HORNADAY-ALBERTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

KRISTINA HORNADAY-ALBERTS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00337-JPH-TAB

)

REBECCA FRECHETTE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Kristina Hornaday-Alberts is disabled and used a Section 8 voucher

administered by the Indianapolis Housing Agency ("IHA") to rent a home from

Rebecca Frechette. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts requested accommodations in her

rental home and a three-bedroom voucher from IHA to accommodate a live-in

aide. She alleges that Defendants U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development and its Secretary Scott Turner1 (collectively "HUD"), IHA, Ms.

Frechette, and CICOA Aging and In-Home Solutions violated federal and state

law through actions related to her voucher and accommodations requests.

IHA, HUD, and Ms. Frechette have filed motions to dismiss. Dkts. [115];

[123]; [125]. For the reasons below, HUD's motion is GRANTED, IHA's motion

is DENIED, and Ms. Frechette's motion is DENIED.

1 Scott Turner became the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in February

2025. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Scott Turner is therefore

automatically substituted for Marcia Fudge as the Defendant in this suit.

I.

Facts and Background

Because Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6), the Court accepts and recites "the well-pleaded facts in the complaint

as true." McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011); see

Ctr. for Dermatology and Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588–89

(7th Cir. 2014).

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts is a Caucasian woman with a disability. Dkt. 111

at 5, 43. She is unable to walk and is visually impaired. Id. at 5. The Family

and Social Security Administration deems her to be an individual who requires

a live-in-aide to live on her own. Id. at 6.

Since 2018, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts has received a two-bedroom Section 8

Voucher from IHA. Id. at 5. Every year since, she requested IHA approval for a

live-in aide and a three-bedroom voucher to accommodate an aide. Id. at 9–10.

From 2018 to 2024, IHA didn't grant this request or "issue [a] proper denial."

Id. at 10. In May 2025, IHA approved her request, "contingent upon

submission of the live-in aide's information and formal approval of the aide."

Id. 15–16. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts found this approval "ineffective" because she

couldn't hire a live-in aide without a bedroom for the aide, but couldn't rent a

three-bedroom unit with a two-bedroom voucher. Id. at 16. Without a live-in

aide, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts suffered physical injuries and cannot fully use and

enjoy the rental property. Id. at 6, 9.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts further alleges that IHA failed to properly calculate

her income and deduct certain medical expenses, resulting in incorrect rent

calculations. Id. at 11–15. IHA also failed to add funds to her Family Self

Sufficiency ("FSS") account. Id. at 24. On one occasion, when Ms. Hornaday-

Alberts was at IHA, she heard an IHA employee say that "We don't need no

white people up in here stealing our benefits." Id. at 35. IHA official William

Garrett also falsely told her not to communicate with staff because a cease-

and-desist order was issued against her. Id. at 34.

From 2019 to 2024, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts used her voucher to rent a

property owned by Ms. Frechette. Id. at 26, 29. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts

requested that Ms. Frechette add accommodations like a wheelchair-accessible

ramp and stair lift, but Ms. Frechette did not do so. Id. at 29–30. In June

2024, Ms. Frechette visited the home without telling Ms. Hornaday-Alberts,

harassed her, and threatened to take her service animals. Id. at 31.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts raises eight claims against IHA; four claims

against Ms. Frechette; three claims against HUD; and three claims against

CICOA. Dkt. 111 at 36–44 (operative complaint).2 IHA, HUD, and Ms.

Frechette have moved to dismiss all claims against them. Dkts. 115, 123, 125.

2 The body of Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's complaint refers to defendants "Kimberly Wize"

and "Yvonda Bean", but they are not named in the case caption and she doesn't assert

claims against them. Dkt. 111 at 1, 4, 36–44. Accordingly, any claims against these

individuals are dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); Myles v. United

States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (to be properly considered a party a defendant

must be "specif[ied] in the caption").

