AR 86-12(9): Hutcheson v. Califano , 638 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1981) -- Determination of Stepchild and Resulting Entitlement to Auxiliary Benefits -- Title II of the Social Security Act

AR 86-12(9)

EFFECTIVE DATE: 4/8/86

ISSUE:

Definition of stepchild for purposes of entitlement to child's insurance

benefits on the earnings record of a recipient of old-age insurance

benefits.

STATUTE/REGULATION/RULING CITATION:

Sections 202(b)(1), (d)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.

402(b)(1), (d)(1)); 20 C.F.R. 404.357; SSR 66-11 , SSR 81-28c

CIRCUIT:

NINTH (ALASKA, CALIFORNIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, OREGON, WASHINGTON, IDAHO,

MONTANA, HAWAII, GUAM, NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS)

Hutcheson v. Califano , 638 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1981)

APPLICABILITY OF RULING:

DESCRIPTION OF CASE(S):

Elwood Hutcheson, an insured individual entitled to old-age insurance

benefits under Section 202(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

Section 402(a), married Doris Hutcheson on June 5, 1970. In October 1972,

they separated. During the separation, on October 10, 1973, Doris gave

birth to a daughter, Sarah, in New Jersey, where Doris was living at the

time. On Sarah's birth certificate, one David Robinson is listed as the

father. Subsequent to Sarah's birth, on March 3, 1974, Doris and Sarah

returned to Elwood's home in Yakima, Washington, where they have lived

ever since. After he became entitled to benefits, Elwood legally adopted

Sarah on May 16, 1974.

Later Doris Hutcheson applied for Social Security benefits as a wife with

an entitled child in her care, and for child's benefits on behalf of

Sarah, based upon the earnings record of Elwood. Both applications were

denied by the Social Security Administration (SSA) since Sarah, who was

not the natural child of the wage earner (Elwood), was found not to meet

the dependency requirements of the Act and was determined not to be the

stepchild of the wage earner. Under Section 202(d)(8) of the Act, if the

insured individual (wage earner) adopts a child after he becomes entitled

to old-age insurance benefits, dependency requirements must be met unless

the child is the insured individual's natural child or stepchild

(Elwood), was found not to meet

the dependency requirements of the Act and was determined not to be the

stepchild of the wage earner. Under Section 202(d)(8) of the Act, if the

insured individual (wage earner) adopts a child after he becomes entitled

to old-age insurance benefits, dependency requirements must be met unless

the child is the insured individual's natural child or stepchild. Under

the regulations, 20 C.F.R. 404.357, to qualify as a stepchild, the parent

of the child and the insured individual must have married after the child

was born. The claimants appealed to the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Washington. The Secretary's decision was sustained

by the United States District Court. Doris appealed for herself and on

behalf of Sarah to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit.

HOLDINGS:

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and noted that the Social

Security Act does not specifically define stepchild and there is no

general federal common law relating to family relationships. Since the

wage earner Elwood was living in the State of Washington, the court held

that Washington law was controlling. Washington law defines stepchild as a

"child of the petitioner's spouse who is not a child of the petitioner."

Wash. Rev. Code Section 26.32.200(3) (1971). Under this definition, Sarah

was held by the court to be Elwood's stepchild and therefore, entitled to

child's benefits on Elwood's earnings record. Since Sarah was eligible for

child's benefits, Doris was held to be eligible for wife's benefits

because she had Sarah in her care. 42 U.S.C. 402(b)(1)(B).

STATEMENT AS TO HOW HUTCHESON DIFFERS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY

POLICY:

32.200(3) (1971). Under this definition, Sarah

was held by the court to be Elwood's stepchild and therefore, entitled to

child's benefits on Elwood's earnings record. Since Sarah was eligible for

child's benefits, Doris was held to be eligible for wife's benefits

because she had Sarah in her care. 42 U.S.C. 402(b)(1)(B).

STATEMENT AS TO HOW HUTCHESON DIFFERS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY

POLICY:

Although the term stepchild is not defined in the Social Security Act, as

provided in 20 C.F.R. 404.357, SSR 66-11 , and SSR

81-28c, the Act has been interpreted by SSA to mean that a person may be

eligible for child's benefits as the insured's stepchild only if the

child's natural or adopting parent marries the insured after the child's

birth.

The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hutcheson holds that, since the term stepchild is not specifically

defined in the Social Security Act, the definition of stepchild as

provided by State law is controlling.

EXPLANATION OF HOW SSA WILL APPLY THE DECISION WITHIN THE CIRCUIT:

This ruling applies only to cases in which the child resides in

California, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, the

Northern Mariana Islands, Alaska, Hawaii, or Guam at the time of the

determination or decision at any level of administrative review, i.e.,

initial, reconsideration, administrative law judge hearing or Appeals

Council. SSA will apply the State law of the insured wage earner's

domicile at the time the application is filed, or, if the wage earner is

dead, the wage earner's domicile at the time of death.

When a case involves the issue of whether or not a person is a stepchild

of an insured individual for purposes of Section 202(d)(1) of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 402(d)(1), the definition of "stepchild" as

provided by State law rather than the Social Security regulation will be

controlling, consistent with the Hutcheson decision.

EFFECTIVE DATE: