Rule 1.5. Fees

« Rule 1.5. »

(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an

unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to

be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the

following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the

questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the

particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers

performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and

expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to

the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after

commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a

regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the

basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the

client.

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the

service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is

prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall

be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the

fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall

accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation

matter for which the

service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is

prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall

be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the

fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall

accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation

and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such

expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is

calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses

for which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing

party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide

the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if

there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of

its determination.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of

which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of

alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may

be made only if:

(1) the client is advised in writing of and does not object to the

participation of all the lawyers involved; and

(2) the total fee is reasonable.

ce or upon the amount of

alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may

be made only if:

(1) the client is advised in writing of and does not object to the

participation of all the lawyers involved; and

(2) the total fee is reasonable.

(f) A lawyer may require the client to pay some or all of the fee in

advance of the lawyer undertaking the representation, provided that:

(1) The lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement that the

fee is refundable if it is not earned,

(2) The written statement shall state the basis under which the fees shall

be considered to have been earned, whether in whole or in part, and

(3) All unearned fees shall be retained in the lawyer’s trust account,

with statement of the fees earned provided to the client at the time such

funds are withdrawn from the trust account.

COMMENT

[1] Reasonableness of fee and expenses. — Paragraph (a) requires that

lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The

factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor

be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for

which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek

reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as

copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone

charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has

agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the

cost incurred by the lawyer.

[2] Basis or rate of fee. — When the lawyer has regularly represented a

client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the

basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be

responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding

as to fees and expenses must be promptly established

onably reflects the

cost incurred by the lawyer.

[2] Basis or rate of fee. — When the lawyer has regularly represented a

client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the

basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be

responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding

as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Generally, it is

desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy

of the lawyer’s customary fee arrangements that states the general nature

of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee

and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs,

expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation. A written

statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility

of misunderstanding.

[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the

reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining

whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is

reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider

the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may

impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage

allowable, or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for

the fee. Applicable law also may apply to situations other than a

contingent fee, for example, government regulations regarding fees in

certain tax matters.

[4] Terms of payment. — A lawyer may require advance payment of a

fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A

lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership

interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a

proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation

contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money

dvance payment of a

fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A

lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership

interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a

proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation

contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money

maybe subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often

have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.

[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the

lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a

way contrary to the client’s interest. For example, a lawyer should not

enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a

stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably

will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client.

Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the

midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the

extent of services in light of the client’s ability to pay. A lawyer should not

exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using

wasteful procedures.

[6] Prohibited contingent fees. — Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from

charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is

contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony

or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not

preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in

connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under

support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not

implicate the same policy concerns.

[7] Division of fee. — A division of fee is a single billing to a client

covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm

does not

preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in

connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under

support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not

implicate the same policy concerns.

[7] Division of fee. — A division of fee is a single billing to a client

covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A

division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter

in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is

used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring

lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a

fee without regard to whether the division is in proportion to the services

each lawyer renders or whether each lawyer assumes responsibility for the

representation as a whole, so long as the client is advised in writing and

does not object, and the total fee is reasonable. It does not require

disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer is to receive.

Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and

must otherwise comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule. A lawyer should

only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring lawyer reasonably

believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.

[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be

received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously

associated in a law firm.

[9] Advance fees. — A lawyer may require that a client pay a fee in

advance of completing the work for the representation. All fees paid in

advance are refundable until earned. Until such time as that fee is earned,

that fee must be held in the attorney’s trust account. An attorney who

accepts an advance fee must provide the client with a written statement

that the fee is refundable if not earned and how the fee will be considered

earned

client pay a fee in

advance of completing the work for the representation. All fees paid in

advance are refundable until earned. Until such time as that fee is earned,

that fee must be held in the attorney’s trust account. An attorney who

accepts an advance fee must provide the client with a written statement

that the fee is refundable if not earned and how the fee will be considered

earned. When the fee is earned and the money is withdrawn from the

attorney’s trust account, the client must be notified and a statement

provided.

[10] Some smaller fees—such as those less than $2500.00—may be

considered earned in whole upon some identified event, such as upon

commencement of the attorney’s work on that matter or the attorney’s

appearance on the record. However, a fee considered to be “earned upon

commencement of the attorney’s work on the matter” is not the same as a

fee “earned upon receipt.” The former requires that the attorney actually

begin work whereas the latter is dependent only upon payment by the

client. In a criminal defense matter, for example, a smaller fee—such as a

fee under $2500.00—may be considered earned upon entry of the

attorney’s appearance on the record or at the initial consultation at which

substantive, confidential information has been communicated which

would preclude the attorney from representation of another potential client

(e.g. a co-defendant). Nevertheless, all fees must be reasonable such that

even a smaller fee might be refundable, in whole or in part, if it is not

reasonable under the circumstances.

[11] As a general rule, larger advance fees—such as those over

$2500.00—will not be considered earned upon one specific event.

Therefore, the attorney must identify the manner in which the fee will be

considered earned and make the appropriate disclosures to the client at the

outset of the representation. The written statement must include a

reasonable method of determining fees earned at a given time in the

representation

dvance fees—such as those over

$2500.00—will not be considered earned upon one specific event.

Therefore, the attorney must identify the manner in which the fee will be

considered earned and make the appropriate disclosures to the client at the

outset of the representation. The written statement must include a

reasonable method of determining fees earned at a given time in the

representation. One method might be calculation of fees based upon an

agreed upon hourly rate. If an hourly rate is not utilized, the attorney is

required to identify certain events which will trigger earned fees. For

example, in a criminal defense matter, an attorney might identify events

such as entry of appearance, arraignment, certain motions, case review,

and trial as the events which might trigger certain specified earned fees

and deduction of those fees from the attorney trust account. Likewise, in a

domestic matter, an attorney might identify such events as entry of

appearance, drafting petition, attendance at mediation conference,

commissioner’s hearing, pre-trial conference, and judge’s hearing as

triggering events for purposes of earning fees. It might be reasonable for

an attorney to provide that a certain percentage of this fee will be

considered earned on a monthly basis, for any work performed in that

month, or upon the completion of an identified portion of the work.

Nevertheless, all fees must be reasonable such that even a fee considered

earned in full per the written statement provided to the client might be

refundable, in whole or in part, if it is not reasonable under the

circumstances.

[12] In contrast to the general rule, a larger advance fee may, under

certain circumstances, be earned upon one specific event

of an identified portion of the work.

Nevertheless, all fees must be reasonable such that even a fee considered

earned in full per the written statement provided to the client might be

refundable, in whole or in part, if it is not reasonable under the

circumstances.

[12] In contrast to the general rule, a larger advance fee may, under

certain circumstances, be earned upon one specific event. For example,

this fee or a large portion thereof could become earned upon an attorney’s

initial consultation with a client in a bankruptcy matter at which

substantive, confidential information has been communicated which

would preclude the attorney from representation of another potential client

(e.g. the client’s creditors). In this context, the attorney must provide a

clear written statement that the fee, or a portion thereof, is earned at time

of consultation as compensation for this lost opportunity. Likewise, a

criminal defense attorney might outline in the written agreement that the

entire fee becomes earned upon conclusion of the matter—in the case of

negotiation and acceptance of a plea agreement prior to trial. Both of these

examples are tempered, however, by the reasonableness requirement set

forth above.

[13] It is not acceptable for an attorney to hold earned fees in the

attorney trust account. See Rule 1.15(a). This is commingling. Once fees

are earned, those fees must be withdrawn from the attorney trust account.

Typically, it is acceptable to draw down earned fees from an attorney trust

account on a monthly or some other reasonable periodic basis. Similarly,

monthly/periodic statements are considered an acceptable method of

notifying one’s clients that earned fees have been withdrawn from a trust

This is commingling. Once fees

are earned, those fees must be withdrawn from the attorney trust account.

Typically, it is acceptable to draw down earned fees from an attorney trust

account on a monthly or some other reasonable periodic basis. Similarly,

monthly/periodic statements are considered an acceptable method of

notifying one’s clients that earned fees have been withdrawn from a trust

account. For those attorneys earning fees on a percentage basis, wherein

the fee would be considered earned upon the completion of an identified

portion of the work, a statement to that effect upon completion of that

work would satisfy this requirement.

[14] Disputes over fees. — If a procedure has been established for

resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure

established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it

is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should

conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure

for determining a lawyer’s fee, for example, in representation of an

executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee

as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a

lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply

with the prescribed procedure.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitration.

— Fees.

Attorneys’ fees.

— Allocation in Family Court.

— Contingency fees.

— Fee agreements.

— Fee splitting.

— Prevailing party.

— Reasonableness.

— Retainer.

— Standard of review.

Sanctions.

— Reprimand.

Analysis

er entitled to such a fee and a

lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply

with the prescribed procedure.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arbitration.

— Fees.

Attorneys’ fees.

— Allocation in Family Court.

— Contingency fees.

— Fee agreements.

— Fee splitting.

— Prevailing party.

— Reasonableness.

— Retainer.

— Standard of review.

Sanctions.

— Reprimand.

Analysis

— Suspension.

Arbitration.

— Fees.

