Rule 2.5. Performing Administrative Responsibilities

(A) Judges shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently,

diligently, and without bias or prejudice.

(B) Judges shall maintain professional competence in judicial administration,

and shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration

of court business.

(C) Rules that might be understood as

(1) requiring impartiality or

(2) prohibiting ex parte communications

in connection with impending matters and pending proceedings, including but

not limited to Rules 1.2, 2.9, 2.11, 2.13, 3.7, and 4.2 (A) (2), do not apply to

administrative duties not in connection with an impending matter or a pending

proceeding.

Commentary:

[1] Judges may perform weddings during their normal office hours,

when doing so does not interfere with or delay court proceedings, security, or

operations. Some courts and judges may have minimal time available for

conducting weddings.

[2] Judges who perform weddings during their normal office hours, for

which they are collecting a salary or are paid a per diem, shall not require

payment for this service. Judges may receive a reasonable tip, gratuity, or

negotiated consideration only for weddings performed both away from the

courthouse and outside their normal office hours. See OCGA § 19-3-49. It is

inappropriate for a judge to have a policy of performing weddings only afterhours and off-site in order to receive payment.

[3] Any remuneration received for performing a wedding shall be

reported under Rule 3.15 as extra-judicial compensation.

[4] As Rule 2.1 states, the primary role of judges is to “serve as the

arbiters of facts and law for the resolution of disputes.” See also Sons of

Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Comm’rs, 315 Ga. 39, 50 (2) (b)

(880 SE2d 168) (2022) (“The judicial power is that which declares what law

is, and applies it to past transactions and existing cases; it expounds and

judicially administers the law; it interprets and enforces the law in a case in

litigation.” (cleaned up))

cts and law for the resolution of disputes.” See also Sons of

Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Comm’rs, 315 Ga. 39, 50 (2) (b)

(880 SE2d 168) (2022) (“The judicial power is that which declares what law

is, and applies it to past transactions and existing cases; it expounds and

judicially administers the law; it interprets and enforces the law in a case in

litigation.” (cleaned up)). But our constitutional system of separated powers

also vests in at least some judges and organizations of judges an additional

role, that of policy-maker with respect to administrative duties. Much of that

authority is vested in the Supreme Court, but at least some is vested in other

classes of courts as well. See, e.g., Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I (providing

for the advice and consent of councils of trial courts in the adoption by the

Supreme Court of uniform trial court rules). Judges in whom the Constitution

has vested policy-making power must be free to exercise that power in the

manner they believe best serves the public, even if that involves preferring and

advocating for particular outcomes within the scope of that policy-making

power in a manner that otherwise would be forbidden if it instead regarded an

impending matter or a pending proceeding. While judges must always be

impartial in their exercise of adjudicative duties (which this Code identifies by

the use of the terms “impending matters” and “pending proceedings”),

extending to policy-making administrative duties that same requirement of

impartiality – at least in the colloquial sense of that word – would be in tension

with the nature of policy-making power. As used in this Code, of course,

impartiality has a narrower, two-fold meaning than its colloquial sense: (1)

avoiding bias and prejudice, and (2) maintenance of an open mind in

considering issues that may come before a judge. The first such meaning

applies to all judicial actions, which Rule 2.5 (A) reiterates

l sense of that word – would be in tension

with the nature of policy-making power. As used in this Code, of course,

impartiality has a narrower, two-fold meaning than its colloquial sense: (1)

avoiding bias and prejudice, and (2) maintenance of an open mind in

considering issues that may come before a judge. The first such meaning

applies to all judicial actions, which Rule 2.5 (A) reiterates. But the second

meaning is limited to the exercise of adjudicative duties, as are the recusal

obligations of Rule 2.11, which by its very terms apply only to proceedings. In

the same way, Rule 2.9’s prohibition on ex parte communications, by its text

and nature, applies only to impending matters and pending proceedings, and

hence has no application to administrative duties unrelated to such matters or

proceedings. That judges, lawyers, members of the public, or other

stakeholders may have and communicate an interest in how a judge performs

administrative duties does not convert the administrative duty into an

adjudicative duty.

Commentary [3] amended effective September 22, 2016. Text amended and Commentary [4]

added effective February 1, 2024.