Rule 8.4. Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

« Rule 8.4. »

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,

knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of

another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s

honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government

agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of

Professional Conduct or other law; or

(f) ) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is

a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

COMMENT

[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to

violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce

another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request

or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer’s behalf. Paragraph (a), however,

does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the

client is legally entitled to take.

[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice

law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to

file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such

implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses

involving “moral turpitude.” That concept can be construed to include

offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery

and comparable offenses, which have no specific connection to fitness for

offense of willful failure to

file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such

implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses

involving “moral turpitude.” That concept can be construed to include

offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery

and comparable offenses, which have no specific connection to fitness for

the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the

entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for

offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.

Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious

interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A

pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when

considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.

[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly

manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,

religion,

national

origin,

disability,

age,

sexual

orientation

or

socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are

prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy

respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial

judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a

discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.

[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law

upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of

Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope,

meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation

of the practice of law.

[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going

beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can

suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers

ts. The provisions of

Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope,

meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation

of the practice of law.

[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going

beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can

suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is

true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor,

administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a

corporation or other organization.

INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINE.

Lawyer’s income taxes.

The following statements of principles are promulgated as Interpretive

Guidelines in the application of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of

Professional Conduct:

Criminal acts that reflect adversely on a lawyer’s honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, as construed under

these Rules, shall be deemed to include, but not limited to, the following:

(1) Willful failure to make and file federal, state, or city income tax

returns or estimated income tax returns, or to pay such estimated tax or

taxes, or to supply information in connection therewith at the time or

times required by law or regulation;

(2) Willful attempt in any manner to evade any federal, state, or city

income tax.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorneys’ fees.

— Fee splitting.

Client relations.

— Client funds.

— — Accounting.

— — Misappropriation.

— — Safeguarding.

— Diligence.

— Sexual.

Analysis

Incapacity or incompetence of attorney.

— Defense to misconduct.

— Reinstatement.

Law firms.

— Bookkeeping.

— Managing co-counsel.

— Managing partner.

— Office.

— Taxes.

Professional conduct.

come tax.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorneys’ fees.

— Fee splitting.

Client relations.

— Client funds.

— — Accounting.

— — Misappropriation.

— — Safeguarding.

— Diligence.

— Sexual.

Analysis

Incapacity or incompetence of attorney.

— Defense to misconduct.

— Reinstatement.

Law firms.

— Bookkeeping.

— Managing co-counsel.

— Managing partner.

— Office.

— Taxes.

Professional conduct.

— Candor toward the tribunal.

— Decorum of the tribunal.

— Illegal conduct.

— Obligations toward the tribunal.

Sanctions.

— Disbarment.

— Disciplinary proceedings.

— Dismissal of claim.

— Reprimand.

— Suspension.

Attorneys’ fees.

— Fee splitting.

Attorney violated subsection (a) by attempting to divide a prospective

fee in violation of Prof. Cond. R. 1.5(e). In re Maguire, 725 A.2d 417 (Del.

1999).

Client relations.

— Client funds.

— — Accounting.

Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 1.15A, 1.16(d), 3.4(c), 8.1(b),

8.4(d) were violated when for several years the attorney mishandled and

improperly accounted for the attorney’s client’s funds and the attorney’s

escrow account and inaccurately completed certificates of compliance; the

attorney was suspended for 3 years, could apply for reinstatement after 2

years if the attorney fulfilled conditions, and could not return to solo

practice. In re Fountain, 878 A.2d 1167 (Del. 2005).

— — Misappropriation.

Attorney violated subsection (c) through his misappropriation of client’s

funds, failure to pay off a judgment, and signing client’s name to a check

tes of compliance; the

attorney was suspended for 3 years, could apply for reinstatement after 2

years if the attorney fulfilled conditions, and could not return to solo

practice. In re Fountain, 878 A.2d 1167 (Del. 2005).

— — Misappropriation.

Attorney violated subsection (c) through his misappropriation of client’s

funds, failure to pay off a judgment, and signing client’s name to a check

without indicating he was signing for her. In re Maguire, 725 A.2d 417

(Del. 1999).

There was substantial evidence to support the factual findings and

conclusions of law of the Board on Professional Responsibility regarding

an attorney’s violations of Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (b),

and 8.4(c), based on the attorney’s misappropriation of clients’ fees on

various occasions, and the attorney’s failure to include the typical refund

provision regarding unearned fees in the retainer agreements for other

clients; a 1-year suspension was warranted. In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322

(Del. 2012).

There was substantial evidence to support the factual findings and

conclusions of law of the Board on Professional Responsibility regarding

an attorney’s violation of Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), based on the

attorney’s theft by misappropriating firm funds; such conduct reflected

adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.

In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322 (Del. 2012).

Based on a report by the Board on Professional Responsibility, there was

clear and convincing evidence that an attorney engaged in criminal

conduct worthy of suspnsion by: (1) misappropriating funds from the

attorney’s employer over a 5-year period; (2) engaging in dishonest

conduct by lying to the attorney’s mortgage company; and (3) forging the

employer’s signature. In re Lankenau, 138 A.3d 1151 (Del. 2016).

— — Safeguarding.

When an attorney falsely represented that he had designated an estate

account as an attorney trust or escrow account under Law. R. Prof. Conduct

1.15A, the attorney violated Law

y’s employer over a 5-year period; (2) engaging in dishonest

conduct by lying to the attorney’s mortgage company; and (3) forging the

employer’s signature. In re Lankenau, 138 A.3d 1151 (Del. 2016).

— — Safeguarding.

When an attorney falsely represented that he had designated an estate

account as an attorney trust or escrow account under Law. R. Prof. Conduct

1.15A, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) and (d). In re

Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).

Attorney was disbarred after having been found to have violated Law. R.