Arbitrator’s award of fees to law firm that represented the clients in an

underlying complex and physically dangerous lawsuit was not manifestly

violative of the terms of the arbitration agreement or Delaware law;

although the court did not review the individual factual findings, it did

find substantial evidence supporting the approach taken by the arbitrator

in reviewing the reasonableness of various groups of charges according to

rules of Delaware case law and ethical rules. Blank Rome, L.L.P. v. Vendel,

2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2003).

Attorneys’ fees.

— Allocation in Family Court.

Husband’s motion for counsel fees under 13 Del. C. § 1515 and Fam. Ct.

Civ. R. 11 was granted in part in a wife’s action, seeking specific

performance under the parties’ separation agreement, because the wife had

changed her position with respect to selection of an appraiser; while the

fees were reasonable under Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. Prof. Conduct R.

1.5(a), since it was unclear whether counsel made a reaonable inquiry,

sanctions were not imposed directly against counsel. C.L.G. v. J.F.W., 2002

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 111 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 3, 2002).

Based on consideration of 13 Del. C. § 1515, Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and

Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a), it was not deemed appropriate to award

counsel fees to either party in post-divorce ancillary proceedings; while

the court must provide reasons for any award of fees, it need not justify a

denial of counsel fees. N.M.B. v. C.R.B., 2002 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 155

(Del. Fam. Ct. June 26, 2002)

2002).

Based on consideration of 13 Del. C. § 1515, Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and

Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a), it was not deemed appropriate to award

counsel fees to either party in post-divorce ancillary proceedings; while

the court must provide reasons for any award of fees, it need not justify a

denial of counsel fees. N.M.B. v. C.R.B., 2002 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 155

(Del. Fam. Ct. June 26, 2002).

Based on the financial circumstances, each party was to pay their own

attorney’s fees. R.A.C. v. V.M.E., 2002 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 153 (Del.

Fam. Ct. Mar. 7, 2002).

Mother was awarded counsel fees under 13 Del. C. § 1515 where the

parties substantially agreed on visitation, making a court appearance

unnecessary had the father informed the mother that he did not intend to

pursue primary residential custody; although the mother’s counsel fees of

$1,462 were reasonable under Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. Prof. Conduct

R. 1.5(a), given the parties’ finances, it was improper to order the father to

pay the mother’s fees in full. E.K. v. C.K., 2002 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 163

(Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 16, 2002).

Because both parties were difficult and contributed to unnecessary and

excessive litigation, each party was to bear his or her own attorney’s fees

and costs pursuant to 13 Del. C. § 1515, Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88, and Del. Law.

Prof. Conduct R. 1.5. T.M. v. M.M., 2002 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 250 (Del.

Fam. Ct. Mar. 12, 2002); D. L. M. v. A. L. M., 2005 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS

35 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 6, 2005).

Trial court evaluated relevant evidence and 13 Del. C. § 1515 Del. Fam.

Ct. Civ. R. 88, and Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5 to conclude that each

party was to pay their own attorneys’ fees. R.D.L. v. C.M.U., 2003 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 56 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 30, 2003); S.W. v. S.W., 2003 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 62 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 24, 2003); J. P. v. S. P., 2004 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 189 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004); J.H. v. L.H., 2006 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 267 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 13, 2006); D.E. v. S.M.E., 2007

Del

1.5 to conclude that each

party was to pay their own attorneys’ fees. R.D.L. v. C.M.U., 2003 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 56 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 30, 2003); S.W. v. S.W., 2003 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 62 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 24, 2003); J. P. v. S. P., 2004 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 189 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004); J.H. v. L.H., 2006 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 267 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 13, 2006); D.E. v. S.M.E., 2007

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 38 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 29, 2007).

Trial court entered orders, under 13 Del. C. § 1513, awarding 65 percent

of marital assets and 35 percent of liabilities to the wife, under 13 Del. C.

§ 1512, and after making allowance for her mother’s living with her,

awarding the wife $ 241 monthly alimony for 8.5 years, 50 percent of their

17-year marriage; under 13 Del. C. § 1515, Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88, and

Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5, the court awarded no attorneys’ fees. J.S. v.

K.S., 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 54 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 12, 2003); K.D.R.

v. C.P.R., 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 58 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 12, 2003).

The purpose of 13 Del. C. § 1515 is to equalize the parties’ positions by

providing a financially disadvantaged party with the financial means to

prosecute or defend a divorce action; the court must provide reasons for

any award of fees, and is also guided by Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Del.

Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. S. S. v. C. S., 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 213

(Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 22, 2003); M. B. v. P. B., 2005 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 63

(Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 21, 2005); D.B. v. N.D.B., 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS

with the financial means to

prosecute or defend a divorce action; the court must provide reasons for

any award of fees, and is also guided by Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Del.

Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. S. S. v. C. S., 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 213

(Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 22, 2003); M. B. v. P. B., 2005 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 63

(Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 21, 2005); D.B. v. N.D.B., 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS

218 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 31, 2006); N.P. v. S.B., 2007 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS

194 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 24, 2007).

Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 requires the Family Court of Delaware, in

determining the reasonableness of litigation costs incurred by the parties,

to consider: (1) the time and expense expended; (2) an itemization of

services rendered; (3) relevant hourly rates; (4) an itemization of

disbursements claimed; (5) any sums received or that will be received

with respect to legal services and/or disbursements; and (6) any

information that will enable the court to properly weigh the relevant factors

set forth in this rule. L. E. B. v. J. J. B., 2004 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 17 (Del.

Fam. Ct. Mar. 25, 2004).

Family court awarded a mother attorney fees and costs because, in light

of the factors enumerated in 13 Del. C. § 731 and Law. Prof. Conduct R.

1.5, the fees she incurred were reasonable, with the exception of charging

the father with the travel time of the mother’s counsel to and from the

courthouse; the father was responsible for the remainder of the mother’s

fees, notwithstanding the disparity in the parties’ incomes, because it was

his refusal to exercise the visitation awarded him and to comply with his

responsibilities as the joint custodian of the parties’ sons that caused the

mother to incur the fees that she did. M. D. H. v. G. S. H., 2004 Del. Fam.

Ct. LEXIS 62 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 29, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Harold v.

Harold, 867 A.2d 901 (Del. 2005); M.B.M. v. C.M., 2006 Del. Fam. Ct.

LEXIS 10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 27, 2006); S.F.C. v. D.F.C., 2007 Del. Fam.

Ct. LEXIS 164 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov

esponsibilities as the joint custodian of the parties’ sons that caused the

mother to incur the fees that she did. M. D. H. v. G. S. H., 2004 Del. Fam.

Ct. LEXIS 62 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 29, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Harold v.

Harold, 867 A.2d 901 (Del. 2005); M.B.M. v. C.M., 2006 Del. Fam. Ct.

LEXIS 10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 27, 2006); S.F.C. v. D.F.C., 2007 Del. Fam.

Ct. LEXIS 164 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 27, 2007); M.B. v. E.B., 28 A.3d 495

(Del. Fam. Ct. 2011).

Under the 13 Del. C. § 1515 factors (especially the financial conditions

of both parties), Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, it was

appropriate for the husband and the wife to be responsible for their own

attorneys’ fees and costs; this was despite the fact that the husband refused

to consider an offer to settle alimony until the day before the trial, leading

to an eventual award of alimony at trial. K. A. D. v. F. W. D., 2005 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 28 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 24, 2005); A.C.M.-W. v. S.W.,

2009 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 58 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 2, 2009); In re C.M.,

2011 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 54 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011).

Wife’s recalcitrant behavior regarding a sale of the marital home was

excessively litigious behavior that increased litigation costs and warranted

an attorney’s fee award to husband; in finding that the requested fees were

reasonable, the court considered the factors listed under Fam. Ct. Civ. R.

88, which incorporated consideration of any factors that would be relevant

under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) to determine whether an attorney met

the ethical duty to charge reasonable fees. D.L.D. v. N.M.D., 2005 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 143 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 7, 2005); D. E. v. S. M. E., 2003

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 211 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003).

Taking into account Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5,

the court denied mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs in a custody

modification action under 13 Del. C

torney met

the ethical duty to charge reasonable fees. D.L.D. v. N.M.D., 2005 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 143 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 7, 2005); D. E. v. S. M. E., 2003

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 211 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 19, 2003).

Taking into account Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5,

the court denied mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs in a custody

modification action under 13 Del. C. § 731; the mother did not prevail in

her requests for sole legal custody of her minor daughter, for permission

to relocate with the child to Utah or a neighboring state, or for restrictions

on the location of the father’s visits with the child, and she and the child’s

father were in comparable financial positions. K.J.G. v. J.M., 2005 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 164 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 1, 2005).

Family Court declined to award attorneys’ fees to either a wife or

husband in an ancillary order following the dissolution of their 35-year

marriage; both parties worked and had sufficient income or assets to pay

their own legal fee obligations. S.C. v. D.C., 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS

232 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 20, 2006).

Parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees were denied as an interim

agreement did not prohibit a husband from making a claim against the

increased equity in the wife’s home, even though the trial court ruled that

the parties could keep the appreciation in their respective properties, and

neither party took an overly litigious position. K. C. S. v. S. H. S., 2006

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 160 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 7, 2006).

As a wife in a divorce proceeding was extremely litigious, took

unreasonable positions and incurred a significant amount of attorneys’

fees as a result, and was relentless with numerous filings that proved

baseless and bordered on harassment, the wife’s request under 13 Del. C. §

1515 for attorneys’ fees, as well as based on considerations of Fam. Ct.

