Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

FiltersIN

9,074 results

1.47s

  • Rogers v. Ford Motor Co.

    952 F. Supp. 606 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jan 21, 1997

    AlliedSignal and Ford move for summary judgment on the grounds that (a) the plaintiffs’ sole design defect expert is not qualified to testify under Daubert v. … Myers clearly lend themselves to testing and substantiation through the scientific method.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Kevin Perry v. State of Indiana

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 13, 2012

    The State does not contend that it qualified Detective Perkins as an expert, but rather, that he qualified as a skilled witness. … The State argues it qualified Detective Perkins as a skilled witness by establishing that he had been a police officer for twenty-two years and a detective for fifteen years; he is assigned to the homicide, aggravated assault

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Bennett v. Crownlife Insurance

    776 N.E.2d 1264 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 29, 2002

    Rather, the first question clearly asks whether the applicant has ever had or been treated for certain specific illnesses. … Thus, his medical problems qualified as an ailment. Moreover, he had “consulted” with a doctor for the problems.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Adams v. Slater

    132 Ind. App. 105 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 19, 1961

    Wherever the word “child” is used in a restricted sense it is specifically qualified or clarified by other words within the same section of the statute. … Here, the only qualification made is that an adult adopted child shall inherit from his natural parents, which is clearly a distinction not afforded to adopted minor children.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Garza v. Kelly

    1 F. Supp. 3d 885 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 19, 2014

    However, she clearly failed to advance such a claim in her Complaint. … Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's claims fail because Defendants Covington and Wong are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immuni *891 ty and Defendants Gorman and Kelly are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Barbara A. Johnson and William T. Johnson, Both Individually and as Trustees of the Barbara A. Johnson Living Trust Dated 12-17-1996 v. Joseph Wysocki and M. Carmen Wysocki

    Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 25, 2013

    In 1996, the Johnsons established the Barbara A. Johnson Living Trust and deeded the property to the Trust. They lived in the home continually, with William Johnson doing most renovation work that arose. … Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 766 (Ind. 2009) (actual knowledge of falsity vitiates qualified privilege for communicating with law enforcement in defamation action); Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Roth-Bradley v. Davilla

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · May 2, 2025

    § 1915A, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such … He told Officer Davilla that he was not a medical provider qualified to make that determination.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Orr v. Sevier

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jun 13, 2019

    Orr asserts that Warden Sevier “blindly relied upon inaccurate and false medical records that were clearly harming Orr.” (ECF 1 at 5.) … “To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must prove that he is a qualified individual with a disability, that he was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • A.C. v. Estate of Crabtree

    809 N.E.2d 433 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 2, 2004

    Clearly, if a tortfeasor is deceased, both the ability to punish and the need to deter like conduct on his or her behalf in the future are lost. … If there is to be a difference in legal treatment, it should be clearly and unequivocally established by the legislature.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Kien v. State

    866 N.E.2d 377 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 17, 2007

    Furthermore, while we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions, we accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Carew, 817 N.E.2d at 285 . … “To be qualified to testify, a child need not be a model witness, have an infallible memory, or refrain from making inconsistent statements.” Casselman v. State, 582 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Ind.Ct.App.1991).

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Kenneth Bardonner v. Veronika Bardonner

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 12, 2024

    Whether the trial court clearly erred when it modified his parenting time with Child. [2] We affirm. … The signs were clearly visible from the windows of Mother’s home, within [Child]’s view.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Ashby v. State

    486 N.E.2d 469 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 12, 1985

    However, in the case at bar, the fact that the witness had conducted studies concerning the plea of insanity was used to qualify the witness as an expert in this field. … He argues that by improperly defining the term, as it was to be used in conjunction with his insanity defense, the court confused the jury and might have lead the jury to apply the more stringent but clearly defined standard

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • McCullough v. Holy Cross College

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Aug 18, 2020

    Summary judgment is proper if the nonmoving party doesn’t establish the existence of an essential element on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Massey v. … Watts’s remaining arguments regarding sovereign immunity and qualified immunity.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Jessica M. Skeens v. State of Indiana

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 23, 2020

    On appeal, she argues for the first time that the trial court erred in admitting those opinions because Trooper Keegan was not qualified to render them. … In sum, Skeens has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm her convictions.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • HORNADAY-ALBERTS

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 15, 2026

    Jan. 28, 2011) (finding that HUD and the receiver appointed to possess a PHA were immune from suit under § 1437d(j)(3)(H)); Walker, 2011 WL 2637328, at *3 (granting HUD's motion to dismiss because of the sovereign immunity … Even if these actions were only "shunning" and "ostracism," those things may qualify as an adverse action if they involve "material harm." Parkins v.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Insurance Corp. of America v. Dillon, Hardamon & Cohen

    725 F. Supp. 1478 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jan 19, 1989

    Since they lacked absolute knowledge of the other errors, they qualified their demand in the June 8 letter. … Clearly, neither Hoyt nor Bensalem covers the situation before this court.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Terrence T. Walker v. State of Indiana

    988 N.E.2d 341 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 14, 2013

    This testimony clearly violated Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b), but we cannot conclude that it deprived Walker of a fair trial. … Indeed, alternate jurors are presumed to be fair and equally qualified to the task. Jervis v. State, 679 N.E.2d 875, 881-82 (Ind. 1997) (citations omitted).

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Supreme Sitting of the Order of the Iron Hall v. Baker

    20 L.R.A. 210 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 26, 1893

    a court of equity will exercise such power, except when the exigencies of the case clearly warrant it; but, we think, under our statute, the court has such power when it is clearly made to appear that the exigencies of the … And whenever such a state of affairs exists, as that the corporation has proper officers qualified, and the funds of the corporation and its proper application secured, it will be the duty of the court to restore the property

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Wayt v. Town of Crothersville

    866 F. Supp. 2d 1008 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 30, 2012

    a property interest in continued water service; (4) Sweazy’s actions in all respects conformed to and were taken consistent with Crothersville Utilities’s policies, thus entitling her to qualified immunity; (5) Plaintiff … Clearly, nothing in these or any other sections of the Crothersville Ordinances explicitly confers a right to water service upon the residents of Crothersville that can only be extinguished for “good cause.”

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Joe E. Jackson, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 30, 2018

    An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. Id. … Here, the parties stipulated that Jackson had a prior qualifying conviction and could not lawfully possess a firearm. Tr. Vol. 2 at 75; State’s Ex. 1.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.