Prof. Conduct 1.15 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 by misappropriating

clients funds and failing to identify a bank account as a law practice

account; the attorney’s conduct was found to have been intentional and no

mitigating factors were present where it was shown that the attorney took

a long time to provide a client with refinancing proceeds and, when the

attorney did, the check was returned for insufficient funds, and the

attorney used a septic system escrow deposit to cover another check that

the attorney had written. In re Garrett, 909 A.2d 103 (Del. 2006).

Attorney whose child stole funds from the attorney’s escrow account

was publicly reprimanded for violating Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and

(d) by filing an annual registration statement that inaccurately reported

that the attorney had a precertification review. In re Otlowski, 976 A.2d

172 (Del. 2009).

Board on Professional Responsibility correctly assigned a 6-month

suspension with conditions for violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R

attorney’s escrow account

was publicly reprimanded for violating Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and

(d) by filing an annual registration statement that inaccurately reported

that the attorney had a precertification review. In re Otlowski, 976 A.2d

172 (Del. 2009).

Board on Professional Responsibility correctly assigned a 6-month

suspension with conditions for violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.15, 5.3

and 8.4 because: (1) the Board considered the attorney’s state of mind and

concluded the attorney, as managing partner, was at least negligent in

overseeing 2 non-attorneys to ensure the books and records were

maintained in compliance with the rules; (2) the attorney knew of rule

violations due to the negative balances in the account; (3) the attorney

filed an inaccurate 2015 Certificate of Compliance with the Delaware

Supreme Court that misrepresented the law firm’s compliance with the

rule on safekeeping property; (4) the covering funds relied on by the Board

on Professional Responsibility should not have been considered a

substitute for negative balances in the client subsidiary ledger; (5) the law

firm had a duty to safeguard the clients’ property but failed to do so; and

(6) as a managing partner who failed to supervise non-attorney employees,

the attorney was responsible for those deficiencies. In re Beauregard, 189

A.3d 1236 (Del. 2018).

— Diligence.

When an attorney handling 2 estates, inter alia, failed to probate the

estates in a timely manner, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct

8.4(d). In re Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).

Lawyer violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) because the lawyer falsely

told a client: (1) a complaint was filed; (2) there was a tolling agreement;

and (3) negotiations were ongoing. In re Wilks, 99 A.3d 228 (Del. 2014).

— Sexual

estates, inter alia, failed to probate the

estates in a timely manner, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct

8.4(d). In re Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).

Lawyer violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) because the lawyer falsely

told a client: (1) a complaint was filed; (2) there was a tolling agreement;

and (3) negotiations were ongoing. In re Wilks, 99 A.3d 228 (Del. 2014).

— Sexual.

Three-year suspension, along with other conditions, was the appropriate

sanction for an attorney who admitted having had a sexual relationship

with a client (who claimed to have felt pressured into it) that had not pre-

existed representation of the client, and where the attorney was also shown

by clear and convincing evidence to have engaged in conduct with clients

and employees of the firm that amounted to the Delaware misdemeanors

of sexual harassment and offensive touching. In re Tenenbaum, 880 A.2d

1025 (Del. 2005).

In a professional disciplinary proceeding, an attorney was disbarred as a

result of engaging in a pattern of sexual misconduct with clients for more

than 2 decades. In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007).

Incapacity or incompetence of attorney.

— Defense to misconduct.

A pattern of taking mortgage payoff funds is strong evidence of

deliberate wrongdoing during an extended period of time, and was grounds

for finding a violation of this section notwithstanding the attorney’s mental

illness. In re Dorsey, 683 A.2d 1046 (Del. 1996).

— Reinstatement.

State Supreme Court approved the Professional Responsibility Board’s

report and recommended sanction as the attorney admitted violations of

Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), and the 18-month suspension was properly

made retroactive to the date that the State Supreme Court entered its order

that the disciplinary proceedings be held in abeyance because the attorney

had been transferred to disability inactive status and was later granted

transfer to active status after rehabilitation. In re Amalfitano, 931 A.2d

1006 (Del. 2007)

tions of

Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), and the 18-month suspension was properly

made retroactive to the date that the State Supreme Court entered its order

that the disciplinary proceedings be held in abeyance because the attorney

had been transferred to disability inactive status and was later granted

transfer to active status after rehabilitation. In re Amalfitano, 931 A.2d

1006 (Del. 2007).

Law firms.

— Bookkeeping.

Attorney was publicly reprimanded and subject to a public two-year

period of probation for her violations of Rule 1.15(b) and (d), former

Interpretive Guideline No. 2, and subsection (d) of this Rule, for failing to

pay various federal and state employee and employer payroll taxes in a

timely manner, for failing to maintain her law practice books and records,

by failing to file her 1998 and 1999 federal unemployment tax returns

until October 2000, and by making consistently delinquent filings and

payment in connection with other law practice payroll tax obligations, and

for certifying to the court that her law practice books and records were in

compliance with the requirements of Rule 1.15 and that her tax obligations

were paid in a timely manner. In re Benson, 774 A.2d 258 (Del. 2001).

Attorney was publicly reprimanded and was ordered to serve a public 2-

year probation period for violating Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) by filing

certificates of compliance containing inaccurate representations as to

compliance with Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 with reference to the

attorney’s law practice bank accounts; the attorney’s substantial

experience, multiple offenses and attitude toward the offenses offset the

attorney’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, extensive remedial efforts,

full cooperation and lack of injury to a client. In re Member of the Bar of

the Supreme Court, 985 A.2d 391 (Del. 2009)

iance with Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 with reference to the

attorney’s law practice bank accounts; the attorney’s substantial

experience, multiple offenses and attitude toward the offenses offset the

attorney’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, extensive remedial efforts,

full cooperation and lack of injury to a client. In re Member of the Bar of

the Supreme Court, 985 A.2d 391 (Del. 2009).

Attorney’s failure to maintain law office books and records, filing

certificates of compliance with annual registration statements that

indicated maintenance of such documentation, and failure to file and pay

taxes violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(d) and Law. R. Prof. Conduct

8.4(c), (d); a public reprimand was imposed. In re Witherell, 998 A.2d 852

(Del. 2010).