Civ. R. 88 and Law R. Prof. Conduct was 1.5, was not deemed meritorious.

g was extremely litigious, took

unreasonable positions and incurred a significant amount of attorneys’

fees as a result, and was relentless with numerous filings that proved

baseless and bordered on harassment, the wife’s request under 13 Del. C. §

1515 for attorneys’ fees, as well as based on considerations of Fam. Ct.

Civ. R. 88 and Law R. Prof. Conduct was 1.5, was not deemed meritorious.

C.G.B. v. P.C.B., 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 255 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 4,

2006).

Because the wife received a substantial portion of the marital estate, the

wife was required to pay her own attorneys’ fees pursuant to 13 Del. C. §

1515, Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. S.C.B. v. L.A.S.,

2007 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 138 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 7, 2007).

Because a wife was to receive a large portion of the marital estate, it

would not have been appropriate to award attorneys’ fees, under 13 Del. C.

§ 1515, Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88, and Law R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. E.F.F. v. A.J.O.,

2007 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 165 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 15, 2007); C.F.M. v.

S.R.M., 2007 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 250 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 31, 2007);

E.F.F. v. A.J.C., 2008 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 17 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 29,

2008).

Because a husband’s request for a continuance resulted not from an

intentional attempt to cause delay but rather the unforeseen unavailability

of witnesses and the husband’s position regarding the wife’s alleged

cohabitation was not frivolous, it would be inequitable to order attorneys’

fees merely because the wife prevailed. M.D. v. C.D., 2007 Del. Fam. Ct.

LEXIS 11 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 15, 2007).

Pursuant to 13 Del. C. § 1515, Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88, and Law. R. Prof.

Conduct 1.5, a wife was entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees

from the husband in the parties’ divorce action, as the wife did not have

sufficient income or ability to pay her own fees. W.J.F. v. K.F., 2008 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 88 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Fanin v.

Fanin, 3 A.3d 1096 (Del. 2009)

suant to 13 Del. C. § 1515, Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88, and Law. R. Prof.

Conduct 1.5, a wife was entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees

from the husband in the parties’ divorce action, as the wife did not have

sufficient income or ability to pay her own fees. W.J.F. v. K.F., 2008 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 88 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Fanin v.

Fanin, 3 A.3d 1096 (Del. 2009).

As parties in a divorce proceeding were not overly litigious and did not

take unreasonable positions, neither party was entitled to an award of

attorneys’ fees from the other pursuant to 13 Del. C. § 1515; the court

considered the financial circumstances of the parties in denying the fee

awards, as well as Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. K.T.

v. Y.T., 2008 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008), rev’d,

963 A.2d 1128 (Del. 2008).

Since both the husband and wife had some income even though they

were in dire financial straits, the trial court decided not to award

attorneys’ fees and costs to either party following the end of their 16-year

marriage; pursuant to 13 Del. C. § 1515, and considering reasonable fee

award factors set forth in Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct

1.5, the trial court directed each party to pay his or her own fees and costs,

as the husband had limited income because the husband was disabled and

only receiving weekly workers’ compensation payments, while the wife

although working had been bearing the brunt of paying the bills and rearing

the parties’ 2 children even before the husband left the marital residence.

K.F. v. L.F., 2008 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 10, 2008).

Upon evaluation by a court of each party’s assets, debts, and financial

circumstances in their divorce and ancillary relief proceeding, each party

was responsible for their own attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fam. Ct. Civ. R.

88 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. N.P. v. J.L.P., 2008 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS

20 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 11, 2008)

L.F., 2008 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 10, 2008).

Upon evaluation by a court of each party’s assets, debts, and financial

circumstances in their divorce and ancillary relief proceeding, each party

was responsible for their own attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fam. Ct. Civ. R.

88 and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. N.P. v. J.L.P., 2008 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS

20 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 11, 2008).

Husband was not entitled to counsel fees under 13 Del. C. § 1515, Fam.

Ct. Civ. R. 88 or Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5, given the de minimis size of

the marital estate ($645 equity in a car), the 25-year length of the marriage

and the substantial difference in income and earning capacity of the parties;

the husband took unreasonable positions, leading to excessive litigation.

N.J.H. v. J.H.H., 2008 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 128 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 26,

2008).

Wife was not awarded attorney fees and costs under 13 Del. C. § 1515,

Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88, and Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5, even though the wife

was disabled and the husband was in good health, as the parties had been

essentially placed in equal financial positions through the payment of

alimony and the disposition of the marital home. A.S. v. R.S., 2010 Del.

Fam. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 12, 2010).

Based on the counsel fees incurred by the husband in successfully

defending the wife’s appeal on the issue of the validity of the parties’

divorce, and upon consideration of Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law Prof.

Conduct R. 1.5, there was no basis to support an award of fees. M.R. v.

B.R., 2012 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 51 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 23, 2012).

Although a decision on attorney’s fees was deferred, the court was

inclined to require that each party be responsible for payment of their

ppeal on the issue of the validity of the parties’

divorce, and upon consideration of Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law Prof.

Conduct R. 1.5, there was no basis to support an award of fees. M.R. v.

B.R., 2012 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 51 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 23, 2012).

Although a decision on attorney’s fees was deferred, the court was

inclined to require that each party be responsible for payment of their

respective counsel fees and costs because, although the wife was the

economically weaker party, she was receiving 60% of the marital estate

and 50% of tax-deferred assets, in addition to alimony and child support.

E.K. v. M.K., 2013 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 55 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 28, 2013),

amended, 2013 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 60 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 13, 2013).

Wife was awarded attorneys’ fees in a divorce action based upon the

husband’s unreasonable conduct of dissipation, but not based upon her

economic state (due to the substantial award of marital property and

alimony to her). In re J-M-R, 2013 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 50 (Del. Fam. Ct.

July 29, 2013), amended, 2013 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 48 (Del. Fam. Ct.

Sept. 23, 2013).

Award of attorneys’ fees in the wife’s favor was appropriate because the

Family Court on several occasions acknowledged the husband’s delay in

litigation and the wife’s need to continually resort to motions to compel

discovery for litigation. Weiner v. Weiner, 2015 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 34

(Del. Fam. Ct. July 13, 2015).

Family Court limited the award of fees to the mother only to the narrow

issue covered under the rule to show cause (RTSC) because: (1) the

testimony regarding the father’s use and/or possession of alcohol in the

home was easily divisible from the rest of the testimony; and (2) the time

spent at trial limited to the RTSC did not exceed 3%, resulting in the father

paying $1,005 in fees and costs. K.W. v. S.W., — A.3d —, 2019 Del. Fam.

Ct. LEXIS 35 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 16, 2019).

— Allocation in Family Court

(RTSC) because: (1) the

testimony regarding the father’s use and/or possession of alcohol in the

home was easily divisible from the rest of the testimony; and (2) the time

spent at trial limited to the RTSC did not exceed 3%, resulting in the father

paying $1,005 in fees and costs. K.W. v. S.W., — A.3d —, 2019 Del. Fam.

Ct. LEXIS 35 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 16, 2019).

— Allocation in Family Court.

Family Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a wife attorneys’

fees after finding the wife’s former husband in contempt for disobeying a

property division stipulation and order; the award was based on an

extensive record developed at trial and attorney fee affidavits. Cook v.

Cook, — A.3d —, 2022 Del. LEXIS 65 (Del. Feb. 23, 2022).

— Contingency fees.

Attorney’s failing to put a contingency fee arrangement in writing

violated subsection (c). In re Maguire, 725 A.2d 417 (Del. 1999).

Attorney was entitled to quantum meruit fees up to a 1/3 contingency

fee from former clients because: (1) the attorney was not fired for cause;

(2) the issues were not complex; (3) the clients pressed the attorney to

settle quickly; (4) nothing showed the attorney was precluded from other

employment; (5) the fee was contingent and based on 1/3 of the recovery;

and (6) the clients’ subsequent attorney could pay the fee based on a

charging lien on recovered fees. Murrey v. Shank, 2011 Del. Super. LEXIS

431 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2011), aff’d, 41 A.3d 430 (Del. 2012)

3) the clients pressed the attorney to

settle quickly; (4) nothing showed the attorney was precluded from other

employment; (5) the fee was contingent and based on 1/3 of the recovery;

and (6) the clients’ subsequent attorney could pay the fee based on a

charging lien on recovered fees. Murrey v. Shank, 2011 Del. Super. LEXIS

431 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2011), aff’d, 41 A.3d 430 (Del. 2012).

Law firm was entitled to the full amount of requested fees in a

contractual fee-shifting case because: (1) the requested fees were not

unreasonable; (2) the parties’ one-third contingent fee arrangement was

quite typical and commercially reasonable; (3) there was nothing

inherently unreasonable in including prejudgment

interest

when

calculating the appropriate amount of fees; (4) the law firm did not include

late fees in the proceeds; and (5) the requested fees were on par with, or

less than, awards the court had previously deemed reasonable. S’holder

Representative Servs. LLC v. Shire US Holdings, Inc., — A.3d

—, 2021 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2021).

— Fee agreements.

Attorney was suspended for 3 months, followed by 18 months of

conditional probation, for having violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f),

1.7(a), 1.15(a), 1.16(d) by: (1) having a conflict of interest with 2 clients;

(2) having a personal interest in a loan transaction; (3) failing to safeguard

client funds; and (4) failing to provide a new client with a fee agreement.

In re O’Brien, 26 A.3d 203 (Del. 2011)

s suspended for 3 months, followed by 18 months of

conditional probation, for having violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f),

1.7(a), 1.15(a), 1.16(d) by: (1) having a conflict of interest with 2 clients;

(2) having a personal interest in a loan transaction; (3) failing to safeguard

client funds; and (4) failing to provide a new client with a fee agreement.

In re O’Brien, 26 A.3d 203 (Del. 2011).

The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the Board on Professional

Responsibility’s findings and recommendation for discipline, publicly

reprimanding and placing the attorney on a 2-year period of probation with

the imposition of specific conditions, because the attorney failed to

provide the client with a fee agreement and/or statement of earned fees

withdrawn from the trust account, to identify and safeguard client fund, to

maintain financial books and records or to supervise nonlawyer assistants;

the attorney had engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation,

prejudicial to the administration of justice. In re Malik, 167 A.3d 1189

(Del. 2017).

— Fee splitting.

Finding of attorney’s violation of subdivision (e)(1) was supported by

substantial evidence. In re Berl, 540 A.2d 410 (Del. 1988); In re Berl, 560

A.2d 1009 (Del. 1989).

Fee division agreement between a law firm and its former associate was

valid and enforceable and did not violate the disciplinary rules; it is not

common for a law firm and a departing attorney to divide the fees resulting

from contingent fee cases which the attorney has been handling and will

continue to handle after he leaves. Tomar, Seliger, Simonoff, Adourian

& O’Brien v. Snyder, 601 A.2d 1056 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).

A Delaware lawyer may not assert non-compliance with Rule 1.5(e) as a

defense to an oral agreement with an out-of-state lawyer who is not charged

with compliance with that rule or a similar rule of another jurisdiction.

Potter v. Peirce, 688 A.2d 894 (Del. 1997)

l

continue to handle after he leaves. Tomar, Seliger, Simonoff, Adourian

& O’Brien v. Snyder, 601 A.2d 1056 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990).

A Delaware lawyer may not assert non-compliance with Rule 1.5(e) as a

defense to an oral agreement with an out-of-state lawyer who is not charged

with compliance with that rule or a similar rule of another jurisdiction.

Potter v. Peirce, 688 A.2d 894 (Del. 1997).

Attorney’s failing to obtain a written agreement with the client

regarding joint representation with another lawyer and his attempting to

divide a prospective fee violated subsection (e). In re Maguire, 725 A.2d

417 (Del. 1999).

Assuming that there was a contract by which a law firm engaged a

representative plaintiff to perform legal work in class action litigation, any

purported contract would have been void and unenforceable as it was

unethical and in violation of the principles governing representative

actions in Delaware; in particular, the agreement would have violated Law.

R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(e) as the representative plaintiff did not advise the

class, either in writing or orally, of the alleged fee-sharing agreement.

Fuqua Indus. S’holder Litig. v. Abrams (In re Fuqua Indus.), 2006 Del. Ch.

LEXIS 167 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2006), aff’d, 922 A.2d 414 (Del. 2007).

— Prevailing party.

Pursuant to Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a)(4), an award for fees, costs,

and expenses incurred in the Chancery Court was not warranted to an

investment company, because it was not the prevailing party there; rather,

the company’s claims in that Court were dismissed. Shore Invs., Inc. v.

Bhole, Inc., 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 621 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2012).

Mother found in contempt of a custody order was required to reimburse

the father $2,520 in attorney fees because: (1) the father’s application

ry Court was not warranted to an

investment company, because it was not the prevailing party there; rather,

the company’s claims in that Court were dismissed. Shore Invs., Inc. v.

Bhole, Inc., 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 621 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2012).

Mother found in contempt of a custody order was required to reimburse

the father $2,520 in attorney fees because: (1) the father’s application

complied with both Law. Prof. Cond. R. 1.5 and Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88; (2)

the rate charged and time spent by the father’s attorney were reasonable in

light of the work performed; (3) the father’s attorney was unavailable for

other work; (4) the father prevailed on his contempt claims; and (5) the

court reduced the father’s fee request by 2.4 hours in light of duplicative

work. A.K. v. A.K., — A.3d —, 2020 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 40 (Del. Fam.

Ct. Oct. 6, 2020).

Court determined that having each party bear their own attorneys’ fees,

costs and expenses incurred during the litigation was equitable because:

(1) neither party “prevailed,” as each party won on some claims and lost

on others, with each party recovering far less than they sought; and (2) as a

result, shifting would not have been equitable under the purchase and sale

agreement at issue. In re Facchina Constr. Litigs., — A.3d —, 2021 Del.

Super. LEXIS 239 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2021).

— Reasonableness.

Although the fees incurred by a mother in an expedited custody

proceeding were reasonable in light of the factors enumerated in Law.

Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, pursuant to 13 Del. C. § 731, the father was not

responsible for fees that the mother would have incurred regardless of his

obstreperous conduct. M.D.H. v. G.S.H., 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 6 (Del.

Fam. Ct. Feb. 28, 2003)

— Reasonableness.

Although the fees incurred by a mother in an expedited custody

proceeding were reasonable in light of the factors enumerated in Law.

Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, pursuant to 13 Del. C. § 731, the father was not

responsible for fees that the mother would have incurred regardless of his

obstreperous conduct. M.D.H. v. G.S.H., 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 6 (Del.

Fam. Ct. Feb. 28, 2003).

Court granted the father’s motion for attorney fees because the mother

violated the court’s order granting the father joint legal custody of and

visitation with the parties’ children in several respects; in setting the fees,

the court considered the factors enumerated in Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct

1.5. D.M.E. v. M.B.S.E., 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 119 (Del. Fam. Ct.

Sept. 11, 2003).

Although the insured was entitled to an attorney fee award as the

prevailing party against the insurer, its fee request was excessive and had

to be reduced to a reasonable amount. Nassau Gallery, Inc. v. Nationwide

Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 401 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 18,

2003).

Exercising its broad 13 Del. C. § 731 discretion and considering Del.

Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88, Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5, and related factors to

determine a reasonable fee, the court allowed the mother’s $412 and father’s

$275 attorney fee requests and ordered the father to pay $100 of the

mother’s fee; the court specifically mentioned it took into account the

father’s intransigent position violating Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 16(b) policy

that contemplated the parties’ participation in mediation to mediate to

settle unresolved issues, the positions taken by the parties, the discrepancy

in counsel’s experience, and the parties’ incomes. N. J. G. v. J. J. G., 2004

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 18 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 2, 2004); L D M v. R L, 2006

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 131 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 1, 2006); D.G.C. v. R.C.,

2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 260 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 30, 2006), aff’d sub

nom. Chasin v. Chasin, 940 A.2d 945 (Del. 2007); R.U. v

e positions taken by the parties, the discrepancy

in counsel’s experience, and the parties’ incomes. N. J. G. v. J. J. G., 2004

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 18 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 2, 2004); L D M v. R L, 2006

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 131 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 1, 2006); D.G.C. v. R.C.,

2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 260 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 30, 2006), aff’d sub

nom. Chasin v. Chasin, 940 A.2d 945 (Del. 2007); R.U. v. R.L.U., 2008

Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 26 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 22, 2008).

After plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their action against defendants for

the interpretation of a partnership agreement, defendants were entitled to

reasonable attorney fees for answering the complaint and responding to

the motion to dismiss; however, the court declined to award fees for the

preparation of defendants’ counterclaims since these were voluntary in

nature and were not necessarily incurred in defense of the action.

Richmont Capital Ptnrs. I, L.P. v. J. R. Invs. Corp., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS

73 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004).

Taking into account the Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a) factors, the trial

court approved the reasonableness of the attorney fees the Special Master

recommended in the Special Master’s Final Report, as the coproate officer

was due the advancement of funds (as provided for in the corporation’s

bylaws) in an investigation for possible accounting irregularities; however,

the trial court had to modify the corporate officer’s pre-judgment interest

request because the corporate officer was only entitled to interest from the

time the officer produced specific advancement expenses to the

corporation. Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 41 (Del. Ch.

Mar. 29, 2005).

Delaware Industrial Accident Board, in awarding minimal attorney’s fee

to the employee’s counsel under 19 Del. C. § 2320, abused its discretion in

failing to demonstrate that it had considered the requisite Cox factors,

based on Law. R. Prof

time the officer produced specific advancement expenses to the

corporation. Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 41 (Del. Ch.

Mar. 29, 2005).

Delaware Industrial Accident Board, in awarding minimal attorney’s fee

to the employee’s counsel under 19 Del. C. § 2320, abused its discretion in

failing to demonstrate that it had considered the requisite Cox factors,

based on Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a), in making its award; the Board

merely stated that it awarded a minimal fee due to the employee’s counsel’s

failure to cooperate with the employer’s counsel by refusing to

send photographs of the employee’s disfigurement. Green v. ConAgra

Poultry Co., 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 321 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2005).

Wife’s counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in the parties’

post-divorce proceedings was granted based upon consideration of the

relevant factors under Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88, as well as the reasonableness of

the fee under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5; the award was within the family

court’s authority under 13 Del. C. § 1515, and included consideration of

the former husband’s financial situation, his retention of a new attorney

for a longer time than the wife, the extensiveness of the parties’ litigation,

and the necessity of the wife’s retention of counsel to obtain a final

resolution of pending matters. L. F. v. L. M. H., 2005 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS

73 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 3, 2005).

Because a mortgage agreement established a ceiling of 5 percent of the

judgment amount which ultimately would be entered after trial and the

lender could not recover attorneys’ fees outside of the foreclosure, the

requested attorneys’ fees were unreasonable. Beneficial Delaware, Inc. v.

