The opinion
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
September 23, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59425-1-II
Respondent,
v.
VINH QUANG LAM, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Vinh Quang Lam1 shoplifted from a grocery store and pointed a knife at
store employees who tried to stop him. The State charged Vinh with first degree robbery with a
deadly weapon sentencing enhancement. At trial, the trial court admitted statements Vinh made to
police even though the officer questioning him did not give him the full Miranda2 warning. A jury
convicted Vinh as charged. At sentencing, the trial court determined that Vinh’s offender score
was 9 points.
Vinh appeals his convictions and sentence. Vinh argues the trial court erred in admitting
his incriminating statements. Vinh also contends that there was insufficient evidence that the knife
was capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm as needed to prove first degree robbery
and that the knife had capacity to inflict death as needed to prove the deadly weapon enhancement.
Finally, Vinh claims that it was unconstitutional for the judge, rather than a jury, to determine
which of his prior convictions counted toward his offender score at sentencing. He also contends
1
In the Vietnamese language, the surname is listed first. Therefore, we will refer to the appellant
as “Vinh” throughout our opinion.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
No. 59425-1-II
that a 2023 amendment to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW should apply
retroactively to exclude his juvenile convictions.
We affirm.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
A. Charged Events
In November 2022, Vinh entered a grocery store carrying a backpack. Vinh moved
throughout the store with a shopping cart, concealed merchandise in the backpack, and proceeded
to the exit, passing all points of sale without paying.
Loss prevention agents Emily Sackett, Adam Sandy, and Dustin Ramsey were stationed
throughout the store, tasked with protecting merchandise and identifying potential shoplifters. The
agents approached Vinh outside the store. They identified themselves, showed their loss
prevention agent badges, and asked Vinh to return the merchandise. Sackett and Ramsey
physically placed their hands on Vinh’s cart. Vinh did not respond verbally; instead, he produced
a knife and “point[ed] it in [the agents’] direction.” VRP at 190. In response, the agents backed
away, allowing Vinh to leave with the merchandise. The store employees then called 911.
Officer Anderson was the first to arrive on the scene, and he intercepted Vinh
approximately five blocks from the store. Vinh complied with Anderson’s instructions without
issue.
B. Miranda Warning
Sergeant O’Rourke arrived on the scene next. He approached Vinh and asked whether Vinh
understood English. O’Rourke then advised Vinh of his Miranda rights, reciting them from
memory rather than reading from a standard advisement-of-rights card, as follows:
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No. 59425-1-II
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in a
court of law. You have the right to an attorney – have one present before or during
any questioning. You can decide at any time to exercise your rights, not answer any
questions, or make any statements. Do you understand those rights? Having those
rights in mind, are you willing to talk with us?
CrR 3.5 Hr’g Ex. P4 (Body Worn Camera (BWC) O’Rourke), at 1 min., 19 sec. to 1 min., 40 sec.
O’Rourke did not inform Vinh that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be provided to
him at no cost. After advising Vinh of most of his Miranda rights, O’Rourke asked whether Vinh
was willing to speak with him, and Vinh nodded.
Sergeant Thiry then questioned Vinh. VRP at 22, 225. Vinh displayed no apparent
confusion or impairment. While being questioned, Vinh initially denied stealing anything.
However, when asked where the knife was, Vinh admitted to having thrown it away in a garbage
can. Vinh also described the knife as a “cooking knife.” CrR 3.5 Hr’g Ex. P2 (BWC Thiry), at 5
min., 44 sec. to 5 min., 54 sec. Thiry repeatedly asked whether the surveillance footage from the
store would show Vinh “pull[ing] a knife” and Vinh ultimately admitted it “probably” would. Id.
at 4 min., 27 sec. to 4 min., 36 sec. Vinh again denied stealing anything. The police found store
merchandise in Vinh’s backpack, but no knife. The knife was never recovered.
The State charged Vinh with robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon sentencing
enhancement. In closing arguments, the State referred to statements Vinh made to the officers only
once during rebuttal.