Attorney was suspended for 1 year, with the suspension to run

retroactively to the date the attorney was transferred to disability inactive

status, for violating Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and (d), by filing

certificates of compliance that contained misrepresentations relating to

attorney’s maintenance of the law practice’s books and records. In re

Nowak, 5 A.3d 631 (Del. 2010).

Following a self-reported embezzlement by a member of the attorney’s

staff, the attorney failed to obtain court-ordered precertification by a

licensed certified public accountant for 2 years of certificates of

compliance, reporting the status of recordkeeping with regard to

requirements of Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.15 and Law Prof. Conduct R.

1.15A; because the absence of any injury to clients did not excuse the

misconduct, the attorney’s repeated violations of Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c) and

Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) supported an imposition of a public

reprimand with conditions. In re Holfeld, 74 A.3d 605 (Del. 2013).

Attorney’s admissions and the record established that the attorney

violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, 5.3, 8.4(c) and (d), resulting in 2 years’

any injury to clients did not excuse the

misconduct, the attorney’s repeated violations of Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c) and

Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) supported an imposition of a public

reprimand with conditions. In re Holfeld, 74 A.3d 605 (Del. 2013).

Attorney’s admissions and the record established that the attorney

violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, 5.3, 8.4(c) and (d), resulting in 2 years’

probation, by: (1) misrepresenting to the court the attorney’s maintenance

of records; and (2) failing to properly maintain them, to safeguard client

funds, to provide for reasonable safeguards to assure accurate accounting,

to supervise nonlawyer staff, and to timely file and pay taxes. In re Gray,

152 A.3d 581 (Del. 2016).

— Managing co-counsel.

Lawyer engaged in knowing misconduct, for which suspension was the

appropriate discipline, by: (1) assisting a suspended lawyer in the

unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer engaged the suspended

lawyer to work on cases without determining the applicable restrictions;

(2) failing to supervise the suspended lawyer adequately; and (3) giving

the suspended lawyer a percentage of a contingency fee that included work

performed both before and after the suspension. In re Martin, 105 A.3d

967 (Del. 2014).

— Managing partner.

Where an attorney, the managing partner of a firm, admitted to violating

Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) by keeping more than $1700 of the

firm’s funds in the client escrow account for almost a year, admitted to

violating Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(d), by failing, for almost a year,

to maintain the firm’s books and records in compliance with the rule’s

requirements, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof

e managing partner of a firm, admitted to violating

Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) by keeping more than $1700 of the

firm’s funds in the client escrow account for almost a year, admitted to

violating Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(d), by failing, for almost a year,

to maintain the firm’s books and records in compliance with the rule’s

requirements, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 5.3 by

failing to have reasonable safeguards in place to ensure an accurate

accounting of the firm’s financial books and records in compliance with

the Rules, by failing to supervise employees’ conduct in reconciling books

and records and filing and paying payroll taxes, and by knowing that

payroll, gross receipts, and corporate taxes were not being timely filed and

paid, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) by filing a

Certificate of Compliance for the year 2000, which falsely stated that the

law practice’s books and records were maintained in compliance with Del.

Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 and by falsely stating on the Certificates of

Compliance for 1998, 1999, and 2000 that the attorney was meeting tax

filing and payment obligations, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof.

Conduct 8.4(d) by failing to file and pay various taxes and by filing false

Certificates of Compliance for the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and

2001, and where a witness testified unequivocally that the attorney

falsely stating on the Certificates of

Compliance for 1998, 1999, and 2000 that the attorney was meeting tax

filing and payment obligations, admitted to violating Del. Law. R. Prof.

Conduct 8.4(d) by failing to file and pay various taxes and by filing false

Certificates of Compliance for the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and

2001, and where a witness testified unequivocally that the attorney

instructed the witness to transfer escrow funds to the firm’s operating

account, and client trust funds had to be, and were, invaded, the Office of

Disciplinary Counsel’s recommended public reprimand was rejected, and

the attorney was suspended from the practice of law for six months and

one day; a managing partner of a law firm had enhanced duties to ensure

that the law firm complied with its recordkeeping and tax obligations, and

the managing partner had to discharge those responsibilities faithfully and

with the utmost diligence. In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851 (Del. 2003).

— Office.

Attorney who failed to maintain a bona fide office for the practice of

law in Delaware violated various disciplinary rules because the attorney’s

assurance to disciplinary counsel that the bona fide office requirement was

satisfied was knowingly false and dishonest; merely being reachable by

phone was not sufficient. In re A Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court

of Delaware: Fred Bar, 99 A.3d 639 (Del. 2013), cert. denied, 573 U.S.

916, 134 S. Ct. 2822, 189 L. Ed. 2d 785 (U.S. 2014).

— Taxes.

When an attorney failed to pay payroll taxes for five years and personal

income taxes for six years, the attorney was suspended from the practice

of law for 3 years for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,

subject to the right to seek reinstatement after 6 months. In re Landis, 850

A.2d 291 (Del. 2004).

Attorney who was delinquent in the payment of the attorney’s law

practice’s federal, state, and local payroll tax obligations violated Law. R.

Prof

come taxes for six years, the attorney was suspended from the practice

of law for 3 years for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,

subject to the right to seek reinstatement after 6 months. In re Landis, 850

A.2d 291 (Del. 2004).

Attorney who was delinquent in the payment of the attorney’s law

practice’s federal, state, and local payroll tax obligations violated Law. R.

Prof. Conduct 1.15(b), 5.3, 8.4(c) and (d); due to the attorney’s prior

disciplinary history with delinquent taxes, a public reprimand, 18-month

probation and implementation of internal accounting controls were

warranted. In re Finestrauss, 32 A.3d 978 (Del. 2011).