Waples, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 274 (Del. Super. Ct. July 3, 2006)

. LEXIS

73 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 3, 2005).

Because a mortgage agreement established a ceiling of 5 percent of the

judgment amount which ultimately would be entered after trial and the

lender could not recover attorneys’ fees outside of the foreclosure, the

requested attorneys’ fees were unreasonable. Beneficial Delaware, Inc. v.

Waples, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 274 (Del. Super. Ct. July 3, 2006).

When the court had held that a workers’ compensation claimant was an

employee and not an independent contractor, the claimant’s attorney was

awarded a fee of $29,053.19, representing $300 multiplied by 96 hours

plus costs of $253.19, as the time expended and the hourly rate were

reasonable given the nature of the case, counsel’s experience, and

community custom, and the employers had not supplied any evidence of

their claimed inability to pay the fee; a ⅓ multiplier, however, was not

justified, because if the issue was complex at all, it was factually, not

legally, complex. Falconi v. Coombs & Coombs, Inc., 2006 Del. Super.

LEXIS 471 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2006).

The employee was entitled to attorney’s fees under 19 Del. C. § 2350(f)

where: (1) the employee’s total disability case presented relatively

difficult questions on appeal; (2) the attorney’s hourly rate was reasonable;

(3) the attorney was successful on appeal; (4) pursuant to Law. Prof.

Conduct R. 1.5, the employer was able to pay; and (5) the Industrial

Accident Board’s award was the only source of attorneys’ fees. Smith v.

Del. State Hous. Auth., 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 624 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb.

14, 2006).

presented relatively

difficult questions on appeal; (2) the attorney’s hourly rate was reasonable;

(3) the attorney was successful on appeal; (4) pursuant to Law. Prof.

Conduct R. 1.5, the employer was able to pay; and (5) the Industrial

Accident Board’s award was the only source of attorneys’ fees. Smith v.

Del. State Hous. Auth., 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 624 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb.

14, 2006).

When an employer was partially successful in a suit against an

employee for the employee’s violation of a noncompetition agreement, an

award to the employer of attorneys’ fees exceeding the amount of damages

awarded was not excessive under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5 because the

employee was responsible for delays resulting in increased fees, as: (1) the

employee’s motion for a continuance required counsel to prepare for trial

twice; and (2) the employee could have minimized litigation costs but

instead drew out the case by requiring the employer to prove every key

issue of fact. EDIX Media Group v. Mahani, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 17 (Del.

Ch. Jan. 25, 2007), aff’d, 935 A.2d 242 (Del. 2007); Mahani v. EDIX

Media Group, Inc., 935 A.2d 242 (Del. 2007); Weichert Co. v. Young, 2008

Del. Ch. LEXIS 51 (Del. Ch. May 1, 2008).

Attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) by charging a fee of

$1,500 for the minimal legal services performed in connection with a

motion for reduction of sentence. In re Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del.

2007).

Attorneys’ total fees of $144,866.70 were reasonable as the case

required a tenacious and highly-skilled lawyer with extensive understanding

of employment law and, as a solo practitioner, the attorney’s ability to

take on other cases was severely limited by the obligations in the case; the

amount involved and the amount recovered by the client, $252,416 on

wrongful termination and bad faith claims, were both substantial. Bunting

v. Citizens Fin. Group, 2007 Del. Super. LEXIS 205 (Del. Super. Ct. June

29, 2007)

nsive understanding

of employment law and, as a solo practitioner, the attorney’s ability to

take on other cases was severely limited by the obligations in the case; the

amount involved and the amount recovered by the client, $252,416 on

wrongful termination and bad faith claims, were both substantial. Bunting

v. Citizens Fin. Group, 2007 Del. Super. LEXIS 205 (Del. Super. Ct. June

29, 2007).

The attorneys’ request for the maximum fee allowed by law was

unsupported because: (1) motion practice was a normal part of litigation;

(2) movant attorneys offered no reason why their motions were so

complex as to justify an attorneys’ fee award of 33%; and (3) the fact that

the county vigorously opposed the motion was irrelevant. Korn v. New

Castle County, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del. Ch. Oct. 3, 2007).

Although an attorney fee award in a workers’ compensation case could

be based on nonmonetary benefits, the Industrial Accident Board had

nothing before it other than the employee’s monetary award from which to

calculate the attorney fee award; however, applying Del. Law. R. Prof.

Conduct 1.5, regarding reasonable attorney fees, and the General Motors

Corporation v. Cox, 304 A.2d 55, 57 (Del. 1973) factors that included the

amount involved and the results obtained, there existed no basis for

overturning the Board’s attorney fee award. Pugh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

945 A.2d 588 (Del. 2008).

Reimbursement of defense fees and costs pursuant to an indemnification

provision in a stock purchase agreement of a manufacturing entity by the

former manufacturer was warranted where the fees were reasonable based

on consideration of the reasonableness factors under Law. R. Prof. Conduct

1.5(a)(1) and (4); such fees included work done prior to the time when

the underlying environmental litigation was commenced, as there were

subpoenas and information requests that served as the basis for the lawsuit

against the new manufacturing entity and others. Rexnord Indus., LLC

v. RHI Holdings, Inc., 2009 Del

ed

on consideration of the reasonableness factors under Law. R. Prof. Conduct

1.5(a)(1) and (4); such fees included work done prior to the time when

the underlying environmental litigation was commenced, as there were

subpoenas and information requests that served as the basis for the lawsuit

against the new manufacturing entity and others. Rexnord Indus., LLC

v. RHI Holdings, Inc., 2009 Del. Super. LEXIS 47 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 13,

2009).

Attorney fees and expert witness fees incurred by former executives in

their action against a corporation, seeking payment of certain options that

they were allegedly promised, were ordered to be paid by the corporation

where the executives were awarded judgment after trial and the sums

sought were, for the most part, reasonable, not duplicative, and not

excessive under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a); the executives were also

entitled to fees for the prosecution of their action seeking payment of fees.

Lillis v. AT&T Corp., 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2009).

Treatment center that failed to comply with subpoenas duces tecum for

substance and alcohol abuse records of an indigent parent involved in a

child dependency case, and which was ultimately found in contempt for its

misconduct, was ordered to pay the parent’s attorney that attorney’s

reasonable attorneys’ fees under Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88; such attorneys’ fees,

based on what the attorney would have earned if the attorney was working

for a private client, were reasonable in the circumstances pursuant to Law.

R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. A.B. v. Thresholds, Inc., 982 A.2d 295 (Del. Fam. Ct.

2009).

Plaintiffs’ request for $83,980 in attorneys’ fees was reduced by 30

percent where: (1) the disputed fees pertained directly to plaintiffs’ efforts

to gain possession of and ability to inspect a defendant’s computer which

that defendant had already modified, losing or disposing of, the hard drive;

(2) the time spent by the most junior and senior attorneys was disallowed;

l. Fam. Ct.

2009).

Plaintiffs’ request for $83,980 in attorneys’ fees was reduced by 30

percent where: (1) the disputed fees pertained directly to plaintiffs’ efforts

to gain possession of and ability to inspect a defendant’s computer which

that defendant had already modified, losing or disposing of, the hard drive;

(2) the time spent by the most junior and senior attorneys was disallowed;

(3) it was reasonable under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) to allow a

weighted average rate of approximately $340 per hour for the other 2

attorneys who spent almost 240 hours on the claimed work, given their

level of experience; and (4) much of the requested relief was denied; and

(5) the award was directed to the prejudice caused by the spoliation. Beard

Research, Inc v. Kates, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2009).

Condominium code and declaration authorized attorneys’ fees to a

prevailing party, such that a condominium council that was awarded partial

summary judgment in its debt action against condominium owners was

awarded its reasonable fees; the fees were reasonable under Law. R. Prof.

Conduct 1.5(a), based on the amount charged, the hours worked, the

owners’ willingness to pursue litigation, and their ability to pay. Dixon v.

Council of the Cliff House Condo., 2009 Del. C.P. LEXIS 71 (Del. C.P.

Dec. 8, 2009).

Although the first party’s attorneys’ fees were reasonable under the

factors set forth in Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a), the first party’s expenses

related to photocopying, transcripts, travel, and computer research were

not to be included because: (1) the terms “costs” and “expenses” had

different meanings; and (2) the parties’ asset purchase agreement only

provided for payment of costs, pursuant to Ch. Ct. R. 54. Ivize of

Milwaukee v. Compex Litig. Support, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 251 (Del. Ch.

June 24, 2009).

Attorneys’ fees based on Law. R. Prof

o photocopying, transcripts, travel, and computer research were

not to be included because: (1) the terms “costs” and “expenses” had

different meanings; and (2) the parties’ asset purchase agreement only

provided for payment of costs, pursuant to Ch. Ct. R. 54. Ivize of

Milwaukee v. Compex Litig. Support, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 251 (Del. Ch.

June 24, 2009).

Attorneys’ fees based on Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) were reduced

partially where the amount of time spent by partners in 1 law firm was

deemed an artificial inflation of a company’s requested fees; the company

was awarded fees based on another company’s breach of a noncompetition

provision in the parties’ asset purchase agreement. Concord Steel, Inc. v.

Wilmington Steel Processing Co., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 18 (Del. Ch. Feb.

5, 2010), aff’d, 7 A.3d 486 (Del. 2010).

