Case law

Ellis v. Myers

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Sep 4, 2019

Ellis’ constitutional rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity. … right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

PERRY v. LITTLEJOHN

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Oct 7, 2020

Consequently, Holleman's burden was to "'show that the defendant[s] violated a constitutional right' and that 'the right was clearly established at [that] time.'" Id. at 877. … Here, the defendants' brief mentions qualified immunity, dkt. 114 at 7, but no argument is developed or presented so it is waived.

Medical Licensing Board of Indiana v. Ward

449 N.E.2d 1129 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 9, 1983

The instant case is a disciplinary action, not a suit to establish liability. … We perceive IC 25-22.5-6-2(6) as clearly falling within the medical licensing act and as defining a specific kind of "unprofessional" conduct. 11 .

Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Recticel Foam Corp.

716 N.E.2d 1015 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 1999

Recticel initiated this action against certain insurers, including Employers Insurance of Wausau (“Wausau”), to establish insurance coverage for its alleged environmental contamination. … However, a non-waiver agreement does not immunize an insurer from responsibility for all its actions. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Fox, 361 F.2d 1, 7 (10th Cir.1966).

Wallace v. State

199 Ind. 317 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 30, 1927

The immunity guaranteed by the constitution should not be lightly set aside by a mere general declaration of a nonjudicial officer that he has reason to believe and does believe, etc. … The question in the instant case is the admissibility of evidence presented by an alleged *339 void search warrant to sustain an entirely different proposition from that before the court in the Rose case, thus clearly distinguishing

Jeffrey M. Miller and Cynthia S. Miller v. Kristine C. Danz

27 N.E.3d 774 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 11, 2015

Danz’s response is that the Millers have not established that the Fifth Amended Complaint inserting Danz for John Doe #8 meets the requirements of Ind. … This is most clearly demonstrated by federal cases allowing relation back where plaintiffs pursuing § 1983 claims had incorrectly named immune institutional entities rather than individual defendants.

Marriage of Edwards v. Edwards

709 N.E.2d 1055 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 6, 1999

The rule clearly provides that the only consequence of not filing a notice of appeal is that other matters may not be filed until the notice of appeal has been filed. … Thus, this Court has required that a written memorial must form the basis for establishing the error or omission to be corrected by the nunc pro tunc order.

Awbrey v. United States

959 F. Supp. 1019 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 28, 1997

The exclusion may be ambiguous under other circumstances, but where it is established that the United States will be liable for any damages resulting from the employee’s negligent or wrongful conduct, the exclusion would … Under the clear language of this definition, even to qualify as an “insured” the United States would have to be liable for Ms. Bell’s use of the vehicle.

David E. Proffitt v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 2018

An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. … The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.

In Re the Mental Commitment of Tarpley

566 N.E.2d 71 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 5, 1991

The first alternative was clearly the most restrictive. … Nevertheless, it is within the qualified right and prerogative of the individual to refuse such medication.

Drollinger v. State

274 Ind. 5 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 26, 1980

Even a showing that a juror entertained a preconceived opinion as to the defendant’s culpability is insufficient: “Qualified jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. … While there was apparently no evidence that this weapon was actually fired during the murders, the weapon nevertheless clearly tends to connect Drollinger with the charged crimes. Riggenbach v. State, supra ; Hill v.

Demetriese Gunn v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 30, 2012

Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. … The instructions clearly tell the jury that they must find all five elements, including bodily injury, in order to convict Gunn.

International Business Machines Corporation v. State of Indiana, acting on behalf of the Indiana Family & Social Services Administration

Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 28, 2018

Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1709-PL-2006 | September 28, 2018 Page 4 of 32  (i) to provide efficient, accurate and timely eligibility determinations for individuals and families who qualify … Accordingly, as the supreme court ultimately and decidedly established the issue of material breach, it remanded for the calculation of the parties’ damages.

Puckett v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division

413 N.E.2d 295 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 9, 1980

As such, claimant, if otherwise eligible and qualifying would be entitled to full unemployment benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act. … Clearly such a Byzantine result was not contemplated by the legislature. 3 .

Stacy Knighten v. East Chicago Housing Authority Individually and d/b/a West Calumet Complex, Davis Security Service, LLC, and Donnell Caldwell

Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 12, 2014

ECHA’s motion for summary judgment asserted statutory immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. … Here, Caldwell was clearly on a mission of his own when the injury occurred.

Westfield Insurance Co. v. Orthopedic & Sports Medicine Center of Northern Indiana, Inc.

247 F. Supp. 3d 958 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 28, 2017

If the pleadings demonstrate that “a claim is clearly excluded under the policy, then no defense is required.” Id. … Because the panel cannot award damages to the Individual Defendants, the Malpractice Complaints do not qualify as suits seeking damages under the BI/PD or Umbrella BI/PD.

Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc.

751 N.E.2d 815 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 20, 2001

It is well established that federal courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over claims of copyright infringement, see 28 U.S.C. § 1838 (a), and that the Federal Copyright Statute, 17 U.S.C. § 101 , et seq. .... completely … Removal is proper over preempled claims in which Congress clearly manifested an intent to convert state law claims into federal-question-claims.

Brian J. Shapiro v. Hamilton County Assessor

Indiana Tax Court · Mar 27, 2024

The version of Subsection F effective for the 2017 assessment date states: If an individual who is receiving the deduction provided by this section or who otherwise qualifies property for a deduction … But just as clearly, the definitions are distinct and do not overlap, indicating that they do not have the same or identical meaning.

WARD v. STATE OF INDIANA

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 4, 2022

On September 20, 2013, a petition to establish paternity was filed in the Circuit Court of Vigo County, Indiana. (Dkt. 25-1 at 1.) … The parties moving for judgment on the pleadings must clearly demonstrate "that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved . . . ." Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007).

Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Scoles

435 N.E.2d 287 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 25, 1982

In support of this argument SIGECO contends that all of the evidence established that Clark did stop before contact with Scoles. … This altered condition, clearly understood by Clark and Scoles alike, required Clark to stop, and permitted Scoles to walk back and forth across the road.