when “weighing the difficult
factors discussed above, courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever
in mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an
obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at
269. The party seeking termination bears the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights serves a child’s needs
and welfare. Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105.
As we explained in our discussion of issue two, it appears that the
juvenile court may have jumped to the needs and welfare portion of the
analysis prior to evaluating each ground for termination. To do so was legal
error. G.W., 342 A.3d at 83. The juvenile court should only proceed to a
needs and welfare analysis under the third prong of (a)(8) and (b) if it
concluded that DHS proved the first two prongs of (a)(8). As stated above,
the juvenile court’s decision as to the first two prongs was in error.
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Remedy
The remedy for these errors is not simply reversing the juvenile court’s
order denying termination, as DHS suggests. To resolve the petition in DHS’s
favor in this case on this record would require this Court to make factual
findings that the juvenile court did not make and to weigh evidence and
competing considerations. These actions are counter to our standard of
review. See S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1129; cf. G.W., 342 A.3d at 88 (applying
juvenile court’s factual findings regarding grounds to the correct legal
standard because such findings had full support in the record and weighing of
evidence by this Court was not required). Instead, we are compelled to
remand the matter so that the juvenile court may apply the correct legal
standard applicable to subsection (a)(8) and to use its discretion to reach a
conclusion. In doing so, the court must evaluate all evidence presented by
DHS, including the juvenile court’s findings introduced in DHS Exhibit 1. Given
“termination’s irreversible effect on a child’s relationship with a parent,” on
remand “we allow the trial court an opportunity to review the record or further
develop it,” if needed, to conduct the correct section 2511(a)(8) analysis. See
Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1117.
We are not directing the juvenile court to resolve any issues regarding
DHS’s burden in a particular fashion or to weigh the facts in a particular
manner, other than abiding by the statutory framework required by the
General Assembly. We make several observations, however, to guide its
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analysis. First, the court should bear in mind that although applying
subsection (a)(8) to a parent who has made some progress toward resolving
the problems that led to removal of her children may seem harsh,
by allowing for termination when the conditions that led to
removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute
implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.
Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates
only a short period of time, to wit [eighteen] months, in which to
complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child
who has been placed in foster care.
R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513.
Second, given that Children came into care as a result of Mother’s
perpetration of child abuse upon M.K.L., the repeated orders for Mother to
address anger management beginning at the outset of the case and continuing
through the date of the termination hearing, and Mother’s visits for twenty-
seven months restricted to weekly to line of sight and line of hearing
supervision, it is of utmost importance that the court carefully assess whether
DHS has proved that Mother’s anger management issues continue to exist. In
particular, while Lowe testified that visits went well, the juvenile court also
was presented with, but did not address, its own factual findings during
Children’s dependency case indicating that Mother’s visits were suspended at
both CUA and DHS during the duration of this case. Particularly pertinent is
its findings following the September 9, 2024 permanency review hearing that
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Mother’s visits at DHS were suspended because she became “irate,” knocked
over snacks, and made a mess, leading to her being escorted out. The factual
findings in the September 9, 2024 permanency review order suggest that
Mother’s anger management issues persisted at that time, possibly in the
presence of Children.
We also emphasize that at the conclusion of the termination hearing,
the court ordered Mother to participate in anger management services,
despite finding that she already completed anger management services.
Although we cannot reach a definitive conclusion at this stage of the case, this
suggests that the court has in fact determined that the condition continues to
exist and that Mother needs further work in that area. Indeed, whether this
condition has been remedied is highly questionable based upon Mother’s
behavior at the hearing. Termination of parental rights hearings are extremely
emotional, and a parent’s ability to control their behavior during such a
hearing may not be reflective of their general behavior in the rest of their life.
Nevertheless, based upon our review of the cold record and our extensive
experience reviewing these matters, Mother’s behavior and inability to control
her outbursts seventy separate times was atypical conduct in a termination
proceeding and, to put it gently, highly concerning. Given that Children were
removed from Mother’s care, in part, because of Mother’s infliction of child
abuse upon M.K.L., we find it odd that the juvenile court did not even make
mention in its opinion of her conduct during the hearing, and manifestly
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unreasonable for it to make no finding as to whether or not it evidenced a
continuing concern related to her anger management and/or mental health.
This is particularly true here, as the juvenile court that heard the evidence
firsthand and observed Mother’s behavior during the hearing is familiar with
the parties and has observed Mother in other proceedings related to Children.
Turning to the needs and welfare analysis, if the juvenile court reaches
the third prong of subsection (a)(8) and subsection (b), it must analyze the
evidence on remand in accordance with K.T. We offer the following
observations to guide the court’s analysis. First, we recognize the disconnect
between DHS’s argument that Lowe’s testimony is not competent to prove
that the bond between Children and Mother is healthy and positive, yet is
somehow competent to prove that Children will experience no irreparable
harm if Mother’s rights are terminated. Clearly, this is not an assessment that
we can make on appeal. A healthy bond, however, is not the ending point of
the analysis: the court must consider whether the bond “is necessary and
beneficial to the child” and weigh the consideration with other factors present
in the record. Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114-15. It must also determine
each child’s needs and consider the bond (both with Mother and Paternal
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Grandmother) from the child’s perspective and within the context of the child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Id.20
Conclusion
Orders vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Murray joins the Opinion.
Judge Bowes files a Concurring Opinion.
____________________________________________
20 We appreciate the concern so thoughtfully set forth by our concurring jurist
that remanding a dependency-related termination of parental rights case
detracts from the goal of securing finality and permanency for young children
during the fleeting stage of their youth. Our Supreme Court has emphasized,
and we remain cognizant of, the critical nature of children’s permanency needs
and the impact of the failure to be vigilant about obtaining it promptly. See
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa. 2013). At the same time, our High Court
has “acknowledged the solemn reality that a decree terminating parental
rights is widely regarded as the civil law equivalent to the death penalty,
forever obliterating the fundamental legal relationships between parent and
child.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 362 (Pa. 2021). The stakes
are high and “intentionally irreversible.” Id. at 358. While the Concurrence is
correct that we afford a much lesser deference in cases involving dependency
adjudications, permanency goal changes, and custody decisions, all of which
profoundly impact a child’s life, only termination decisions are irrevocable.
The bifurcated statutory scheme, DHS’s exacting burden of proof, and our
standard of review on appeal all reflect the nature of these stakes and
competing interests of the parties. “[O]ur role is not to decide whether [the
petitioner] satisfied its burden of proof at the hearing; instead, we must decide
whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law
in deciding that [the petitioner] did not.” G.W., 342 A.3d at 94. We certainly
appreciate the learned Concurrence’s view that the facts reveal only one
reasonable outcome and plainly support the termination of parental rights,
see Concurring Opinion at 2, 4, but it is not our role to make this
determination in the first instance.
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Date: 2/24/2026
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