Because the plaintiffs’ fees were reasonable as to the amount involved,

and because the time expended was justifiable based on the amount of

money involved, the number of the defendants, and the vigor with which

the arbitration was contested, the plaintiffs were entitled to their

attorneys’ fees and costs under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a). Global Link

Logistics, Inc. v. Olympus Growth Fund III, L.P., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 30

(Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010).

With the exception of certain expenses that fell outside the fee award, a

corporation’s attorneys’ fees were reasonable as to the number of attorneys

involved and the related dollar amounts; therefore, pursuant to Law. R.

Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) and Ch. Ct. R. 88, a shareholder was obligated to pay

the corporation’s expenses incurred by the shareholder’s contempt. Aveta

Inc. v. Bengoa, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2010)

that fell outside the fee award, a

corporation’s attorneys’ fees were reasonable as to the number of attorneys

involved and the related dollar amounts; therefore, pursuant to Law. R.

Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) and Ch. Ct. R. 88, a shareholder was obligated to pay

the corporation’s expenses incurred by the shareholder’s contempt. Aveta

Inc. v. Bengoa, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2010).

Former officer of a corporation reasonably requested $292,019.91 for

fees and expenses incurred in connection with the officer’s defense of

claims asserted against the officer by the corporation’s parent in an

underlying action; the record in the underlying action strongly suggested

that the parent adopted a litigation strategy designed to overwhelm the

officer by forcing the officer to incur significant expenses defending a

wide-ranging, unfocused action. Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc., 58 A.3d 991

(Del. Ch. 2012).

Attorneys’ fees and costs of $3,267,355 requested were reasonable and

were awarded to a fund under a contractual fee-shifting provision because:

(1) the attorneys’ fee component was calculated using the rates the fund’s

counsel customarily charged the fund, which were their standard hourly

rates discounted by 10%; (2) the lawyers who staffed the matter were able

and experienced practitioners and charged what were readily recognizable

as reasonable rates for complex commercial litigation; (3) that the

opponents’ attorneys charged lower rates did not render the fund’s

counsel’s rates unreasonable in light of the fund’s counsel’s prominence,

the qualifications of its practitioners and the legal market in which the

firm provided services; and (4) that the opponents’ attorneys incurred

fewer hours working on the case did not undercut the reasonableness of the

fund’s request. ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge

Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d in part and

rev’d in part, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013)

e qualifications of its practitioners and the legal market in which the

firm provided services; and (4) that the opponents’ attorneys incurred

fewer hours working on the case did not undercut the reasonableness of the

fund’s request. ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge

Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d in part and

rev’d in part, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013).

Trial court properly awarded a minority stockholder’s attorney a fee of

$304 million (15% of a $2.031 billion judgment) in a derivative suit since

Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(c) contemplated fees that were based on a

percentage; the trial court properly made a reasonableness determination

based on the Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980)

factors. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).

The extraordinary benefit that was achieved by plaintiff minority

shareholder in a derivative suit merited a very substantial award of $304

million in attorneys’ fees where: (1) plaintiff’s attorneys pursued the case

on a contingent fee basis, invested a significant number of hours, incurred

more than $1 million in expenses, attorneys reviewed approximately

282,046 pages in document production and traveled outside the United

States to take multiple depositions; (2) plaintiffs indisputably prosecuted

the action through trial and secured an immense economic benefit; (3)

plaintiff had to deal with very complex financial and valuation issues,

while being up against major league, first-rate legal talent; (4) with

prejudgment interest, the benefit achieved through the litigation amounted

to more than $2 billion; and (5) postjudgment interest accrued at more

than $212,000 per day. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del.

2012)

nse economic benefit; (3)

plaintiff had to deal with very complex financial and valuation issues,

while being up against major league, first-rate legal talent; (4) with

prejudgment interest, the benefit achieved through the litigation amounted

to more than $2 billion; and (5) postjudgment interest accrued at more

than $212,000 per day. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del.

2012).

Award of $304 million in attorneys’ fees in a derivative suit was properly

based upon the total damage award, which included prejudgment interest;

the Court of Chancery’s decision to include prejudgment interest in its

determination of the benefit achieved was not arbitrary or capricious, but

rather was the product of a logical and deductive reasoning process which

took into account the slow pace of litigation and any part plaintiffs might

have played in that pace. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213

(Del. 2012).

Award of $304 million in attorneys’ fees in a derivative suit, based upon

a calculation of 15% of a $2.031 billion judgment, was proper due to the

complexity of the case and valuable benefits conferred; the fact that

plaintiff’s counsel spent 8,597 hours on this case, meaning that the award

would represent a per hour payment of approximately $35,000 an hour,

was irrelevant because the benefit achieved by the litigation was the

common yardstick by which a plaintiff’s counsel should be compensated

in a successful derivative action. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d

1213 (Del. 2012).

Pursuant to Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, an award for fees, costs and

expenses incurred in a breach of lease claim was reasonable and

proximately $35,000 an hour,

was irrelevant because the benefit achieved by the litigation was the

common yardstick by which a plaintiff’s counsel should be compensated

in a successful derivative action. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d

1213 (Del. 2012).

Pursuant to Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, an award for fees, costs and

expenses incurred in a breach of lease claim was reasonable and

appropriate where an investment company prevailed on that claim; the

court allocated the percentage to be awarded for each item, because other

claims had also been pursued. Shore Invs., Inc. v. Bhole, Inc., 2012 Del.

Super. LEXIS 621 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2012).

Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees was granted only in part because

many of the entries by her attorney did not relate to the husband’s

dissipation of marital assets, which was the basis of the award; the amount

awarded was deemed reasonable. J- M- R- v. K- J. R-, 2013 Del. Fam. Ct.

LEXIS 48 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013).

In awarding fees and costs under the bad faith exception to the

American Rule, an indication that the amount of the fee request was

reasonable was that at the time the fees and expenses were incurred,

plaintiffs had no guarantee of obtaining a fee-shifting award; further, the

court determined that most prelitigation expenses were reasonable,

considering that plaintiffs acted reasonably by seeking to resolve the matter

before filing suit. Staffieri v. Black, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 322 (Del. Ch.

Aug. 8, 2013), aff’d, 2014 Del. LEXIS 88 (Del. Feb. 27, 2014).

While the attorney fee award was greater than the amount recovered for

the breach of contract, the award was supported because: (1) the guarantor

made many claims which were costly to defend against; (2) the lender

hired a legal team and expert advisors necessary to tackle the numerous,

difficult issues; (3) the fees charges were reasonable and less than those

expended by the guarantor; and (4) the professionals chosen were well-

qualified

amount recovered for

the breach of contract, the award was supported because: (1) the guarantor

made many claims which were costly to defend against; (2) the lender

hired a legal team and expert advisors necessary to tackle the numerous,

difficult issues; (3) the fees charges were reasonable and less than those

expended by the guarantor; and (4) the professionals chosen were well-

qualified. Edgewater Growth Capital Partners L.P. v. H.I.G. Capital, Inc.,

2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 104 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2013).

Defendant’s attorneys’ fees of $287,339 were reasonable because: (1)

the litigation lasted over 3 years; (2) plaintiff repeatedly engaged in bad

faith litigation tactic; (3) defense counsel’s hourly rates were consistent

with the rates generally charged in Delaware; and (4) the number of hours

devoted to the litigation was not excessive, redundant, duplicative or

otherwise unnecessary. Preferred Invs., Inc. v. T&H Bail Bonds, 2014 Del.

Ch. LEXIS 43 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 2014).

Shifting attorneys’ fees under the bad faith exception to the American

Rule and awarding reasonable fees to an estate for defending against a

challenger’s exceptions to the final accounting was appropriate because:

(1) the challenger lacked standing to prosecute exceptions; (2) the

litigation was vexatious and frivolous; and (3) the attorney’s fees

requested were reasonable and involved a modest hourly rate of $225 for

over 20 hours in preparing for the exceptions. In re Estate of Branson,

2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Branson

v. Branson, 105 A.3d 988 (Del. 2014).

In this contract action, defendant was entitled to an award of $700,000

for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses because defendant predominated in

the litigation regarding the breach of contract issuea; the time and labor

required in this suit were significant because the ownership and control of

defendant was at stake. AFH Holding & Advisory, LLC v. Emmaus Life

Scis., Inc., 2014 Del. Super. LEXIS 228 (Del. Super. Ct

defendant was entitled to an award of $700,000

for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses because defendant predominated in

the litigation regarding the breach of contract issuea; the time and labor

required in this suit were significant because the ownership and control of

defendant was at stake. AFH Holding & Advisory, LLC v. Emmaus Life

Scis., Inc., 2014 Del. Super. LEXIS 228 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014).

Although plaintiff requested $374,128 in attorneys’ fees and costs for

misuse of computer system information, the award was reduced to

$200,000 because: (1) the amount sought was unreasonable and

disproportionate to the $87,016.25 awarded to plaintiff as nominal and

unjust enrichment damages; and (2) not all of the time and labor expended

by plaintiff’s counsel on the computer misuse claim was necessary.

Wayman Fire Prot., Inc. v. Premium Fire & Sec., LLC, 2014 Del. Ch.

LEXIS 108 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2014).

Plaintiff was entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees of

$33,440 for defendant’s refusal to comply with a discovery request

because: (1) plaintiff’s time entries sufficiently advised the court as to the

task being completed; (2) plaintiff’s explanations as to the nature of any

disputed work were credible; (3) defendant was not paying for purely

clerical tasks; and (4) defendant was not paying for redundant/unnecessary

tasks or excessive time. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 2014

Del. Super. LEXIS 475 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2014).