Evidence supported the determination of an attorney’s misconduct by

the Board on Professional Responsibility because the attorney failed to file

taxes in a timely manner for a period of years; the attorney also responded

untruthfully that the taxes had in fact been filed on the annual attorney

registration statement. In re Bria, 86 A.3d 1118 (Del. 2014).

Attorney’s failure to file taxes in a timely manner for a period of years,

and the attorney’s false response on that issue on the annual attorney

registration statement, warranted a suspension of 6 months and 1 day in

order to avoid the automatic reinstatement of a lesser suspension period.

In re Bria, 86 A.3d 1118 (Del. 2014).

Professional conduct.

— Candor toward the tribunal.

“Negligent misrepresentation” may form the basis for a charge of

misconduct under the literal terms of Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c). In re

Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).

Attorney’s misrepresentation to a Family Court that a client was not in

arrears with regard to alimony and had paid the debt in full was

determined to have been an act of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation in violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and (d), a

failure to provide competent representation to the client, in violation of

Law. Prof. Conduct R

A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).

Attorney’s misrepresentation to a Family Court that a client was not in

arrears with regard to alimony and had paid the debt in full was

determined to have been an act of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation in violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(c) and (d), a

failure to provide competent representation to the client, in violation of

Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, and a failure to explain a matter to the extent

reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions, in

violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.4(b); the misrepresentation was found

to have been knowingly made, but the recommended suspension of 2 years

was reduced to 6 months, because mitigating circumstances were found in

the

nature

of the

attorney

providing

the

Family

Court with

correspondence, which would have permitted the Family Court and the

adverse party an opportunity to verify the debt. In re Chasanov, 869 A.2d

327 (Del. 2005).

Attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) by filing with a Family

Court a petitioner’s answer to a respondent’s counterclaim, on which the

attorney had signed the client’s name and had falsely notarized the

signature. In re Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007).

Based on an attorney’s false statements to a Virginia court regarding

delivery of legal documents to a party-opponent, and misleading statements

in a Virginia disciplinary proceeding constituting violations of Law. Prof.

Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1), 4.1, and 8.4(c), a 30-day suspension was imposed;

rather than imposing an “admonishment with terms,” as Virginia

Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007).

Based on an attorney’s false statements to a Virginia court regarding

delivery of legal documents to a party-opponent, and misleading statements

in a Virginia disciplinary proceeding constituting violations of Law. Prof.

Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1), 4.1, and 8.4(c), a 30-day suspension was imposed;

rather than imposing an “admonishment with terms,” as Virginia

did, a “substantially different discipline” was warranted pursuant to Bd.

Prof. Resp. 18(4). In re Amberly, 996 A.2d 793 (Del. 2010).

Attorney admittedly committed disciplinary violations by failing to

comply with continuing legal education (CLE) requirements, and by

failing to respond to communications with the CLE Commission about

that deficiency. In re Poverman, 80 A.3d 960 (Del. 2013).

Attorney admittedly committed disciplinary violations by falsely

certifying in the annual registration that there were no disciplinary charges

pending because the attorney knew of a continuing legal education

deficiency issue and the investigation thereof. In re Poverman, 80 A.3d

960 (Del. 2013).

Deputy attorney general was suspended from the practice of law for 6

months and 1 day for 7 ethical violations because the attorney initially

falsely denied making statements (corroborated by a prothonotory also

present) threatening a criminal defendant by implying that the State would

brand that defendant an informant; the attorney admitted only part of the

substance, falsely accusing the defendant of eavesdropping, although later

admitting that the attorney intended for the defendant to hear the

intimidating statements about possible prison reprisals. In re Favata, 119

A.3d 1283 (Del. 2015)

y also

present) threatening a criminal defendant by implying that the State would

brand that defendant an informant; the attorney admitted only part of the

substance, falsely accusing the defendant of eavesdropping, although later

admitting that the attorney intended for the defendant to hear the

intimidating statements about possible prison reprisals. In re Favata, 119

A.3d 1283 (Del. 2015).

Disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s intentional

misconduct in a medical negligence case, which included failing to

disclose altered medical records, failing to supplement discovery responses

and failing to correct a client’s false testimony (despite multiple

opportunities for corrective action); although the attorney had no prior

disciplinary record and presented evidence of good character and

reputation, dishonesty and other aggravating factors outweighed the

mitigating factors. In re McCarthy, 173 A.3d 536 (Del. 2017).

— Decorum of the tribunal.

Revocation of an attorney’s admission pro hac vice was authorized for

his failure to control his client’s behavior during a deposition. State v.

Mumford, 731 A.2d 831 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999).

In an appeal taken to the trial court from a licensing board, attorney’s

written arguments suggesting that the trial court would not rule on the

merits, an unfounded accusation, violated Law R. Prof. Conduct 3.5(d),

conduct degrading to a tribunal, and Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), conduct

prejudicial to the administration of justice; the trial court had to waste

judicial resources striking the offending arguments sua sponte and writing

an opinion explaining its actions, and warranted a public reprimand of the

attorney. In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482 (Del.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 950, 128

S. Ct. 381, 169 L. Ed. 2d 263 (U.S. 2007)

tribunal, and Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), conduct

prejudicial to the administration of justice; the trial court had to waste

judicial resources striking the offending arguments sua sponte and writing

an opinion explaining its actions, and warranted a public reprimand of the

attorney. In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482 (Del.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 950, 128

S. Ct. 381, 169 L. Ed. 2d 263 (U.S. 2007).

Attorney’s communications sent to 4 different Deputy Attorneys

Generals did not violate this rule because the evidence did not clearly

show that the letters, as offensive and inappropriate as they were, had an

actual impact on the administration of justice; the emails, which included

crude and sexualized comments, were private and did not directly burden

the trial court or affect the outcome of pending litigation. In re Memebr of

the Bar of the Supreme Court: Hurley, 183 A.3d 703 (Del. 2018).

— Illegal conduct.

Attorney’s conviction for felony possession of a firearm was conclusive

of a violation of subsection (b). In re Funk, 742 A.2d 851 (Del. 1999).

