National Instant Criminal Background Check System Regulation

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Federal Register › Vol. 64 › 64 FR 10262

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 25

[AG Order No. 2209-99]

RIN 1105-AA51

National Instant Criminal Background Check System Regulation

AGENCY: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The United States Department of Justice (``DOJ'') proposes to

amend the DOJ regulation implementing the

National Instant Criminal Background Check System (``NICS'') pursuant

to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (``Brady Act''), to

establish a retention period of 90 days for information relating to

allowed firearm transfers in the system transaction log of background

check transactions (``NICS Audit Log''). Audits of the use of the NICS

are considered essential to safeguard the privacy of the sensitive

information checked by the system and to ensure that the system is

operating in the manner required by the Brady Act. Audits will help

prevent invasions of privacy that result from misuse of the system. For

example, audits will enable the detection of felons who assume the

identity of a qualified person to buy guns illegally and persons who

misuse the system to perform background checks unrelated to gun

purchases (such as employment checks). In addition, the proposed rule

clarifies that the retention period begins to run on the day after the

request for a NICS check is received. The proposed rule also clarifies

that only the FBI has direct access to the NICS Audit Log and that, in

furtherance of the purpose of auditing the use and performance of the

NICS, the FBI may extract and provide information from the NICS Audit

Log to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (``ATF'') for use in

ATF's inspections of Federal Firearms Licensee (``FFL'') records,

provided that ATF destroys NICS Audit Log information about allowed

firearm transfers within the applicable retention period and maintains

a written record certifying the destruction

the

NICS, the FBI may extract and provide information from the NICS Audit

Log to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (``ATF'') for use in

ATF's inspections of Federal Firearms Licensee (``FFL'') records,

provided that ATF destroys NICS Audit Log information about allowed

firearm transfers within the applicable retention period and maintains

a written record certifying the destruction. By using the preexisting

ATF inspection system to audit use of the NICS by FFLs, it will be

unnecessary to propose a system under which the FBI would perform

recurring audits of FFLs. Such a system could lead to duplication of

effort and expense resulting from FBI auditors traveling to FFL

premises to review the same records that ATF reviews during its routine

inspections of FFLs.

DATES: Written comments must be received on or before June 1, 1999.

ADDRESSES: All comments concerning this proposed rule should be sent

to: Mr. Emmet A. Rathbun, Unit Chief, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Module C-3, 1000 Custer Hollow Road, Clarksburg, West Virginia 26306-

0147.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Emmet A. Rathbun, Unit Chief,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, telephone number (304) 625-2000.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This proposal would amend the National

Instant Criminal Background Check System Regulation (28 CFR, Part 25,

Subpart A), published in the Federal Register on October 30, 1998 (63

FR 58303). The proposed amendments are to the portions of the NICS

regulation providing for the retention and use of information in the

NICS Audit Log pertaining to allowed firearm transfers, 28 CFR

25.9(b)(1) and (2) (63 FR 58311).

Record Retention Period

stant Criminal Background Check System Regulation (28 CFR, Part 25,

Subpart A), published in the Federal Register on October 30, 1998 (63

FR 58303). The proposed amendments are to the portions of the NICS

regulation providing for the retention and use of information in the

NICS Audit Log pertaining to allowed firearm transfers, 28 CFR

25.9(b)(1) and (2) (63 FR 58311).

Record Retention Period

The Brady Act requires the Attorney General to ensure the privacy

and security of information in the NICS and the proper operation of the

system. The purpose of maintaining the NICS Audit Log is to help carry

out this function by facilitating audits of the use and operation of

the NICS. At the same time, to prevent the establishment of a national

firearms registry, the Brady Act requires the destruction of NICS

records (other than the NICS Transaction Number (``NTN'') and the date

the NTN was assigned) relating to allowed firearm transfers. Although

an eighteen-month retention period for information about allowed

firearm transfers was initially proposed in the notice of proposed

rulemaking for the NICS regulation, the final NICS rule took into

account the comments on this subject and balanced the competing

interests by reducing the retention period to no more than six months.