II. TRIAL
A. CrR 3.5 Hearing
During motions in limine, the State moved to admit statements Vinh made to the police,
including that he initially provided an inaccurate name and date of birth when police first
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No. 59425-1-II
confronted him. During the pretrial CrR 3.5 hearing, Vinh’s counsel questioned O’Rourke about
the speed at which he delivered the Miranda warning and the fact that he recited it from memory.
Defense counsel suggested that the fast pace, combined with Vinh’s occasional signs of confusion
during questioning, could indicate that Vinh did not fully understand what he was agreeing to when
speaking to the officers. However, Vinh’s counsel did not specifically raise the issue of
O’Rourke’s failure to inform Vinh that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed
at no cost.
The trial court found that Vinh was properly advised of his Miranda rights and that his
waiver of those rights was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Vinh’s case proceeded to a jury trial. Sackett, Sandy, and Ramsey testified, and the jury
viewed surveillance footage and still shots from inside and outside the store. Sergeant Thiry and
Officer Anderson also testified, and the jury viewed short segments of the body-worn camera
footage of their conversations with him.
B. Testimony at Trial
During trial, all three loss prevention agents testified that they saw Vinh produce a knife.
Sackett testified that Vinh pulled a “standard pocketknife” from his pocket, with a switch on it so
that the blade “flipped up.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 172. She could not recall the exact
size of the blade, but described it as “metal” and “sharp.” VRP at 173. Ramsey testified that Vinh
produced the knife from his backpack and “pointed it” in Ramsey’s direction. VRP at 194. He
described it as a “hunting knife,” but characterized it as “cheap” and “[n]othing major.” VRP at
191. Nonetheless, he acknowledged it was a “real knife” made of metal, not plastic. VRP at 192.
Ramsey estimated the blade to be approximately two and a half to three inches long. Sandy testified
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No. 59425-1-II
that he saw the knife only briefly—for “maybe a second”—but long enough to confirm that it was
a blade. VRP at 211.
The agents also testified about their reactions to the knife. Sackett stated that after Vinh
produced the knife, they backed away for “[s]afety reasons,” explaining that it was “not worth
anyone getting hurt over.” VRP at 174. Ramsey testified that he assumed, “if it looks like a
weapon, it’s a weapon,” and that when Vinh “pointed” the knife, the agents backed away for their
own safety. VRP at 192, 196. Ramsey further testified that Vinh pointed the knife in the agents’
general direction and, although he did not jab the knife, Ramsey described the action as
threatening.
C. Jury Instructions and Verdict
The trial court instructed the jury on the definition of robbery generally:
A person commits the crime of robbery when [they] unlawfully and with
intent to commit theft thereof takes personal property from the person or in the
presence of another and the taking was against that person’s will by the use or
threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 24. The trial court instructed the jury further that the threat of force may be
either express or implied, the degree of force is immaterial so long as the force is used to obtain or
retain possession of the property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking.
The jury was also specifically instructed that a first degree robbery occurs if, while
committing or fleeing a robbery, the defendant is armed with or displays what appears to be a
deadly weapon. The trial court instructed the jury that a “deadly weapon” means any weapon
“which under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used,
is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.” CP at 31.
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No. 59425-1-II
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury on the deadly weapon special verdict, which
required the State to prove that Vinh was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the robbery.
For the special verdict, the jury was told that a knife with a blade longer than three inches is per se
a deadly weapon. Alternatively, if the blade was shorter than three inches, the jury could decide
whether the blade constituted a deadly weapon based on evidence the weapon “has capacity to
inflict death and, from the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce or may easily produce
death.” CP at 37.
The jury found Vinh guilty of first degree robbery and answered “yes” to the deadly
weapon special verdict. CP at 48.
III. SENTENCING
At sentencing, the parties disputed Vinh’s offender score. Vinh had six juvenile felony
convictions and six adult felony convictions. The State provided documentation of Vinh’s release
dates to establish that there had been no five-year period during which he remained in the
community crime free; therefore, none of his prior offenses washed out. The trial court found that
Vinh’s offender score was 9, which meant his standard sentencing range for first degree robbery
was 129-171 months.