Where an attorney was convicted of possession of child pornography

and unlawful dealing in material depicting a child engaging in a prohibited

sexual act, the serious crimes reflected on the attorney’s fitness as a lawyer

in violation of Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), and attorney’s

misconduct warranted disbarment without further proceedings. In re Fink,

825 A.2d 238 (Del. 2003).

State Supreme Court approved the state Professional Responsibility

Board’s report and found that the attorney’s conduct in getting together

with a friend, selling paintings to each other, making claims against a

corporation that accepted payments for transactions, and then pursuing a

legal action to recover not only a money back guarantee, but also treble

damages and attorney fees, violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), 8.4(c),

and 8.4(d), and warranted a public reprimand (especially in light of the

attorney’s lack of prior discipline and remorse)

lling paintings to each other, making claims against a

corporation that accepted payments for transactions, and then pursuing a

legal action to recover not only a money back guarantee, but also treble

damages and attorney fees, violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), 8.4(c),

and 8.4(d), and warranted a public reprimand (especially in light of the

attorney’s lack of prior discipline and remorse). In re Gielata, 933 A.2d

1249 (Del. 2007).

In an attorney disciplinary matter, an attorney was disbarred as a result

of committing various felonies (violently physically attacking that

attorney’s spouse in front of their children, destruction of evidence and

continual violation of a protective order) in the State of Maine which

violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(a) and (c) and 8.4(b), (c), and (d); the

Supreme Court of Delaware rejected the attorney’s defense that the

conduct was the result of 2 brain injuries, as the medical evidence did not

address mental state at the time of the crimes and there was nothing in the

record to suggest that the attorney raised any defense to those crimes

based on the claimed infirmity. In re Enna, 971 A.2d 110 (Del. 2009).

Attorney’s conduct in connection with a motor vehicle accident was a

violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4, where the attorney: (1) reported

false information (i.e. that the attorney did not drink prior to the accident)

to a law-enforcement officer relating to an actual offense or incident in

violation of 11 Del C. § 1245; and (2) ingested alcohol after the incident

with the intent to circumvent the police investigation. In re Davis, 43 A.3d

856 (Del. 2012).

Sanction of a public reprimand of attorney was the appropriate where

the attorney violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), (c) and (d); the attorney

had made a false report to the police in a 9-1-1 call that a hostage situation

was taking place, in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1245, in order to obtain an

expedited police response. In re Schaeffer, 45 A.3d 149 (Del. 2012)

, 43 A.3d

856 (Del. 2012).

Sanction of a public reprimand of attorney was the appropriate where

the attorney violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), (c) and (d); the attorney

had made a false report to the police in a 9-1-1 call that a hostage situation

was taking place, in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1245, in order to obtain an

expedited police response. In re Schaeffer, 45 A.3d 149 (Del. 2012).

Attorney was suspended for 2 years under Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d)

where the attorney pled guilty to possession of controlled substances and

drug paraphernalia (both misdemeanors) with no aggravating factors; there

were, however, a number of mitigating factors including political

involvement and substantial pro bono work. In re Nixon, 49 A.3d 1193

(Del. 2012).

Denial of a petition for discipline against an attorney was proper because

Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b) implicated only criminal conduct that

reflected adversely on an attorney’s fitness to practice law; there was no

such case where the offensive touching was committed by the attorney in

an attempt to prevent that attorney’s child from running away from

home. In re Michaels, 67 A.3d 1023 (Del. 2013).

Because an attorney knowingly executed Department of Housing and

Urban Development settlement statements containing false information

which ensured loan funding by lenders, such constituted a criminal act that

reflected adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as

a lawyer in other respects in violation of the rules of professional conduct.

In re Sanclemente, 86 A.3d 1119 (Del. 2014).

Attorney who violated the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct, as

well as 18 U.S.C. § 1010, by making false certifications in Department of

Housing and Urban Development settlement statements (HUD-1

statements) was disbarred; the attorney acted with the intent of facilitating

22 real estate closings that defrauded those who relied on the accuracy of

the HUD-1 statements. In re Sullivan, 86 A.3d 1119 (Del. 2014)

the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct, as

well as 18 U.S.C. § 1010, by making false certifications in Department of

Housing and Urban Development settlement statements (HUD-1

statements) was disbarred; the attorney acted with the intent of facilitating

22 real estate closings that defrauded those who relied on the accuracy of

the HUD-1 statements. In re Sullivan, 86 A.3d 1119 (Del. 2014).

Court accepted the findings by a panel of the Board on Professional

Responsibility that an attorney’s misappropriation of legal fees constituted

theft under the criminal code, which was an ethical violation. In re

Vanderslice, 116 A.3d 1244 (Del. 2015).

Lawyer was properly suspended for 15 months because: (1) the lawyer

knowingly carried a concealed weapon, drove under the influence of

alcohol and illegally possessed a controlled substance, reflecting adversely

on honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness, causing potential injury to the

public and actual injury due to resources expended to prosecute the lawyer;

(2) the presumptive sanction was suspension; and (3) mitigating factors

of lack of prior discipline or selfish motive, personal problems, effort to

rectify misconduct, cooperation, inexperience, character, other sanctions

and remorse outweighed aggravating factors of a pattern of misconduct and

illegal conduct. In re Vavala, 207 A.3d 564 (Del. 2019).

— Obligations toward the tribunal.

Where attorney who had practiced for over 20 years and was found to be

a good lawyer committed professional misconduct by failing to appear at a

scheduled family court hearing and by failing to reschedule two other

teleconferences in family court, which constituted violations of Del. Law.

R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d), the public probation period that

attorney was already serving for prior misconduct was extended for an

additional year. In re Solomon, 847 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2004)

ted professional misconduct by failing to appear at a

scheduled family court hearing and by failing to reschedule two other

teleconferences in family court, which constituted violations of Del. Law.