The preamble to the final NICS regulation described the question of

the period of record retention as follows: ``In light of the statutory

requirement that records for allowed transfers be destroyed, and the

countervailing statutory requirement to provide for system privacy and

security, the Department determined that the general retention period

for records of allowed transfers in the NICS Audit Log should be the

minimum reasonable period for performing audits on the system, but in

no event more than six months. Section 25.9(b) in the final rule was

revised to reflect this and to provide that such information may be

retained for a longer period if necessary to pursue identified cases of

misuse of the system

general retention period

for records of allowed transfers in the NICS Audit Log should be the

minimum reasonable period for performing audits on the system, but in

no event more than six months. Section 25.9(b) in the final rule was

revised to reflect this and to provide that such information may be

retained for a longer period if necessary to pursue identified cases of

misuse of the system. The Department further determined that the FBI

shall work toward reducing the retention period to the shortest

practicable period of time less than six months that will allow basic

security audits of the NICS. By February 28, 1999, the Department will

issue a notice of a proposed revision of the regulation setting forth a

further reduced period of retention that will be observed by the

system.'' (63 FR 58304.) The purpose of this notice is to propose a

period of retention less than six months that will be observed by the

system.

Audits of the NICS will include (1) quality control audits of NICS

examiners and call center operators to ensure the accuracy of the

responses given to FFLs; (2) audits of the system's data processing to

aid in the resolution of technical system problems; (3) audits of the

use of the NICS by state agencies serving as points of contact

(``POCs'') for the NICS and/or using the NICS in connection with

issuing firearms licenses or permits, to ensure that such agencies are

accessing the NICS only for authorized purposes; and (4) audits of the

use of the NICS by FFLs to ensure that FFLs are accessing the NICS only

for authorized purposes and are not sending the NICS false data to

evade the system.

Auditing the users (FFLs and POCs) of the NICS is essential to

safeguard the security and privacy of personal information in the

system. The NICS will perform background checks that access a

tremendous amount of criminal history, mental health, military

background, and other information about individuals

ly

for authorized purposes and are not sending the NICS false data to

evade the system.

Auditing the users (FFLs and POCs) of the NICS is essential to

safeguard the security and privacy of personal information in the

system. The NICS will perform background checks that access a

tremendous amount of criminal history, mental health, military

background, and other information about individuals. Access to such

sensitive information for background checks on individuals should only

be available for purposes authorized by law. Misuse of that information

could lead to significant invasions of privacy. The Brady Act

recognized the sensitivity of system information by requiring the

Attorney General to issue regulations ``to ensure the security and

privacy of the information of the system.'' The Brady Act also provides

that disclosures of information from the NICS are subject to the

restrictions of the Privacy Act. Without the capacity to audit the use

of the system, there will be no way of determining whether FFLs are

requesting checks for purposes other than checking on the background of

a prospective gun purchaser. Many businesses and individuals would be

very interested in having easy access to these government databases

through FFLs to do employment or other unauthorized checks on persons.

While it is true that a NICS check will not disclose what record was

the reason for a denial, the mere fact that the system response is

``denied'' (indicating that at least one disqualifying record exists)

may be enough to cause employers or others to take adverse action

against the person checked. A ``delayed'' response might also have a

detrimental impact on the subject of the check if a person misusing the

system does not wait to see if a ``proceed'' follows or concludes,

unfairly, that the response means the individual checked has some kind

of stigmatizing ``record.'' The FBI must take appropriate steps to

identify and guard against such invasions of privacy

inst the person checked. A ``delayed'' response might also have a

detrimental impact on the subject of the check if a person misusing the

system does not wait to see if a ``proceed'' follows or concludes,

unfairly, that the response means the individual checked has some kind

of stigmatizing ``record.'' The FBI must take appropriate steps to

identify and guard against such invasions of privacy.

In addition, the Brady Act requires the Attorney General to

establish a system that will inform FFLs whether

available information demonstrates that a person seeking to acquire a

firearm is disqualified by law from possessing firearms. The background

check system established to perform this function is based upon names

and other personally identifying information that can be falsified.

Therefore, it is equally important to be able to audit NICS

transactions to ensure that FFLs are not misusing the NICS by

deliberately submitting false information to the system. The ability to

audit the background checks requested by FFLs, by comparing the

information submitted to the NICS with information retained by the FFL,

will deter attempts to evade the system. In other words, audits will

help ensure that the system is operating in the manner required by the

Brady Act.

There is no formula for determining with precision what retention

period is the minimum necessary to allow adequate audits of the NICS,

and because the NICS is a new system, there is no historical data

regarding the use of the NICS from which any definite conclusion about

retention periods can be drawn. What can be said with certainty is

that, at six months, the NICS retention period is already less than

half of the retention period established for auditing the users of the

Interstate Identification Index (``III''), the information system

managed by the FBI that makes up the vast majority of the records

checked by the NICS

which any definite conclusion about

retention periods can be drawn. What can be said with certainty is

that, at six months, the NICS retention period is already less than

half of the retention period established for auditing the users of the

Interstate Identification Index (``III''), the information system

managed by the FBI that makes up the vast majority of the records

checked by the NICS. It is also undeniable that, the shorter the

period, the less likely it is that even random audits will uncover or

deter system misuse.

In determining the period of retention that will allow for a

minimal opportunity to detect misuse of the system by FFLs and POCs,

the Department recognizes the need for both: (1) a sufficient period of

system activity to be audited; and (2) time to administer the audits. A

time period for administering the audits is necessary to: identify

those system records that will be used in the audit; conduct the audit;

and review the results of the audit to determine whether there are any

identified cases of misuse of the system. Accordingly, the Department

has concluded that the shortest practicable period of time for

retaining records of allowed transfers that would permit the

performance of basic security audits of the NICS is 90 days.

Under the proposed rule, therefore, section 25.9(b)(1) provides

that in cases of allowed transfers, all information in the NICS Audit

Log relating to the person or the transfer, other than the NTN assigned

to the transfer and the date the number was assigned, will be destroyed

not more than 90 days after the date the request for the NICS check was

received. The proposed rule also changes section 25.9(b)(1) to provide

that the retention period begins to run on the day after ``the date the

request for the NICS check was received,'' instead of the date the

``transfer was allowed.'' This change provides a uniform date from

which to begin the retention period.

Accomplishing the Audits

days after the date the request for the NICS check was

received. The proposed rule also changes section 25.9(b)(1) to provide

that the retention period begins to run on the day after ``the date the

request for the NICS check was received,'' instead of the date the

``transfer was allowed.'' This change provides a uniform date from

which to begin the retention period.

Accomplishing the Audits

Quality control, data processing, and POC audits can all be

accomplished by FBI employees or contractors without the need for

outside assistance. In order to audit the use of the NICS by FFLs,

however, the FBI is developing a plan, in coordination with ATF, under

which information from the NICS Audit Log will be provided to ATF for

use in conjunction with its compliance inspections of FFL records. FFLs

are subject to inspections by ATF pursuant to the provisions of the Gun

Control Act (``GCA''), 18 U.S.C. 923(g)(1)(B)(ii). By using the

preexisting ATF inspection system to audit use of the NICS by FFLs, it

will be unnecessary to propose a system under which the FBI would

perform recurring audits of FFLs. Such a system could lead to

duplication of effort and expense resulting from FBI auditors traveling

to FFL premises to review the same records that ATF reviews during its

routine inspections of FFLs. It is least intrusive and most efficient

to have regular review of FFL NICS records performed by ATF as part of

its inspection program.

The information comparisons by ATF of NICS Audit Log data with FFL

records of NICS checks will detect and deter misuse of the NICS by FFLs

and ensure FFL compliance with the Brady Act and the GCA. Under this

plan, ATF will not have direct access to the information in the NICS

Audit Log. The information will be extracted from the NICS Audit Log by

the FBI and provided to ATF for the FFLs to be inspected.

Irregularities relating to the use of the NICS by an FFL discovered

during an ATF inspection will be referred to the FBI

rdance with the Regulatory Flexibility

Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), has reviewed this final regulation and by

approving it certifies that this regulation will not have a significant

economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. While many

FFLs are small businesses, they are not subject to any additional

burdens by the proposed plan to audit their use of the NICS.

Executive Order 12866

The proposed rule has been drafted and reviewed in accordance with

Executive Order 12866, section 1(b), Principles of Regulation. The

Department of Justice has determined that this proposed rule is a

``significant regulatory action'' under section 3(f) of Executive Order

12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, and thus it has been reviewed by

the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'').

Executive Order 12612

This proposed rule will not have a substantial direct effect on the

states, on the relationship between the national government and the

states, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive

Order 12612, it is determined that this proposed rule does not have

sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a

Federal Assessment.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

This proposed rule will not result in the expenditure by state,

local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private

sector, of $100,000,000 or more in any one year, and it will not

significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no

actions were deemed necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded

Mandates Reform Act of 1995.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

l not result in the expenditure by state,

local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private

sector, of $100,000,000 or more in any one year, and it will not

significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no

actions were deemed necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded

Mandates Reform Act of 1995.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

This final rule is not a major rule as defined by the Small

Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. 5 U.S.C. 804.

This rule will not result in an annual effect on the economy of

$100,000,000 or more, a major increase in costs or prices, or have

significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment,

productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based

companies to compete with foreign-based companies in domestic and

export markets.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 25

Administrative practice and procedure, Business and industry, Computer

technology, Courts, Firearms, Law enforcement officers, Penalties,

Privacy, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures,

Telecommunications.

Accordingly, Sec. 25.9 of part 25 of title 28 of the Code of

Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 25--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Subpart A--The National Instant Criminal Background Check System

1. The authority section for Subpart A continues to read as

follows:

Authority: Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536.

Sec. 25.9 [Amended]

2. In Sec. 25.9, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:

* * * * *

he Code of

Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 25--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Subpart A--The National Instant Criminal Background Check System

1. The authority section for Subpart A continues to read as

follows:

Authority: Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536.

Sec. 25.9 [Amended]

2. In Sec. 25.9, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:

* * * * *

(b) The FBI will maintain an automated NICS Audit Log of all

incoming and outgoing transactions that pass through the system.

(1) The NICS Audit Log will record the following information: type

of transaction (inquiry or response), line number, time, date of

inquiry, header, message key, ORI, and inquiry/response data (including

the name and other identifying information about the prospective

transferee and the NTN). In cases of allowed transfers, all information

in the NICS Audit Log related to the person or the transfer, other than

the NTN assigned to the transfer and the date the number was assigned,

will be destroyed not more than 90 days after the date the request for

the NICS check is received. NICS Audit Log records relating to denials

will be retained for 10 years, after which time they will be

transferred to a Federal Records Center for storage. The NICS will not

be used to establish any system for the registration of firearms,

firearm owners, or firearm transactions or dispositions, except with

respect to persons prohibited from receiving a firearm by 18 U.S.C. 922

is received. NICS Audit Log records relating to denials

will be retained for 10 years, after which time they will be

transferred to a Federal Records Center for storage. The NICS will not

be used to establish any system for the registration of firearms,

firearm owners, or firearm transactions or dispositions, except with

respect to persons prohibited from receiving a firearm by 18 U.S.C. 922

(g) or (n) or by state law.

(2) The NICS Audit Log will be used to analyze system performance,

assist users in resolving operational problems, support the appeals

process, or support audits of the use of the system. Searches may be

conducted on the NICS Audit Log by time frame, i.e., by day or month,

by FFL, or by a particular state or agency. Information in the NICS

Audit Log pertaining to allowed transfers may only be directly accessed

by the FBI for the purpose of conducting audits of the use and

performance of the NICS. Permissible uses include extracting and

providing information from the NICS Audit Log to ATF in connection with

ATF's inspections of FFL records, provided that ATF destroys the

information about allowed transfers within the retention period for

such information set forth in Sec. 25.9(b)(1) and maintains a written

record certifying the destruction. Such information, however, may be

retained and used as long as needed to pursue cases of identified

misuse of the system. The NICS, including the NICS Audit Log, may not

be used by any Department, agency, officer, or employee of the United

States to establish any system for the registration of firearms,

firearm owners, or firearm transactions or dispositions. The NICS Audit

Log will be monitored and reviewed on a regular basis to detect any

possible misuse of the NICS data.

* * * * *

Dated: February 27, 1999.

Janet Reno,

Attorney General.

[FR Doc. 99-5343 Filed 3-1-99; 2:36 pm]

BILLING CODE 4410-06-P

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