II.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

Defendants may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to

dismiss claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss claims for "failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted." When faced with a 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff

"bears the burden of establishing that the jurisdictional requirements have

been met." Burwell, 770 F.3d at 588–89. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). A facially plausible claim is one that allows "the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Id. In other words, a complaint "must allege enough details about the subject-

matter of the case to present a story that holds together," Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co.,

8 F.4th 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021), "but it need not supply the specifics required

at the summary judgment stage." Graham v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.4th 625, 627

(7th Cir. 2021).

Under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Court will "accept the well-pleaded

facts in the complaint as true," but will not defer to "legal conclusions and

conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim." McCauley,

671 F.3d at 616; see Burwell, 770 F.3d 586 at 588–89.

Indiana substantive law governs this case's state-law claims. See

Webber v. Butner, 923 F.3d 479, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2019). Absent a controlling

decision from the Indiana Supreme Court, the Court does its best to predict

how that court would rule on the issues of law. Mashallah, Inc. v. West Bend

Mut. Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 311, 319 (7th Cir. 2021). In doing so, the Court may

consider decisions from the Indiana Court of Appeals. See id.

III.

Analysis

A. HUD's motion to dismiss

The Section 8 voucher program that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts used is

funded by HUD and administered by public housing agencies ("PHAs") like IHA.

24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1). If a PHA substantially defaults on its obligations, HUD

may take possession of the PHA under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j)(3)(A)(iv). Here, the

parties agree that HUD took possession of IHA in April 2024 and appointed

new IHA officials. Dkt. 124 at 3 n.2; dkt. 111 at 4. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts

alleges that HUD-appointed IHA officials denied her voucher requests and

miscalculated her rental assistance. Dkt. 111 at 10, 16, 34.

HUD argues that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts lacks standing to pursue the

claims against it raised in the operative complaint. Dkt. 124 at 7. The

"irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing consists of three elements:

"the plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable

to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.

330, 338 (2016). HUD contends that traceability is absent because, under a

federal statute, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's alleged injuries are traceable only to

IHA, not HUD. Dkt. 124 at 7–9. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts responds that her

injuries are traceable to HUD because it retained "ultimate authority" over IHA

and appointed the IHA officials who injured her. Dkt. 137 at 2.

For traceability, an injury must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's

conduct, and "not the result of an independent action" of another party. Lujan

v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). If the plaintiff cannot trace their

injury to the defendant, the "court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate [plaintiff's] claim, and the case must be dismissed." Johnson v.

Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 719 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2013).

Federal regulations address HUD's liability when the Secretary takes

possession of a PHA:

If the Secretary . . . takes possession of a public housing agency . .

. the Secretary . . . shall be deemed to be acting not in the official

capacity of that person or entity, but rather in the capacity of

the public housing agency, and any liability incurred, regardless

of whether the incident giving rise to that liability occurred while the

Secretary . . . was in possession of all or part of the public agency .

. . shall be the liability of the public housing agency.

42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j)(3)(H) (emphasis added). Under this language, HUD was

not acting in its own capacity when in possession of IHA or when appointing

IHA officials. Instead, HUD's actions were done solely "in the capacity of [IHA]."

§ 1437d(j)(3)(H).

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's alleged injuries were therefore—by statute—

caused only by individuals acting "in the capacity of" IHA, and not HUD. See

42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j)(3)(H); Greene v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 789 F. Supp.

2d 582, 585 n.2 (E.D. Penn. 2011) ("[T]he clear purpose of [§ 1437d(j)(3)(H)] is

to separate the actions undertaken while managing a troubled housing

authority from official HUD actions, and to prevent the authority's actions from

being attributed to HUD."); Walker v. Woods, No. 10–4267, 2011 WL 2637328,

at *3 (W.D. La. July 6, 2011) (finding that under § 1437d(j)(3)(H), the alleged

wrongdoing was committed by the PHA, an "entity separate from HUD").

Because Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's alleged injuries resulted from IHA's

actions—not HUD's—she at most alleges a causal connection to HUD through

"the independent action of some third party." See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA,

568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013) (expressing "reluctance to endorse standing theories

that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors"). That is

insufficient to establish traceability. Id.; Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d

384, 388–89 (7th Cir. 2018) (traceability was lacking when the injuries were

caused by a state's decision, not a decision by the federal government). HUD's

motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the claims against it must be dismissed

without prejudice for lack of standing.3

3 Even if § 1437d(j)(3)(H)'s language didn't preclude traceability, it grants HUD

immunity by providing that "any liability incurred . . . shall be the liability of the

public housing agency." See Smith v. V.I. Housing Auth., No. 09-cv-00011, 2011 WL

285858, at *3–5 (D.V.I. Jan. 28, 2011) (finding that HUD and the receiver appointed to

possess a PHA were immune from suit under § 1437d(j)(3)(H)); Walker, 2011 WL

2637328, at *3 (granting HUD's motion to dismiss because of the sovereign immunity

found in § 1437d(j)(3)(H)). Because Ms. Hornaday-Alberts lacks standing, the Court

need not resolve HUD's motion based on immunity or address its remaining

arguments for dismissal. See dkt. 124 at 10–19.

B. IHA's motion to dismiss

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts raises eight claims against IHA, alleging violations

of her procedural due process rights, the U.S. Housing Act, and HUD and IHA's

administrative policies; failure to accommodate her disability; retaliation; racial

discrimination; and breach of contract. Dkt. 111 at 36–44.

1. Procedural due process claims (Count 1)

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts claims that IHA violated her due process rights

when it failed to issue her a three-bedroom voucher and maintain funds in her

FSS account. Dkt. 111 at 9–10, 24, 36–37. Procedural due process claims

require "(i) a deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or

property, and (ii) inadequate state process." Sherwood v. Marchiori, 76 F.4th

688, 694 (7th Cir. 2023).

a. Three-bedroom voucher

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts currently receives a two-bedroom voucher from

IHA. Dkt. 111 at 36. For several years, she requested a three-bedroom

voucher to allow for a live-in aide, but IHA "refused to issue" one. Id. at 10.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts asserts that IHA denied her due process by failing to

provide notice, a written decision, and "appeal rights for an informal hearing,"

when it didn't issue the voucher. Id. at 10, 36.

IHA argues that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts had no protected property

interest in a three-bedroom voucher because she was not entitled to it without

first identifying a live-in aide and has "no cognizable property interest" in a

specific dwelling. Dkt. 116 at 7–8. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts responds that as a

voucher recipient, she has a protected property right in "a properly sized

voucher necessary to accommodate a live-in aide." Dkt. 126 at 8.

A protectable property interest is a "legitimate claim of entitlement" that

"usually arise[s] from rights created by state statutes, state or municipal

regulations or ordinances, and contracts with public entities." Rock River

Health Care, LLC v. Eagleson, 14 F.4th 768, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2021). Here,

under IHA's policies, it "must approve a live-in aide if needed as a reasonable

accommodation," and "[l]ive-in aides will be allocated a separate bedroom."

Dkt. 111 at 9 (citing 2019 IHA HCV Administrative Plan ch. 3 § I.M). Ms.

Hornaday-Alberts alleges that she provided the "necessary documentation"

from her doctors showing that a live-in aide was a necessary accommodation.

Dkt. 111 at 9–10. She has therefore alleged that she followed IHA's policies as

required for "a live-in aide . . . as a reasonable accommodation" and the

accompanying additional bedroom. Id. (citing 2019 IHA HCV Administrative

Plan ch. 3 § I.M); cf. Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010) ("A

property interest of constitutional magnitude exists only when the state's

discretion is 'clearly limited' such that the plaintiff cannot be denied the

interest 'unless specific conditions are met.'").

IHA's argument that it had discretion to deny Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's

requests because she was required to identify an aide does not require

dismissal of her due process claim at this stage. Dkt. 116 at 7. IHA relies on

its policy for approving new household members, which states in relevant part

that it will approve a new household member if it "determines an individual

meets IHA's eligibility criteria or documentation requirements." Id.; dkt. 111 at

18 (citing 2019 IHA HCV Administrative Plan § 11-II.B). Accepting that this

part of the policy generally required Ms. Hornaday-Alberts to identify the

specific person who would be her live-in aide, however, does not necessarily

foreclose a protected property interest. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts also pleads that,

under the policy, IHA "must approve a live-in aide if needed as a reasonable

accommodation," and the limited portions of IHA's policies in the pleadings and

addressed in IHA's argument do not show whether a specific aide must be

identified in advance under that mandatory reasonable-accommodation

provision. See dkt. 111 at 9; Teva Pharma. USA, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 181

F.4th 756, 767 (7th Cir. 2026) (The "burden of persuasion lies with the moving

party . . . to show an entitlement to dismissal.").

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts also pleads that she provided documentation from

her doctors that she needed a live-in aide and that IHA officials later "approved

[her] reasonable accommodation for a live-in aide," though they "still only

issued a two-bedroom voucher." Dkt. 111 at 6, 16. Those alleged actions are

enough to plead a "cognizable property interest" at this stage based on "rules or

mutually explicit understandings that support [her] claim of entitlement to the

benefit." Forgue v. City of Chicago, 873 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir. 2017)

("'[P]roperty' denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by existing

rules or understandings.").

Last, IHA contends that individuals do not have a property interest in a

specific dwelling. Dkt. 116 at 7. That argument does not support dismissal

because Ms. Hornaday-Alberts isn't seeking a specific three-bedroom unit or

dwelling, but a three-bedroom voucher.

IHA's motion to dismiss this claim is therefore denied. See Forgue, 873

F.3d at 970 (reversing dismissal because plaintiff alleged a legitimate claim of

entitlement to a benefit despite a policy allowing discretion).

b. FSS escrow account

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleges that she signed a contract with IHA to

establish an FSS escrow account on her behalf. Dkt. 111 at 22. Under the

contract, IHA was to place income in her account and maintain those funds,

which she would eventually receive. Id. She alleges that IHA failed to add and

maintain funds as required, depriving her of protected property without due

process. Id. at 23–24, 36–37. IHA argues that these allegations fail to state a

claim because Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleged "only that funding to which she

was entitled was withheld," not that she was deprived of it without process.

Dkt. 116 at 9 (emphasis in original). Ms. Hornaday-Alberts responds that she

alleged insufficient process by asserting that IHA mismanaged her funds

without notice of the "factual and legal basis" for the decision. Dkt. 126 at 16.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleges the deprivation of protected property (her

FSS funds) and inadequate state process (no written basis for decision). Dkt.

111 at 24, 36. While IHA argues that she alleges only a withholding of benefits,

a "temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a deprivation in

terms of the Fourteenth Amendment." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85

(1972). IHA also questions whether the deprivation occurred due to an

established state procedure; but even if it did not, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts can

still be entitled to some process. See Cannici v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 885 F.3d

476, 479 (7th Cir. 2018) ("[A] claim based on a random and unauthorized acts

by state officials" still requires "meaningful post-deprivation" remedies).

IHA's motion to dismiss this claim is therefore denied.4

2. Municipal liability claims under § 1983 (Counts 1, 2)

Because IHA is a municipal entity, it is liable under § 1983 only if its

"policy or custom caused the constitutional injury." Leatherman v. Tarrant

Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see Monell

v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). IHA argues that

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's municipal liability claims must be dismissed because

she has not sufficiently alleged a policy, practice, or custom. Dkt. 116 at 5–6.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts responds that officials involved were de facto

policymakers and that she alleged a "long-standing practice or policy that was

repetitious and occurred over many years." Dkt. 126 at 4–8.