R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d), the public probation period that

attorney was already serving for prior misconduct was extended for an

additional year. In re Solomon, 847 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2004).

Office of Disciplinary Counsel established by clear and convincing

evidence that an attorney engaged in conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice, in violation of Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d)

where: (1) the attorney wasted judicial resources in continuing to request

to withdraw from appointments as attorney of record; (2) asked the court

to put “on the record” and disclose to clients the fact that the attorney

should not be appointed, but that the court was making the appointment

anyway; (3) caused clients to believe that the attorney could not represent

them and that they needed other counsel; and (4) failed to obtain substitute

counsel or to even contact the 2 attorneys whose names were provided by

the court for just that purpose. In re Murray, 47 A.3d 972 (Del. 2012).

While it was true that an attorney’s language did not amount to the

inflammatory language of other cases where public reprimand was

ordered, the attorney did send discourteous letters to the court in 3 different

cases and violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 3.5 and 6.2 in each of those

cases; because the Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) violation for the wasting

of judicial resources in attempting to avoid court appointment was not de

minimus, public reprimand was appropriate. In re Murray, 47 A.3d 972

(Del. 2012)

lic reprimand was

ordered, the attorney did send discourteous letters to the court in 3 different

cases and violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 3.5 and 6.2 in each of those

cases; because the Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) violation for the wasting

of judicial resources in attempting to avoid court appointment was not de

minimus, public reprimand was appropriate. In re Murray, 47 A.3d 972

(Del. 2012).

Where an attorney engaged in lateness or failure to appear at scheduled

court appearances, tardy requests for postponements, failure to comply

with court-imposed deadlines, “sloppy work and complete disregard to the

Court’s rules and procedure” and wasted judicial resources in 3 Delaware

Courts, in addition to violating the duty of candor to the Supreme Court of

Delaware, the attorney violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, 1.3, 3.3, 3.4 and

8.4. In re: Poliquin, 49 A.3d 1115 (Del. 2012).

Based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Law. Prof. Conduct R.

8.4(d) to mean that although not all crimes are “prejudicial to the

administration of justice,” crimes involving “violence, dishonesty, breach

of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice” are

categorically Rule 8.4(d) violations; an attorney’s theft constituted a

violation thereof. In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322 (Del. 2012).

Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s client

charged with murder and related offenses, after the attorney retrieved it

from the codefendant’s file, violated the codefendant’s attorney-client

privilege; the disclosure constituted a violation of the professional conduct

rules relating to the confidentiality of information

re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322 (Del. 2012).

Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s client

charged with murder and related offenses, after the attorney retrieved it

from the codefendant’s file, violated the codefendant’s attorney-client

privilege; the disclosure constituted a violation of the professional conduct

rules relating to the confidentiality of information

and conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re

Lyle, 74 A.3d 654 (Del. 2013).

Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s

client charged with murder and related offenses, after the attorney

retrieved it from the codefendant’s file, did not involve dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation;

despite the attorney’s mere “knowing”

conduct, the attorney was trying to zealously defend the client and had no

intent to engage in dishonest behavior. In re Lyle, 74 A.3d 654 (Del. 2013).

Where an attorney, in order to benefit a client, knowingly violated the

Chancery Court’s seizure order enjoining persons from bringing claims

relating to an insurer except in that Court, thereby causing injury to the

insurer and the Insurance Commissioner and prejudice to the judicial

system, the presumptive sanction of suspension was nevertheless reduced

to public reprimand; mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors

in the case. In re Brown, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014).

Office of Disciplinary Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence

that an attorney committed professional conduct violations by knowingly

causing images from a sexual abuse victim’s cell phone to be shown to

both the victim’s parent and defendant in violation of a protective order. In

re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581 (Del. 2015)

avating factors

in the case. In re Brown, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014).

Office of Disciplinary Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence

that an attorney committed professional conduct violations by knowingly

causing images from a sexual abuse victim’s cell phone to be shown to

both the victim’s parent and defendant in violation of a protective order. In

re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581 (Del. 2015).

Thirty-day suspension of a deputy attorney general was appropriate

because the attorney’s conduct, cajoling a bailiff to enter a room in a

courthouse brandishing a firearm as an ill-conceived prank, involved

breaches of duties owed to the legal system and to the legal profession. In

re Gelof, 142 A.3d 506 (Del. 2016).

Board on Professional Responsibility erred in finding that the attorney’s

admitted violation of the terms of private probation did not also constitute

a violation of the rule of professional misconduct with respect to

obligations to the tribunal; there was clear and convincing evidence that

the attorney’s violation thereof was prejudicial to the administration of

justice. In re Woods, 143 A.3d 1223 (Del. 2016).

Sanctions.

— Disbarment.

Lawyer was disbarred for the misappropriation of client funds for the

lawyer’s personal use, and the failure to establish a separate account for

the proceeds of the sale of a client’s house, despite evidence of the lawyer’s

personal and emotional problems. In re Carey, 809 A.2d 563 (Del. 2002).

Attorney was disbarred for knowingly violating the terms of a prior

suspension by failing to turn all files over to an active member of the bar,

by failing to notify all parties of attorney’s suspension, and by paying

attorney’s fees from estates during the suspension; that misconduct caused

potential injury to the estate beneficiaries. In re McCann, 894 A.2d 1087

(Del. 2005)

63 (Del. 2002).

Attorney was disbarred for knowingly violating the terms of a prior

suspension by failing to turn all files over to an active member of the bar,

by failing to notify all parties of attorney’s suspension, and by paying

attorney’s fees from estates during the suspension; that misconduct caused

potential injury to the estate beneficiaries. In re McCann, 894 A.2d 1087

(Del. 2005).

Attorney was disbarred in part because of failure to: (1) maintain proper

books and records relating to client funds, but falsely certified compliance

for 3 years; (2) timely file and pay federal and state payroll taxes, but

falsely certified compliance for 6 years; and (3) pay personal state and

federal income taxes. In re McCann, 894 A.2d 1087 (Del. 2005).

