AR 86-17(9): Owens v. Schweiker , 692 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1982) Child's Benefits -- Title II of the Social Security Act

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Social Security Rulings › AR › Ninth Circuit Court › AR 86-17(9)

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Text

AR 86-17(9) (Rescinded 11/27/98)

EFFECTIVE DATE: 5/21/86

ISSUE:

Whether, for purposes of determining a child's status under Section

216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act, the Secretary must apply the

State law of interstate succession in effect at the time of the worker's

death, rather than the law in effect at the time of the Secretary's

determination.

STATUTE/REGULATION/RULING CITATION:

Section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(2)(A));

20 C.F.R. 404.354(b)

CIRCUIT:

NINTH (ALASKA, ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, GUAM, HAWAII, IDAHO, MONTANA, NEVADA,

NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, OREGON, WASHINGTON)

Owens v. Schweiker , 692 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1982)

APPLICABILITY OF RULING:

DESCRIPTION OF CASE:

Jason Owens alleges that he is entitled to child's insurance benefits on

the earnings record of Elvis Joe Quinton because he is the worker's

illegitimate son. Mr. Quinton, a Washington domiciliary, died six months

before Jason was born. Theresa Owens, Jason's mother, was never married to

Mr. Quinton nor did she live with him. Mr. Quinton was unaware of the

pregnancy at the time of his death, and left no will or other writing

acknowledging the unborn child as his own. Jason's right to benefits was

dependent on his right to inherit from his father under the laws of

intestacy of the State of Washington. Under Washington law in effect at

the time of Mr. Quinton's death in 1971, an illegitimate child could not

take by intestate succession from a deceased father unless the father had

either married the child's mother or acknowledged the child in writing.

Jason could therefore not qualify as Mr. Quinton's child under either

provision.

nder the laws of

intestacy of the State of Washington. Under Washington law in effect at

the time of Mr. Quinton's death in 1971, an illegitimate child could not

take by intestate succession from a deceased father unless the father had

either married the child's mother or acknowledged the child in writing.

Jason could therefore not qualify as Mr. Quinton's child under either

provision.

In 1976, after Mr. Quinton's death but before Jason's Social Security

claim was filed, Washington amended its law of intestate succession so

that a child's right to inherit by intestate succession does not depend on

whether the parents married each other. Under the amended statute, Jason

may be an intestate heir of Quinton and therefore may be his child for

purposes of claiming benefits under the Act.

Ms. Owens' 1978 claim for benefits on behalf of Jason was denied by the

administrative law judge (ALJ) on the ground that the applicable State law

to apply for purposes of section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act

was that in effect at the time of Mr. Quinton's death. Ms. Owens appealed

to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington

which affirmed the Secretary's decision. Ms. Owens then appealed to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which reversed the

district court's decision and remanded the case to the district court with

instructions to remand it to the Secretary for a determination under the

Washington law of intestate succession, as amended in 1976.

HOLDING:

The Court of Appeals held that the Secretary erred by applying the law of

intestate succession in effect at the time of the insured worker's death,

rather than the law in effect at the time of the Secretary's

determination.

STATEMENT AS TO HOW OWENS DIFFERS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY

POLICY:

y for a determination under the

Washington law of intestate succession, as amended in 1976.

HOLDING:

The Court of Appeals held that the Secretary erred by applying the law of

intestate succession in effect at the time of the insured worker's death,

rather than the law in effect at the time of the Secretary's

determination.

STATEMENT AS TO HOW OWENS DIFFERS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY

POLICY:

42 U.S.C. 416(h)(2)(A) states in pertinent part that to determine ". . .

whether an applicant is the child . . .of a fully or currently insured

individual for purposes of this title, the Secretary shall apply such law

as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate property by

the courts of the State in which . . . if such insured individual is dead,

. . . he was domiciled at the time of his death. . . ." Under the

Secretary's regulation (20 C.F.R. 404.354(b)), interpreting the statute,

SSA applies intestacy laws which were in effect in the State of the

worker's domicile at the time of the worker's death.

The Court of Appeals in Owens held that the Secretary must apply

the intestacy law in effect at the time of the Secretary's

determination.

EXPLANATION OF HOW SSA WILL APPLY THE DECISION WITHIN THE CIRCUIT:

This ruling applies only to cases where the child resides in Alaska,

Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern

Mariana Islands, Oregon, or Washington at the time of determination or

decision at any level of administrative review, i.e., initial,

reconsideration, administrative law judge hearing or Appeals Council.

OW SSA WILL APPLY THE DECISION WITHIN THE CIRCUIT:

This ruling applies only to cases where the child resides in Alaska,

Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern

Mariana Islands, Oregon, or Washington at the time of determination or

decision at any level of administrative review, i.e., initial,

reconsideration, administrative law judge hearing or Appeals Council.

In a claim for surviving child's benefits involving section 216(h)(2)(A)

of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 416(h)(2)(A)), to determine the

right of the child to inherit under the intestacy law in the State of the

worker's domicile at the time of death, the law which is in effect at the

time of the determination or decision at any level of administrative

review, i.e., initial, reconsideration, administrative law judge hearing

or Appeals Council review, shall be applied to determine the child's

entitlement to benefits.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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