The trial court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the standard range and added 48 months
for the sentencing enhancement, totaling 177 months of confinement.3
Vinh appeals his convictions and his sentence.
3
Because Vinh’s 2007 felony conviction already included a prior firearm enhancement, any
subsequent deadly weapon enhancements would be doubled, converting the standard 24-month
enhancement to 48 months.
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No. 59425-1-II
ANALYSIS
I. INCOMPLETE MIRANDA WARNING
Vinh argues that we must reverse his conviction because the trial court erred in admitting
his incriminating statements due to an incomplete Miranda warning. Vinh did not challenge the
improper advisement below during the CrR 3.5 hearing. Although we reach the issue, and we
accept the State’s concession that the trial court erred, we conclude the error was harmless.
A. RAP 2.5
Generally, we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a); State
v. Frieday, 33 Wn. App. 2d 719, 743, 565 P.3d 139 (2025). However, we will consider a manifest
error affecting a constitutional right, even if it was not raised below. RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v.
Bertrand, 165 Wn. App. 393, 400, 267 P.3d 511 (2011). Manifest error requires a showing of
actual prejudice, meaning the error had “practical and identifiable consequences” in the trial. State
v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99, 217 P.3d 756 (2009).
Here, the State concedes that Sergeant O’Rourke’s recitation of the Miranda advisement
was incomplete, as he failed to inform Vinh that an attorney would be provided if he could not
afford one. The State acknowledges the trial court therefore erred when it admitted Vinh’s
statements to police, and the error was constitutional because it implicated his right against self-
incrimination. Finally, the State concedes that the error was manifest, noting that had Vinh’s
counsel objected, the trial court would likely have suppressed Vinh’s incriminating and potentially
prejudicial statements. Br. of Resp’t at 19. We accept both concessions.4
4
The State argues we should not reach this issue because Vinh did not argue the error was a
manifest constitutional error in his opening brief, waiving the exception to the general rule that we
do not consider new issues on appeal. RAP 2.5(a). Although Vinh did not explicitly invoke RAP
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No. 59425-1-II
B. Harmless Error
If an appellant successfully shows that the trial court erred, and the error is both
constitutional in magnitude and manifest, the burden then shifts to the State to prove that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bertrand, 165 Wn. App. at 401. Where an error is
constitutional in nature, we consider an error harmless only if the untainted evidence is so
overwhelming that it necessarily leads to the same outcome. In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 180
Wn.2d 664, 688, 327 P.3d 660 (2014).
Vinh argues that his improperly admitted post-Miranda statements about the knife and
what the surveillance footage might show, along with his admission that he threw the knife away,
were prejudicial. He contends that these remarks gave the impression he was attempting to cover
up his actions and were “essential” to the State’s case. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 30.
The Washington Supreme Court has found that the erroneous admission of a statement
made following an improper Miranda warning can be harmless when the untainted evidence of
guilt is overwhelming. State v. Mayer, 184 Wn.2d 548, 556, 362 P.3d 745 (2015). In Mayer, the
Court concluded that the trial court’s admission of the defendant’s confession to first degree
robbery was harmless because untainted evidence—specifically accomplice testimony and DNA
evidence—was so compelling that it necessarily led to the same result. 184 Wn.2d at 556.
2.5(a)(3) in his brief, he explains and references cases establishing the constitutional nature of the
error stemming from the incomplete Miranda warning and its manifest nature. See State v.
Radcliffe, 164 Wn.2d 900, 905, 194 P.3d 250 (2008); State v. Piatnitsky, 180 Wn.2d 407, 412, 325
P.3d 167 (2014). Therefore, we address this issue, especially in light of the State’s concessions.
Vinh also contends that the argument he raised on appeal falls within the scope of the issues
raised during the pretrial CrR 3.5 hearing, and that he should be permitted to refine his arguments
on appeal. We need not resolve this point.