Because there was evidence to support the finding that a suspended

attorney knowingly practiced law multiple times over more than 1 year

during a disciplinary suspension, the lawyer violated multiple disciplinary

rules; the appropriate sanction in the circumstances was disbarment. In re

Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Del. Feuerhake, 89 A.3d 1058

(Del. 2014).

Court accepted the findings by a panel of the Board on Professional

Responsibility that an attorney committed multiple ethical violations by

misappropriating fees received for legal services to clients while the

attorney was engaged in the private practice of law and failing to disclose

the fees during prior disciplinary proceedings; disbarment was warranted.

In re Vanderslice, 116 A.3d 1244 (Del. 2015).

— Disciplinary proceedings.

No statute of limitation applies to a professional disciplinary proceeding

and, therefore, no basis exists in such proceedings to assert the affirmative

defense of laches. In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007).

— Dismissal of claim.

sclose

the fees during prior disciplinary proceedings; disbarment was warranted.

In re Vanderslice, 116 A.3d 1244 (Del. 2015).

— Disciplinary proceedings.

No statute of limitation applies to a professional disciplinary proceeding

and, therefore, no basis exists in such proceedings to assert the affirmative

defense of laches. In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007).

— Dismissal of claim.

Because the integrity of the proceedings and the court’s truth-finding

function involving company management disputes between the parties was

threatened by plaintiffs’ actions, based on their payments to witnesses in

exchange for certain testimony, threats against witnesses and threats of

civil litigation on baseless claims, their conspiracy claims were dismissed

against all defendants; certain adverse inferences were also drawn as to

other claims. OptimisCorp v. Waite, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 222 (Del. Ch.

Aug. 26, 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 137 A.3d 970 (Del. 2016).

— Reprimand.

When an attorney handling 2 estates violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct

8.4(d), because the attorney had aggravating factors of a prior private

admonition, multiple counts, and substantial legal experience, and

mitigating factors of remorse and lack of dishonest motive, the attorney

was publicly reprimanded, prevented from representing a personal

representative or serving as 1, and required to cooperate and pay costs. In

re Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).

The appropriate sanction was a public reprimand and 1 year probation

period where: (1) an attorney violated the conditions of a previously

imposed

private admonition

by

failing

to

provide a required

precertification and not promptly paying various payroll taxes; (2) the

attorney admitted to violating Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c) and Law Prof. Conduct

R

In

re Wilson, 886 A.2d 1279 (Del. 2005).

The appropriate sanction was a public reprimand and 1 year probation

period where: (1) an attorney violated the conditions of a previously

imposed

private admonition

by

failing

to

provide a required

precertification and not promptly paying various payroll taxes; (2) the

attorney admitted to violating Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c) and Law Prof. Conduct

R. 1.15(b), 1.15(d), 5.3, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d); (3) the attorney’s violations

were not isolated incidents but were repeat violations; (4) the attorney

failed to adequately supervise a nonlawyer assistant to assure an accurate

accounting of the firm’s books and records; and (5) the attorney

disregarded the conditions imposed on the private admonition. In re

Martin, 35 A.3d 419 (Del. 2011).

Attorney who committed various disciplinary violations with respect to

the failure to complete continuing legal education requirements and

reporting obligations relating thereto was publicly reprimanded with

conditions, because: (1) the attorney acted knowingly and had no remorse;

(2) the attorney did not cause injury to a client; and (3) the aggravating

factors outweighed the mitigating ones. In re Poverman, 80 A.3d 960 (Del.

2013).

Attorney who had knowingly violated a protective order was properly

sanctioned to public reprimand because the misconduct was serious,

caused potential injury to the vulnerable teenage victim and caused actual

injury to the legal system. In re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581 (Del. 2015).

Attorney committed professional misconduct by failing to comply with

the conditions of private probation, by failing to maintain the firm’s books

and records properly, and by filing false certifications with respect to

compliance with that obligation; public reprimand and probation for 3

years with conditions were imposed upon the attorney’s immediate

reinstatement to the practice of law. In re Woods, 143 A.3d 1223 (Del.

2016).

When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R

of private probation, by failing to maintain the firm’s books

and records properly, and by filing false certifications with respect to

compliance with that obligation; public reprimand and probation for 3

years with conditions were imposed upon the attorney’s immediate

reinstatement to the practice of law. In re Woods, 143 A.3d 1223 (Del.

2016).

When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (d),

8.4(c) and (d) by failing to properly maintain law firm’s books and records

for 3 consecutive years, filing inaccurate certificates of compliance for 3

consecutive years, and failing to give flat fee clients proper notice that the

fee was refundable if not earned, a public reprimand with a 2-year period

of probation was appropriate; this was true, even considering the

mitigating factors, given a lawyer’s obligation to maintain orderly books

and records. In re Castro, 160 A.3d 1134 (Del. 2017).

The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the Board on Professional

Responsibility’s findings and recommendation for discipline, publicly

reprimanding and placing the attorney on a 2-year period of probation with

the imposition of specific conditions, because the attorney failed to

provide the client with a fee agreement and/or statement of earned fees

withdrawn from the trust account, to identify and safeguard client fund, to

maintain financial books and records or to supervise nonlawyer assistants;

the attorney had engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation,

prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re Malik, 167 A.3d 1189

(Del. 2017).

Attorney was publicly reprimanded with a 2-year probation, subject to

conditions; the attorney acted with “wilfulness” and did not comply with 3

conditions of a prior disciplinary sanction by failing to inform the firm’s

supervising attorney of the conditions of the attorney’s reinstatement,

including the need for a practice monitor. In re Grandell, 189 A.3d 1288

(Del. 2018).

(Del. 2017).

Attorney was publicly reprimanded with a 2-year probation, subject to

conditions; the attorney acted with “wilfulness” and did not comply with 3

conditions of a prior disciplinary sanction by failing to inform the firm’s

supervising attorney of the conditions of the attorney’s reinstatement,

including the need for a practice monitor. In re Grandell, 189 A.3d 1288

(Del. 2018).