While the amount of time law firms devoted to the representation of the

trustees of a trust was reasonable, given that the beneficiaries vigorously

contested numerous aspects of the action, and the amounts charged by the

trustees’ attorneys generally were reasonable, the court capped the

reimbursable billing rates for one law firm when the court determined that

the maximum rate for reasonable attorneys’ fees was lower than that firm

to the representation of the

trustees of a trust was reasonable, given that the beneficiaries vigorously

contested numerous aspects of the action, and the amounts charged by the

trustees’ attorneys generally were reasonable, the court capped the

reimbursable billing rates for one law firm when the court determined that

the maximum rate for reasonable attorneys’ fees was lower than that firm

charged. In re Hawk Mt. Trust, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 236 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8,

2015).

Upon granting a mortgagee’s foreclosure and breach of contract claims

pursuant to a judgment on the pleadings, the court determined the

reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees to award, based upon consideration

of the professional conduct factors, including the billing statements that

detailed the hours worked, the nature of the representation and the amount

of the judgment. CRELK Enters. v. Meris Props., 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS

180 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2016).

Nursing home’s attorney was entitled to an award of fees and costs

pursuant to the admission agreement because: (1) the attorney practiced

law for more than 40 years, including the representation of nursing homes

for about 20 years; (2) the attorney’s discounted hourly rate of $270 was

below those fees customarily charged by attorneys with similar experience;

and (3) the attorney obtained a favorable result for the home. 810 South

Broom St. Operations, LLC v. Daniel, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 332 (Del.

Super. Ct. July 15, 2016), rev’d, 158 A.3d 884 (Del. 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees and

costs in the amount of $10,296 to a nursing home because: (1) there was a

contractual basis for shifting attorneys’ fees; (2) the parties engaged in an

unsuccessful mediation; (3) the nursing home was required to engage in

motion practice; and (4) there was a 1-day trial. Miller v. Onix Silverside,

LLC, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 434 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2016)

in awarding attorneys’ fees and

costs in the amount of $10,296 to a nursing home because: (1) there was a

contractual basis for shifting attorneys’ fees; (2) the parties engaged in an

unsuccessful mediation; (3) the nursing home was required to engage in

motion practice; and (4) there was a 1-day trial. Miller v. Onix Silverside,

LLC, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 434 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2016).

Although a commercial landlord sought $42,412 in attorneys’ fees, the

landlord was awarded $20,132 in fees because 32.5 hours billed for post-

trial memoranda was unreasonable; the landlord was not permitted to bill

for another trial that had to be held at a later date when 2 of the landlord’s

witnesses were unavailable for the original trial. J.M.L. Inc. v. Shoppes of

Mount Pleasant, LLC, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 519 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct.

14, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees to a

maintenance company in its action against a property owner, arising from

the property owner’s alleged failure to pay annual assessment; the amount

awarded was reasonable. Saunders-Gomez v. Rutledge Maint. Corp., 2017

Del. Super. LEXIS 164 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2017), aff’d, 189 A.3d 1288

(Del. 2018).

Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees was granted, in part, because: (1)

tasks performed by defendant’s attorneys were made necessary by counsel

having had no part in negotiating the asset purchasing agreement; and (2)

defendant’s attorneys were required to research and understand a complex

corporate transaction with little to no prior familiarity with what occurred.

The Boeing Co. v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., 2017 Del. Super. LEXIS 630

(Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2017), aff’d, 190 A.3d 999 (Del. 2018)

neys were made necessary by counsel

having had no part in negotiating the asset purchasing agreement; and (2)

defendant’s attorneys were required to research and understand a complex

corporate transaction with little to no prior familiarity with what occurred.

The Boeing Co. v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., 2017 Del. Super. LEXIS 630

(Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2017), aff’d, 190 A.3d 999 (Del. 2018).

In an action for breach of a commercial lease, the landlord’s attorneys’

fees were reasonable because counsel: (1) could not work on other matters

while working on the instant litigation; (2) gave the landlord a discounted

fee rate due to their continued business; (3) assigned different matters to

associates and paralegals at a lower billable rate; and (4) never raised its

rates throughout the 3-year litigation. Bridev One, LLC v. Regency Ctrs.,

L.P., 2017 Del. Super. LEXIS 729 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2017).

When a partnership official sought advancement of fees and costs, where

the partnership objected that the official’s counsel’s fees exceeded rates

charged by other law firms, the official was not entitled to summary

judgment; a discrepancy between rates the official’s counsel charged and

rates other firms charged raised a fact question on the reasonableness of

the firm’s fees. Weil v. Vereit Operating P’ship, L.P., — A.3d —, 2018 Del.

Ch. LEXIS 48 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2018).

In light of the absence of any novel or complex issues on appeal from a

decision of the Delaware Industrial Accident Board, a request for

attorneys’ fees was excessive (failing to justify a contingency multiplier).

McCabe v. Bayside Roofing, Inc., — A.3d —, 2018 Del. Super. LEXIS 76

(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2018)

ating P’ship, L.P., — A.3d —, 2018 Del.

Ch. LEXIS 48 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2018).

In light of the absence of any novel or complex issues on appeal from a

decision of the Delaware Industrial Accident Board, a request for

attorneys’ fees was excessive (failing to justify a contingency multiplier).

McCabe v. Bayside Roofing, Inc., — A.3d —, 2018 Del. Super. LEXIS 76

(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2018).

Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees of $41,110 were reasonable, even though

plaintiff’s counsel spent 11 more hours working on the case than

defendant’s counsel, because: (1) plaintiff’s counsel had to review and

respond to defendant’s affirmative defenses; (2) plaintiff showed that the

services its attorneys rendered were thought prudent and appropriate at the

time, in the good faith professional judgment of counsel; and (3)

plaintiff’s counsel successfully secured a $1,000,000 award and charged

less than 5% of that sum to do so. Bellmoff v. Integra Servs. Techs., —

A.3d —, 2018 Del. Super. LEXIS 273 (Del. Super. Ct. June 22, 2018).

In response to competing motions for attorney fees and costs, the court

held that shifting fees was inequitable and unwarranted in favor of any

party because no bad faith existed; under Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a),

plaintiffs were entitled to fees and costs in the amount of $681,835 in light

of the fees expended by them and the amount recovered. Brace Indus.

Contr. v. Peterson Enters., — A.3d —, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 567 (Del. Ch.

Dec. 12, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d, 224 A.3d 574 (Del. 2020).

Plaintiffs’ request for $3,022 in fees, in connection with their motion

for evidentiary relief, was reasonable given the Delaware legal market, the

proximity of the motion to an important trial and the fact that the outcome

of the motion would likely impact plaintiffs’ pretrial briefing strategy.

Greenstar IH Rep, LLC v. Tutor Perini Corp., — A.3d —, 2019 Del. Ch.

LEXIS 1379 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2019)

iffs’ request for $3,022 in fees, in connection with their motion

for evidentiary relief, was reasonable given the Delaware legal market, the

proximity of the motion to an important trial and the fact that the outcome

of the motion would likely impact plaintiffs’ pretrial briefing strategy.

Greenstar IH Rep, LLC v. Tutor Perini Corp., — A.3d —, 2019 Del. Ch.

LEXIS 1379 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2019).

On plaintiff’s action for advancement of fees and expenses, the fees

invoiced by plaintiff’s counsel were reasonable because: (1) the hourly

rate charged by counsel was reasonable; (2) there was no suggestion that

any amount invoiced failed to reflect legal services actually performed;

(3) the amounts were reasonable in light of the damages pled by defendant

in the substantive breach of loyalty action; and (4) the controversy was of

great concern to the plaintiff, given that defendant had framed a complaint

putting plaintiff in legal jeopardy for millions of dollars. Day v. Diligence,

Inc., — A.3d —, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 184 (Del. Ch. May 15, 2020).

In an action by an insured for declaratory relief against insurance

companies for alleged breach of director and officer liability policies

arising from a failure to defend the insured in an underlying suit, the court

granted the insured’s motion to recover costs and fees expended in that

underlying action; the insured was to submit mostly unredacted historic

invoices because attorneys’ fees and other expenses submitted for

advancement must be reasonable, as governed by the factors set out in the

Rules of Professional Conduct. Ferrellgas Partners L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins.

Co., — A.3d —, 2020 Del. Super. LEXIS 2745 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 20,

2020).

osts and fees expended in that

underlying action; the insured was to submit mostly unredacted historic

invoices because attorneys’ fees and other expenses submitted for

advancement must be reasonable, as governed by the factors set out in the

Rules of Professional Conduct. Ferrellgas Partners L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins.

Co., — A.3d —, 2020 Del. Super. LEXIS 2745 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 20,

2020).

Following a determination by the Industrial Accident Board (IAB) that

an estate representative was entitled to compensation for the decedent’s

mesothelioma, the representative was entitled to attorney fees because the

estate’s position in the hearing before the IAB was affirmed on appeal; the

court awarded the claimant $31,530 in fees based on the relevant General

Motors Corporation v. Cox, 304 A.2d 55, 57 (Del. 1973) factors, including

consideration of the fact that the underlying appeal involved novel issues

of first impression requiring considerable time and labor, the experience

of claimant’s legal team and that customary rates for the legal services

provided in this case were considerably lower than the rates requested.

Weddle v. BP Amoco Chem. Co., — A.3d —, 2020 Del. Super. LEXIS

2756 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2020).