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No. 59425-1-II
Similarly, here, untainted evidence from the testimony of the three loss prevention agents,
each of whom witnessed firsthand that Vinh left the store without paying and produced the knife
when confronted, as well as the surveillance footage showing him with the knife, overwhelmingly
establish Vinh’s guilt.
Further, unlike in Mayer, Vinh never fully admitted to committing a robbery. His
statements about his role in the incident were inconsistent, so the jury had to rely on other evidence.
The State referred to Vinh’s improperly admitted statements only once in closing argument during
rebuttal. Although this was a direct reference, these statements were minimally significant in light
of the untainted evidence surrounding Vinh’s possession and use of the knife. Thus, the untainted
evidence—including the agents’ testimony and the video evidence corroborating their accounts—
was overwhelming, and the improper admission of Vinh’s statements was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Vinh argues that neither his first degree robbery conviction nor the special verdict was
supported by sufficient evidence.
In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is “highly deferential to the
jury’s decision.” State v. Davis, 182 Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d 820 (2014). We ask whether, taking
the State’s evidence as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor, “any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Altman, 23 Wn. App. 2d 705, 710, 520 P.3d 61 (2022). Circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence are equally reliable under this standard. State v. O’Neal, 159 Wn.2d 500, 506, 150 P.3d
1121 (2007).
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No. 59425-1-II
A. Robbery in the First Degree
Vinh argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that his knife qualified as a deadly
weapon capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm, an essential element of first degree
robbery. Vinh also argues there was at most a modicum of evidence about the danger the knife
presented, and the threat was overstated because he never jabbed or thrusted the knife. We
disagree.
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, while committing or fleeing from a
robbery, the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a)(i). “Deadly
weapon” includes any weapon which, “under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to
be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.”
RCW 9A.04.110(6).
Where the deadly weapon in question is neither a firearm nor an explosive, more than mere
possession is required. In re Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wn.2d 354, 366, 256 P.3d 277 (2011).
There must be some manifestation of willingness to use a knife before it can be found to be a
deadly weapon. Id.
This court has held that there is no requirement for a knife to be jabbed or thrusted to
qualify as a deadly weapon. In State v. Holmes, this court held that waving a utility knife towards
a store manager, causing the manager to step back, was sufficient to support a first degree robbery
charge. 106 Wn. App. 775, 782, 24 P.3d 1118 (2001). Similarly, in State v. Ingham, the defendant
threatened the use of a knife to silence the victim and, even though the victim never saw the knife,
this court held it could be considered a deadly weapon based on the circumstances. 26 Wn. App.
45, 51-52, 612 P.2d 801 (1980).
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No. 59425-1-II
Vinh argues that none of the police officers could meaningfully testify about the knife’s
ability to cause death or bodily harm, because they never observed it. However, all three loss
preventions agents who did see the knife testified regarding its characteristics, including its
approximate size, material, and type. Sackett testified that Vinh drew a “standard pocketknife” that
was “metal” and “sharp.” VRP at 172-73. Ramsey described the knife as a “hunting knife” which,
although “cheap,” was a real knife made of metal, not plastic. VRP at 191. Ramsey estimated the
blade to be approximately two and a half to three inches long. Sandy testified that although he only
saw the knife very briefly, it was long enough to confirm it was a blade.
More significantly, Ramsey testified that Vinh pointed the knife at him, and all of the
agents also testified about their reactions to the knife. All three either said they backed away or
they felt threatened when Vinh produced the knife. Contrary to Vinh’s assertion, the threat was
not overstated. Vinh produced the knife in direct response to the agents’ request that he return the
merchandise. These circumstances reasonably support the inference that the knife was used to
intimidate and deter the agents from interfering.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the collective testimony, in combination
with the surveillance footage, provide substantially more than a modicum of evidence. This
evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the knife was readily capable of causing death or
substantial bodily harm.
B. Deadly Weapon Enhancement
Vinh also argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that the knife qualified
as a deadly weapon for purposes of the special verdict because it was not capable of causing death
by itself or in the manner it was used. We disagree.
