Case law

King v. Globe Newspaper Co.

400 Mass. 705 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 17, 1987

These are factors that we have previously recognized as tending to establish a statement as one of fact rather than of opinion for First Amendment purposes. See Aldoupolis v. … "Clearly, I could have made the $500 million property tax rollback if Ron had only performed up to par. And talk about patronage!

BI 40 LLC v. Tewksbury Living Group, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 13, 2025

Once the movant does so, “[t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. … See, e.g., Dkt. 248-30 at 2-3 (“The inability to get funds was clearly an issue relative to the ongoing operations of the facility.

Brookline v. COMM. OF THE DEPT. OF ENVTL QUALITY ENG'G

387 Mass. 372 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 3, 1982

We leave it to the DEQE to make this determination, especially as it is so clearly within the ambit of its expertise. See School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 363 Mass. 125, 128 (1973); G.L.c. 30A, § 14. … In such circumstances, the DEQE is qualified to determine its own methods of enforcement. 5. Tentative decision.

BI 40 LLC v. Tewksbury Living Group, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 13, 2025

Once the movant does so, “[t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. … See, e.g., Dkt. 248-30 at 2-3 (“The inability to get funds was clearly an issue relative to the ongoing operations of the facility.

Compagnie De Reassurance D'Ile De France v. New England Reinsurance Corp.

944 F. Supp. 986 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 7, 1996

Moreover, the evidence does not clearly establish which plaintiffs actually received the version of the 1982 AI described above. … Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Industrial General, supra, established a "test” for determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists.

Liquor Liability Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Great American Insurance

16 Mass. L. Rptr. 268 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 14, 2003

Ass’n, 417 Mass. 48 (1994) (the Massachusetts Medical Professional Insurance Association (MMPIA) does not engage in “trade or commerce,” and, therefore, is immune to suit under G.L.c. 93A) when it amended G.L.c. 176D so as … Statutorily established joint underwriting associations were not specifically included in the 1992 version of G.L.c. 176D.

J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp.

580 F. Supp. 1173 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 14, 1984

Yet none of the latter qualify as a ‘systems’ product, as currently defined, and none of them can be supplied by Onan in any ‘off the shelf’ sense.” … Westerbeke’s subsequent characterization at trial of this response as an “acceptance” of an alleged offer, however, does not supply the necessary mutual assent that is clearly missing.

Klein v. Fireman's Fund Insurance

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 295 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 20, 1996

The issue here is whether the dumptruck qualifies as a “temporary substitute motor vehicle." The court finds the “temporary substitute motor vehicle" clause unambiguous. … The policy clearly states that a “temporary substitute motor vehicle” is one which substitutes for an “insured motor vehicle.”

Adams v. Adams

459 Mass. 361 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 14, 2011

By contrast, an interest in an established partnership, though subject to degrees of uncertainty and the contingency of future performance, has more than theoretical value. … In addition, the judge’s findings clearly stated the rationale for the equal property division.

Foreign Car Center, Inc. v. Salem Suede, Inc. (In Re Salem Suede, Inc.)

221 B.R. 586 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 24, 1998

If not, does the attempt to appeal from the order nevertheless qualify for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order? These are among the threshold questions in the present proceeding in this court. C. … My purpose is to identify as clearly as possible, given the limited nature of the record before me, the trialworthy issues that remain.

Hutchins v. Cardiac Science, Inc.

456 F. Supp. 2d 173 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 27, 2006

According to Plaintiff, the APA triggered the terms of Section 3.10[, which] ... clearly require that the stockholders of the Complient Corporation pay the LICENSOR, namely Hutchins, seven and one-half percent (7-1/2) of … Jan. 22, 2004) (dismissing Plaintiff's claim under the doctrine of arbitral immunity), affd 108 Fed.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chipotle Mexican Grill

98 F. Supp. 3d 198 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2015

I can get quality food at many other places without the disrespect I received at your establishment. (Callaghan Complaint at 1-2). … The EEOC contends that the Carr affidavit establishes prima facie evidence that Connell was replaced by a “non-disabled person.”

ACLU of Massachusetts v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 24, 2020

ACLUM’s May Request clearly sought “[r]ecords containing some or all of the Address, including without limitation any prepared remarks, notes, talking points, and outlines . . . thereof.” Doc. No. 27 ⁋ 11. … Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (holding that “[t]o qualify [for Exemption 5’s protection], a document[’s] . . . source must be a Government agency”).

Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH v. Eli Lilly and Company

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 3, 2022

“[T]he materiality required to establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality[,]” id. … Lilly claims that the antibodies have clearly distinct functions because Galcanezumab binds to the mid-region of CGRP whereas Antibody G1 binds to the C-terminal end. [Id. at 7].

Galvin v. Excel Switching Corp.

21 Mass. L. Rptr. 233 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 31, 2006

Each of the plaintiffs signed a Non-Qualified Stock Option Agreement (“Option Agreement”), granting them stock options. … Id. at 850 (no recoveiy on promissoiy estoppel theoiy where it was unreasonable, as a matter of law, for business persons to rely on alleged oral promise to make $43 million loan, where parties clearly intended written agreement

Washtenaw County Employees Retirement System v. Avid Technology, Inc.

28 F. Supp. 3d 93 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 27, 2014

Misrepresentation or Omission of a Material Fact In order to qualify as a material misrepresentation or omission, the plaintiff must indicate that a reasonable investor would have viewed the information as “having significantly … The Plaintiffs allege that the pre-July 2011 statements were clearly false. Furthermore, “[t]he need to restructure an entire division’s sales force was material to shareholders....

Searle v. RBS Citizens Bank N.A.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 7, 2018

Here, Plaintiffs have not established that Ditech/Green Treeis a “debt collector” as defined bythe FDCPA. … “The party seeking the preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing that these four factors weigh in its favor.” Id.

San Francisco Health Plan v. McKesson Corp.

767 F. Supp. 2d 263 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 4, 2011

Typically, the publishing company played no independent role in establishing AWP, other than applying this formulaic markup to the manufacturer’s price. 2. … Hartman’s damages methodology includes programs that use Red Book instead of FDB, this is not a persuasive argument for denying class certification, because the definition of each proposed class clearly excludes public payors

Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum

672 F. Supp. 2d 217 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 7, 2009

Legal Standard The plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the defendant’s fair use defense, asking the Court to find that fair use is foreclosed by the established facts of this case. … At summary judgment, a court considers whether sufficient facts have been established to warrant a decision as a matter of law.

Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee

454 F. Supp. 703 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 5, 1978

Clearly, a school committee can determine what books will go into a library and, indeed, if there will be a library at all. … Even though he could have been discharged for no reason whatever, and had no constitutional right to a hearing prior to the decision not to rehire him . he may nonetheless establish a claim to reinstatement if the decision