Defendants’ requested fee award was prima facie reasonable because

the litigation, which concerned ownership of a media conglomerate worth

$27.3 million, was complex, contentious and time-consuming. the litigation

was also expedited, meaning it incurred more substantial attorneys’ fees

than litigation proceeding at the customary pace. Lynch v. Gonzalez, —

A.3d —, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 292 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2020)

d fee award was prima facie reasonable because

the litigation, which concerned ownership of a media conglomerate worth

$27.3 million, was complex, contentious and time-consuming. the litigation

was also expedited, meaning it incurred more substantial attorneys’ fees

than litigation proceeding at the customary pace. Lynch v. Gonzalez, —

A.3d —, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 292 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2020).

Director and shareholder were entitled to recover legal fees and costs

incurred in underlying litigation with a corporation because: (1)

advancement was warranted under the indemnification agreement; (2) the

legal expenses were reasonable where it was logical to retain Delaware

counsel to defend an action in which Delaware law is at issue; (3) even if

the director and shareholder were never served in the underlying New York

action, it was reasonable to retain representation due to the threat of

litigation (that threat also being a trigger to the advancement right); and

(4) the filing of particular motions or the achievement of certain litigation

milestones were not the only possible triggers of the right to advancement.

Seiff v. Tokenize Inc., — A.3d —, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 342 (Del. Ch. Nov.

19, 2020).

Claimant was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees because although

the compensation owed to the claimant had not yet been determined by the

Industrial Accident Board, the claimant’s counsel obtained a favorable

result for the claimant; counsel had shown that the rate charged was

commensurate with those customarily charged in Delaware workers’

compensation cases, as well as properly reflective of counsel’s experience,

ward of attorneys’ fees because although

the compensation owed to the claimant had not yet been determined by the

Industrial Accident Board, the claimant’s counsel obtained a favorable

result for the claimant; counsel had shown that the rate charged was

commensurate with those customarily charged in Delaware workers’

compensation cases, as well as properly reflective of counsel’s experience,

reputation and ability. Foraker v. Amazon.com, Inc., — A.3d —, 2021 Del.

Super. LEXIS 30 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2021).

Trial court awarded attorneys’ fees to a limited liability company (LLC)

in a dispute involving contractual and tort claims because the parties’

license agreement provided for an award of attorneys’ fees to the LLC as

the reasonably prevailing party on all contractual claims; although the

LLC failed to segregate noncompensable hours, the court considered that

the case lacked novelty, that the litigation prevented the attorneys from

working on other remunerative work, that the fee was not contingent and

that the hourly fee was reasonable. Optical Air Data Sys., LLC v. L-3

Communs. Corp., — A.3d —, 2021 Del. Super. LEXIS 113 (Del. Super. Ct.

Feb. 8, 2021).

In an action by a condominium owner against a condominium

association that retaliated against the owner by publicizing the owner’s

appeal from a fine, the owner was entitled to recover litigation expenses

pursuant to the Delaware Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act

(“DUCIOA,” 25 Del. C. § 81-101 et seq.) because: (1) the association’s

declarations of covenants, conditions and restrictions did not conflict with

the DUCIOA enforcement provision; (2) the owner established that the

association breached both the declaration and DUCIOA; (3) fees were

warranted due to the owner having been adversely affected by actions of

the association; (4) it was an appropriate case for expense shifting under

DUCIOA; and (5) the court considered reasonableness factors set out in

this rule. Bragdon v. Bayshore Prop

ith

the DUCIOA enforcement provision; (2) the owner established that the

association breached both the declaration and DUCIOA; (3) fees were

warranted due to the owner having been adversely affected by actions of

the association; (4) it was an appropriate case for expense shifting under

DUCIOA; and (5) the court considered reasonableness factors set out in

this rule. Bragdon v. Bayshore Prop. Owners Ass’n, 251 A.3d 661 (Del. Ch.

2021).

In a condominium association’s action alleging defendant failed to pay

liens and assessments against defendant and defendant’s townhouse unit,

an award of attorneys’ fees to the association in the amount of $34,307

was proper because: (1) the primary reason for the fees was the litigation

strategy adopted by the defendant; (2) the record was replete with

opportunities to end the litigation and mitigate liability for attorneys’ fees;

and (3) defendant eventually did what could have been done much earlier

by paying the assessments. Linden Green Condo. Ass’n v. Larkin, — A.3d

—, 2022 Del. Super. LEXIS 130 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2022).

— Retainer.

Attorney’s acceptance of a $1,000.00 retainer, without providing the

client with a written explanation of fees, was in violation of subsection (f)

of this rule. In re Becker, 788 A.2d 527 (Del. 2001).

Attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(f) by: (1) failing to provide

a client with a written statement that a $1,500 advance fee was refundable

(if not earned) and stating the basis under which the fees would be

considered to have been earned, whether in whole or in part; and (2) by

failing to deposit, account for and retain the $1,500 in a client trust account

as fees were earned. In re Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007).

Attorney did not violate Law. Prof. Conduct R

ith a written statement that a $1,500 advance fee was refundable

(if not earned) and stating the basis under which the fees would be

considered to have been earned, whether in whole or in part; and (2) by

failing to deposit, account for and retain the $1,500 in a client trust account

as fees were earned. In re Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007).

Attorney did not violate Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5 where a retainer was

deposited originally into a trust account and not into an operating account;

because no fees were claimed to have been earned at the time the retainer

was deposited, a written statement of the fees earned was not required. In

re Sisk, 54 A.3d 257 (Del. 2012).

Attorney violated various disciplinary rules because the results of an

audit showed the attorney’s failure to adequately maintain books and

records, to safeguard client funds or to indicate in the retainer that

unearned fees were refundable. In re A Member of the Bar of the Supreme

Court of Delaware: Fred Bar, 99 A.3d 639 (Del. 2013), cert. denied, 573

U.S. 916, 134 S. Ct. 2822, 189 L. Ed. 2d 785 (U.S. 2014).

— Standard of review.

For the court, 1 of the most important factors in reviewing and awarding

attorneys’ fees is if the attorneys cannot take on other work because of the

requirements of the case for which fees are sought. Cuppels v. Mountaire

Corp., — A.3d —, 2021 Del. Super. LEXIS 292 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 12,

2021).

Sanctions.

— Reprimand.

For the violation of both Rule 1.4(b) and subdivision (e)(1) of this Rule,

the appropriate sanction to be imposed is a public reprimand. In re Berl,

560 A.2d 1009 (Del. 1989).

When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (d),

8.4(c) and (d) by failing to properly maintain law firm’s books and records

LEXIS 292 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 12,

2021).

Sanctions.

— Reprimand.

For the violation of both Rule 1.4(b) and subdivision (e)(1) of this Rule,

the appropriate sanction to be imposed is a public reprimand. In re Berl,

560 A.2d 1009 (Del. 1989).

When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (d),

8.4(c) and (d) by failing to properly maintain law firm’s books and records

for 3 consecutive years, filing inaccurate certificates of compliance for 3

consecutive years, and failing to give flat fee clients proper notice that the

fee was refundable if not earned, a public reprimand with a 2-year period

of probation was appropriate; this was true, even considering the

mitigating factors, given a lawyer’s obligation to maintain orderly books

and records. In re Castro, 160 A.3d 1134 (Del. 2017).

— Suspension.

Where a lawyer engaged in a pattern of knowing misconduct over a

period of several years by commingling client funds, failing to maintain

the lawyer’s law practice accounts, failing to pay taxes, falsely representing

on certificates of compliance that the lawyer complied with the record-

keeping requirements and paid taxes, the lawyer violated Del. Law. R.

Prof. Conduct 1.5(f), 1.15(a), (b), (d), 8.4(b), (c), (d); as a result, the lawyer

was suspended for 3 years. In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514 (Del. 2003).

Attorney whose multiple federal actions for assorted clients were

dismissed due to failure to respond to dismissal or summary judgment

motions violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4,

warranting a 2-year suspension from the practice of law, with conditions

where: (1) the attorney had an unblemished record; (2) the attorney had

undergone 2 eye surgeries; (3) the attorney had suffered the loss of a half-

sibling; but (4) the conduct was deemed “knowing” and evidenced

engagement in a pattern of misconduct. In re Feuerhake, 998 A.2d 850

(Del. 2010)

.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4,

warranting a 2-year suspension from the practice of law, with conditions

where: (1) the attorney had an unblemished record; (2) the attorney had

undergone 2 eye surgeries; (3) the attorney had suffered the loss of a half-

sibling; but (4) the conduct was deemed “knowing” and evidenced

engagement in a pattern of misconduct. In re Feuerhake, 998 A.2d 850

(Del. 2010).

There was substantial evidence to support the factual findings and

conclusions of law of the Board on Professional Responsibility regarding

an attorney’s violations of Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (b),

and 8.4(c), based on the attorney’s misappropriation of clients’ fees on

various occasions, and the attorney’s failure to include the typical refund

provision regarding unearned fees in the retainer agreements for other

clients; a 1-year suspension was warranted. In re Vanderslice, 55 A.3d 322

(Del. 2012).

Attorney who committed numerous ethical violations, including

neglecting multiple client matters, making misrepresentations to the court

and failing to properly safeguard clients’ funds, was suspended for 18

months, based on a determination that the mitigating factors significantly

outweighed the aggravating factors. In re Carucci, 132 A.3d 1161 (Del.

2016).

Del. Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 1.6