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No. 59425-1-II
The deadly weapon special verdict required the State to prove that the defendant was armed
with a deadly weapon at the time of the robbery. For purposes of a deadly weapon enhancement,
a knife is considered a deadly weapon per se if its blade is longer than three inches. RCW
9.94A.825. Alternatively, as is the case here, the State may prove a smaller knife is a deadly
weapon by showing it “has capacity to inflict death and from the manner in which it is used, is
likely to produce or may easily and readily produce death.” RCW 9.94A.825. Whether a knife with
a blade less than three inches qualifies as a deadly weapon is a question of fact for the jury. State
v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 546, 548-49, 564 P.2d 323 (1977). A knife need not be presented at trial
nor must the victim sustain any injury for the knife to qualify as a deadly weapon; however, under
the circumstances of its use, the defendant must have manifested a willingness to use the knife. Id.
Here, the State did not establish that the knife’s blade was longer than three inches, instead
the testimony estimated it to be approximately “two and a half to three inches.” VRP at 192.
However, for the same reasons we should conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish the
knife was readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm, we should also conclude the
State provided sufficient evidence to prove the knife had the capacity to inflict death and,
considering the manner in which it was used, it was likely to cause death.
The agents testified that Vinh drew the knife in response to the agents’ request that he
return the merchandise. When Vinh produced the knife and pointed it toward the agents, a
reasonable inference arose that he was threatening to stab the agents if they continued to interfere
with his attempt to leave with the merchandise. The agents testified they felt threatened and
disengaged for their own safety due to their close proximity to Vinh. Surveillance footage
corroborated this testimony, showing the agents stepping backward and creating distance from
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No. 59425-1-II
Vinh. Contrary to Vinh’s assertion, there is no specific proximity requirement that must be
established.
By using the knife to threaten the agents, Vinh manifested a willingness to use it. Moreover,
the agents’ testimony describing the knife as “sharp,” “metal,” and a “real knife” allowed the jury
to infer it was readily capable of causing death. VRP at 173, 192. This testimony, combined with
the surveillance footage, provides sufficient evidence to sustain the deadly weapon special verdict.
In sum, we affirm Vinh’s convictions.
III. ERLINGER ARGUMENT
Vinh next argues that we should remand for resentencing because his sentence violates the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution. He relies on Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 144 S. Ct. 1840,
219 L. Ed. 2d 451 (2024), to argue that a jury should have determined which convictions counted
towards his offender score. In response, the State points out that Vinh did not raise this argument
below. We disagree that remand is required.
Generally, “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000); see also State v. Brinkley,
192 Wn. App. 456, 462, 369 P.3d 157 (2016). There is, however, a narrow exception. Erlinger,
602 U.S. at 823. A sentencing court may consider “‘the fact of a prior conviction’” so long as it
determines only “‘what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.’” Id. at 838
(quoting Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111 n.1, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013);
quoting Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 512, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 195 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2016)).
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No. 59425-1-II
Additionally, Washington sentencing courts are permitted, as a matter of law, to determine
not only the fact of a prior conviction, but also those facts “‘intimately related”’ to the prior
conviction, using documents flowing from the prior conviction and sentence. State v. Jones, 159
Wn.2d 231, 241, 149 P.3d 636 (2006) (quoting United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2005)).
In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court expressly limited its holding to the
“occasions inquiry” for determining firearm offenses under the federal Armed Career Criminals
Act (ACCA). 602 U.S. at 822. Further, in State v. Wheeler, the Washington Supreme Court held
that a judge may consider prior convictions during sentencing without violating a defendant’s
rights because they are not elements of the crime. 145 Wn.2d 116, 34 P.3d 799 (2001). In State v.
Anderson, Division One considered and rejected an argument seeking to expand Erlinger.
(Erlinger “is limited to resolving ACCA’s occasions inquiry and does not overrule our state's well-
established precedent.”). 31 Wn. App. 2d 668, 681 552 P.3d 803 (2024).