Attorney was publicly reprimanded, subject to specific conditions,

because: (1) the attorney failed to maintain the firm’s books and records,

resulting in the firm’s trust accounts being exposed to fraud; (2) the

attorney’s certificates of compliance contained misrepresentations

concerning the status of the firm’s books and records; and (3) the attorney

was already the subject of discipline for similar conduct to the conduct at

issue. In re A Mbr. of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware Glancy,

246 A.3d 1140 (Del. 2021).

— Suspension.

Where a lawyer engaged in a pattern of knowing misconduct over a

period of several years by commingling client funds, failing to maintain

the lawyer’s law practice accounts, failing to pay taxes, falsely representing

on certificates of compliance that the lawyer complied with the record-

keeping requirements and paid taxes, the lawyer violated Del. Law. R.

Prof. Conduct 1.5(f), 1.15(a), (b), (d), 8.4(b), (c), (d); as a result, the lawyer

was suspended for 3 years. In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514 (Del. 2003).

Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules of

Professional Conduct and who violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, 1.2(a),

1.4(a), 1.15(a), 8.1, 8.1(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), and Law. Disc. P. R

e lawyer violated Del. Law. R.

Prof. Conduct 1.5(f), 1.15(a), (b), (d), 8.4(b), (c), (d); as a result, the lawyer

was suspended for 3 years. In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514 (Del. 2003).

Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules of

Professional Conduct and who violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, 1.2(a),

1.4(a), 1.15(a), 8.1, 8.1(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), and Law. Disc. P. R. 7(c),

was suspended from the practice of law in Delaware for 3 years after the

Board on Professional Responsibility found that the attorney’s problems

appeared to be getting worse and included: co-mingling client trust funds;

inadequate bookkeeping and safeguarding of client funds; inadequate

maintenance of books and records; knowingly making false statements of

material fact to the ODC; false representations in Certificates of

Compliance for 3 years; and failure to file corporate tax returns for 3

years. In re Becker, 947 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2008).

Attorney whose misconduct involved false notarizations, failure to

safeguard fiduciary funds, failure to pay taxes on real estate transactions,

and other misrepresentations committed violations Law. R. Prof. Conduct

1.15(a), (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d); based on knowing, rather than

negligent, conduct in committing the violations, a 1-year suspension as

well as a public reprimand and permanent practice restrictions were

deemed appropriate sanctions to impose. In re Member of the Bar of the

Supreme Court, 974 A.2d 170 (Del. 2009).

Attorney whose multiple federal actions for assorted clients were

dismissed due to failure to respond to dismissal or summary judgment

motions violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4,

warranting a 2-year suspension from the practice of law, with conditions

where: (1) the attorney had an unblemished record; (2) the attorney had

undergone 2 eye surgeries; (3) the attorney had suffered the loss of a half-

sibling; but (4) the conduct was deemed “knowing” and evidenced

engagement in a pattern of misconduct

nt

motions violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4,

warranting a 2-year suspension from the practice of law, with conditions

where: (1) the attorney had an unblemished record; (2) the attorney had

undergone 2 eye surgeries; (3) the attorney had suffered the loss of a half-

sibling; but (4) the conduct was deemed “knowing” and evidenced

engagement in a pattern of misconduct. In re Feuerhake, 998 A.2d 850

(Del. 2010).

Suspension for 6 months and 1 day was warranted where an attorney:

(1) violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.1, 1.3, 3.3, 3.4 and 8.4; (2) had a

record of 2 prior private admonitions; (3) engaged in a pattern of

misconduct consisting of multiple offenses; (4) suffered from personal or

emotional problems; (5) cooperated with the Office of Disciplinary

Counsel in connection with the hearing; (6) was generally of good

character, as evidenced by willingness to represent those who might not

otherwise have had representation; and (7) exhibited remorse. In re:

Poliquin, 49 A.3d 1115 (Del. 2012).

Based on an experienced attorney’s misappropriation on multiple

occasions of clients’ funds and the attorney’s use of a deficient retainer

agreement, which constituted a violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b)

and (d) as well as violations of other disciplinary rules, a suspension of 1

year was deemed appropriate; in the circumstances, a public reprimand

was too lenient. In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322 (Del. 2012).

Lawyer was suspended for 21 months, retroactive to the date of the

attorney’s transfer to disability inactive status, for violating this rule after

the attorney injured another driver as a result of DUI; the attorney

demonstrated aggressive and consistent rehabilitation since the accident,

implementing the appropriate and necessary life changes and counseling

to maintain sobriety for over 1 year. In re Cairns, 132 A.3d 1160 (Del.

2016)

ve to the date of the

attorney’s transfer to disability inactive status, for violating this rule after

the attorney injured another driver as a result of DUI; the attorney

demonstrated aggressive and consistent rehabilitation since the accident,

implementing the appropriate and necessary life changes and counseling

to maintain sobriety for over 1 year. In re Cairns, 132 A.3d 1160 (Del.

2016).

Attorney who committed numerous ethical violations, including

neglecting multiple client matters, making misrepresentations to the court

and failing to properly safeguard clients’ funds, was suspended for 18

months, based on a determination that the mitigating factors significantly

outweighed the aggravating factors. In re Carucci, 132 A.3d 1161 (Del.

2016).

Attorney was suspended for an additional 6 months where: (1) the

attorney filed 2 complaints in Superior Court without maintaining a

Delaware office, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; (2)

the attorney created a false impression by testifying in a prior disciplinary

matter that the attorney did not currently have any suits pending in

Delaware; (3) the violations were knowing and caused potential harm to

the legal system; (4) suspension was the presumptive sanction; and (5) the

aggravating factors did not sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors to

warrant disbarment. In re Lankenau, 158 A.3d 451 (Del. 2017).

Del. Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 8.5