Case law

Grimsby v. Samson

85 Wash. 2d 52 · Washington Supreme Court · Jan 9, 1975

Courts will not immunize tort feasors from liability in a whole class of cases because of the possibility of fraud, but will depend upon the legislature to deal with the problem as a question of public policy. … Clearly a case-by-case approach will be necessary to define the precise limits of such conduct.

State Of Washington, V Erin Deon Rieman

Court of Appeals of Washington · May 27, 2015

This exception entitles a petitioner to relief if he establishes that the evidence "`( 1) will probably change the result of the trial; ( 2) was discovered since the trial; ( 3 … See Brown, 143 Wn.2d at 453 ( to qualify as newly discovered, evidence must have been discovered since trial and must not have been discoverable before trial).

State Of Washington, V. Meta Platforms, Inc.

560 P.3d 217 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Dec 2, 2024

After all, “[t]o provide broad immunity ‘every time a website uses data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate [the disclosure law].’” Id. (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100). … Here, the disclosure law is clearly a civil penal statute as it authorizes “sanctions” and “penalties” for violations. RCW 42.17A.750.

Keodalah v. Allstate Ins. Co.

194 Wash. 2d 339 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 3, 2019

App. 201, 210, 304 P.3d 914(2013)(because the legislature enacted the statute at issue "to protect the general public from risks posed by legend drugs," complainant cannot qualify as a member of a "class for whose especial … No party or amicus contends otherwise, and potential liability on the part of her employer was clearly not sufficient to deter Smith's alleged bad faith conduct.

State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court

81 Wash. 623 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 21, 1914

Clearly the statute does not intend that the council shall submit the amendment until the fact exists that the necessary number of qualified voters have petitioned. … Clearly the legislature was not required to go further, and we think it has not done so.

State of Washington v. Jackie Lynn Dean

Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 29, 2022

Dean As more fully detailed in Jodie Lee Dean, “Wentz established that the ordinary meaning of ‘fenced area’ clearly includes an area that is completely surrounded by a fence.” … not qualify the yard as curtilage under Engel.

In re the Marriage of David-Oytan

171 Wash. App. 781 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Nov 5, 2012

Since I am a diplomat with diplomatic immunity, per the 1962 and 1964 Vienna Conventions, Canada does not have jurisdiction over me or my property. … The legislature did not define “living in a marital relationship” but clearly viewed it as distinct from residency — a feature of the statute Kudret would like us to ignore. 6 What constitutes living in a marital relationship

In Re Carter

230 P.3d 181 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Mar 9, 2010

Carter contends that this change in the law applies retroactively to his case. ¶ 16 Deck applied clearly established law relevant to the guilt phase of a trial to the capital sentencing context. Lakin v. … Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 892-94 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that defendant was actually innocent of being career offender because his predicate offenses did not qualify him for that status).

State Of Washington, V. Vinh Quang Lam

Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 23, 2025

This court has held that there is no requirement for a knife to be jabbed or thrusted to qualify as a deadly weapon. In State v. … However, existing precedent clearly establishes that his interpretation is contrary to the legislature’s express intent and is therefore unreasonable. 16 No. 59425-1-II

State v. Trey M.

186 Wash. 2d 884 · Washington Supreme Court · Oct 27, 2016

I also conclude that J.M. and Kilburn are clearly harmful for two reasons. ¶58 First, J.M. and Kilburn infringe a constitutional protection. … Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996), unquestionably qualifies as the kind of threat that is unprotected by the First Amendment”), 368 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I agree with the *912 Court that ...

State Of Washington, V Naaman Jamal Washington

Court of Appeals of Washington · Aug 11, 2014

to only one qualifying patient at any one time. … Calvin, this court explained that "[w]e review the trial court's decision to impose discretionary financial obligations under the clearly erroneous standard."29 "'A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there

Ellis v. Mirghanbari (In re Pittman)

540 B.R. 451 · United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Washington · Sep 4, 2015

“Clearly, the legislature’s choice of different language” in RCW 30A.22.090(1) and (2) “indicates a different legislative intent.” Conover, 355 P.3d at 1097 . … In addition, RCW 30A.22.020(2) specifically provides that one of the purposes of the Deposit Act is to “qualify and simplify the law concerning the respective ownership interests of individuals to funds held on deposit by

Robel v. Roundup Corp.

59 P.3d 611 · Washington Supreme Court · Dec 12, 2002

In Robel's case, the answer is clearly yes. … However, I believe the majority's attempt to qualify Potts as a "manager" as the term is used in Glasgow is inappropriate.

Johnson v. United States of America

District Court, W.D. Washington · Oct 30, 2020

Here, although plaintiff qualifies financially to proceed IFP, her proposed complaint 22 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as discussed herein. … In order to state a claim against these 7 defendants, plaintiff must clearly identify the right(s) allegedly violated, the harm suffered, and 8 include allegations establishing that these organizations should be considered

Tapper v. Employment Security Department

122 Wash. 2d 397 · Washington Supreme Court · Sep 16, 1993

This task is complicated by the absence of clearly defined findings of fact and conclusions of law within the Commissioner's decision. … Relying on its decision in Becker , the Court of Appeals concluded that Tapper's difficulties at work were the result of her inabilities and thus did not qualify as misconduct. See Tapper, 66 Wn. App. at 452-53 .

Bravern Residential II, LLC v. Department of Revenue

183 Wash. App. 769 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Sep 23, 2014

Similarly, the court in Nord emphasized the “well established legal principle that a business entity is a distinct, separate ‘person’ from its owners.” Nord, 164 Wn. App. at 230 . … The guidelines state that to qualify as a speculative builder, the joint venture must “perform the construction itself.” CP at 488.

Crystal Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Bothell

182 Wash. 2d 665 · Washington Supreme Court · Feb 12, 2015

Under the SCC, then, a pipe that controls excess water qualifies as a stormwater facility wherever that water is located, including underground. … The plat clearly shows a drainage easement within Tract 999, and the record contains no indication that Tract 999 contains any drainage facility of any type aside from the *678 interceptor pipe and the A.W.D. sanitary sewer

State v. Mayer

Washington Supreme Court · Oct 22, 2015

Consequently, the State has failed to establish that Mayer's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent. A. … The "at any time" statement thus did not immunize Dennison's warnings against the defects created by his later responses to Mayer's questions. C.

In Re Custody of AC

153 P.3d 203 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Feb 13, 2007

statement offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is not admissible at trial unless it qualifies as an exception. … Despite this language, which is apparently contained in the standard custody form used by the court to draft its findings and conclusions, the trial court's findings and its oral ruling clearly establish that it applied the

Sign-O-Lite Signs, Inc. v. DeLaurenti Florists, Inc.

64 Wash. App. 553 · Court of Appeals of Washington · Jan 21, 1992

This is bolstered by the fact that the act allows for injunctive relief, clearly implying that injury without monetary damages will suffice. Nordstrom, at 740. … Attorney fees as awarded in the present context do not qualify as actual damages.