In determining Vinh’s offender score, the sentencing judge properly relied on certified
documents establishing Vinh’s prior convictions and incarceration history. These records showed
that Vinh never went five years in the community without committing a criminal offense, meaning
none of his prior felonies washed out, and his offender score was correctly calculated as 9.
Here, the sentencing judge was not deciding fact-intensive issues regarding the
circumstances, timing, or occasions of Vinh’s prior convictions; therefore, these determinations
properly fall within the “fact of a prior conviction” exception. Even if they did not fall directly
within the exception, they “[flow] from the prior conviction and sentence” and are “intimately
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No. 59425-1-II
related,” such that a judge, rather than a jury, has the authority to determine them under Jones, 159
Wn.2d at 233, 244, 241 (quoting Moore, 401 F.3d at 1225).
Even assuming without deciding that this issue is properly before us, we decline to depart
from established pre-Erlinger precedent and recent cases recognizing the Erlinger holding is
limited. Therefore, we conclude the trial judge had the authority to determine which convictions
counted toward Vinh’s offender score, and Vinh’s sentence is constitutional.
IV. ENGROSSED HOUSE BILL 1324
Vinh also argues that the 2023 amendment to the Sentencing Reform Act, which excludes
juvenile adjudications from offender score calculations, should apply retroactively. He further
contends that the recent line of cases declining to apply the 2023 amendment retroactively were
wrongly decided based on legislative intent. We disagree.
The 2023 amendment to former RCW 9.94A.525 (2021) added a clause stating that
“adjudications of guilt pursuant to Title 13 RCW [for juvenile adjudications] which are not murder
in the first or second degree or class A felony sex offenses may not be included in the offender
score.” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, §2(1)(b).
Sentences imposed under the Sentencing Reform Act “shall be determined in accordance
with the law in effect when the current offense was committed” unless otherwise provided. RCW
9.94A.345 (emphasis added). The saving clause statute provides that whenever a criminal law is
changed or repealed, any offenses committed while it was still in effect will still be punished as if
it were in force, unless a contrary intention is expressly declared in the amending act. RCW
10.01.040. The saving clause applies to “substantive changes in the law,” which include changes
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No. 59425-1-II
to “the punishment for offenses or the type of punishments possible.” State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d
708, 721-22, 487 P.3d 482 (2021).
In a recent line of cases, this court has held that the amendment to the Sentencing Reform
Act does not apply retroactively to offenses committed before the amendment’s effective date. See
State v. Tester, 30 Wn. App. 2d 650, 546 P.3d 94, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1019 (2024); State v.
Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d 592, 546 P.3d 458, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1016 (2024).
Vinh acknowledges the recent line of cases. Vinh also acknowledges that there is a
presumption that this amendment does not apply to him or others in his position. Contrary to
Vinh’s assertion, these cases were properly decided.5
The intent statement in Engrossed House Bill (EHB)1324 provides that the legislature
intended to facilitate rehabilitation, reintegration, and due process, and to recognize the research
on juvenile brains and the disproportionate impact of juvenile adjudications on adult sentences.
LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, §1. As the amendment affects offender scores, it is a substantive change
in the law to which the saving clause applies. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 721.
Nothing in the bill mentions retroactive application or indicates that it should apply to cases
pending on the effective date. Applying the 2023 amendment to Vinh’s case would therefore
violate RCW 9.94A.345 and RCW 10.01.040 by applying a sentencing law that was not in effect
when he committed his offenses in November 2022. In sum, EHB 1324 does not apply to Vinh’s
sentencing and his offender score was properly calculated.
5
Vinh also argues that if both his interpretation and the State’s interpretation of the amendment
are reasonable, the rule of lenity requires this court to adopt the interpretation most favorable to
him. However, existing precedent clearly establishes that his interpretation is contrary to the
legislature’s express intent and is therefore unreasonable.
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No. 59425-1-II
Accordingly, we affirm Vinh’s sentence.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Vinh’s convictions and sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
GLASGOW, J.
We concur:
CRUSER, C.J.
VELJACIC, J.
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