"[A] widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it

constitutes a custom or practice" can support Monell liability. Bohanon v. City

of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2022). Ms. Hornaday-Alberts

alleges that IHA applied such a "longstanding practice or policy" when it did

not approve her voucher requests from 2018 to 2025. Dkt. 111 at 37. She

also alleges that multiple IHA personnel were involved. Id. at 13–14 (listing five

4 Ms. Hornaday-Alberts also alleges that IHA improperly calculated her two-bedroom

voucher assistance without due process, dkt. 111 at 10–11, 36–37, but IHA does not

argue that these allegations fail to state a due process claim, see dkt. 116 at 5–10.

IHA officials involved). These allegations of IHA employees' long-term actions

plausibly allow a reasonable inference of a widespread practice. See Calhoun v.

Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005) ("If the same problem has arisen

many times and the municipality has acquiesced in the outcome, it is possible .

. . to infer that there is a policy at work.").

IHA resists this conclusion by arguing that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts cannot

rely on only her own circumstances to allege a widespread practice. Dkt. 116

at 5–6. At this pleadings stage, however, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts is not required

to include allegations beyond her own experience. White v. City of Chicago, 829

F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that an individual pleading a Monell

claim is "not required to identify every other or even one other individual" who

had been affected by the alleged unconstitutional practice).

IHA's motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims on this ground is denied.5

3. Failure-to-accommodate claims (Counts 3, 4)

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts asserts failure-to-accommodate claims under the

Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and

Rehabilitation Act, which require IHA to provide "reasonable" accommodations

that are "necessary to afford [a covered] person equal opportunity to use and

enjoy a dwelling."6 Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300

5 The Court therefore does not address whether a final policymaker was responsible

for the deprivations. See Funding, LLC v. Sugar Felsenthal Grais & Helsinger LLP, 136

F.4th 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2025) (stating that if a "plaintiff states a plausible claim for

relief under one discernable legal theory" a federal court "start[s] and end[s] there").

6 The Court does not understand Ms. Hornaday-Alberts to allege intentional

discrimination claims under these statutes, but IHA argues that any claims must be

dismissed. Dkt. 116 at 13–15. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts does not respond to that

F.3d 775, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying same standard across all three

statutes). Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleges that from 2018 to 2025, IHA failed to

grant her accommodation requests for a live-in aide and additional bedroom.

Dkt. 111 at 6, 9–10, 37–39.

IHA argues that these claims must be dismissed because it

accommodated Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's aide request when it approved an aide

in May 2025, and because it would not be reasonable or necessary to modify its

rule requiring identification and approval of an aide before issuing an

additional bedroom voucher. Dkt. 116 at 15–17. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts

responds that she alleged reasonable accommodation requests necessary to

address the housing barriers created by her disability. Dkt. 126 at 23–26.

An accommodation is "necessary" if it "will affirmatively enhance a

disabled plaintiff's quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disability."

Valencia v. City of Springfield, Ill., 883 F.3d 959, 968 (7th Cir. 2018). Ms.

Hornaday-Alberts alleges that she cannot take care of her basic needs without

a live-in aide and could not identify or hire one without an additional bedroom.

Dkt. 111 at 6; see Valencia, 883 F.3d at 968 (explaining that "the key inquiry"

for necessity is "asking whether the rule in question, if left unmodified hurts

[disabled] people by reason of their [disability].") (emphasis in original). These

allegations give "enough details" about Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's need for the

requested accommodations to "present a story that holds together." Swanson

argument, so she so she has "abandoned the claim" and may no longer pursue it.

Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2008).

v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010); see Valencia, 883 F.3d at

968. Moreover, as discussed above for the due process claim, it is not

established at this stage that IHA's policies prevent approval of an aide as a

reasonable accommodation in this situation. The parties' dispute about

whether such an accommodation would be reasonable therefore must wait.

Wis. Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 749 (7th Cir. 2006)

(Whether an accommodation is reasonable is a "highly fact-specific inquiry and

requires balancing the needs of both parties.").

IHA next argues that it accommodated Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's disability

by granting her request for an aide in May 2025. Dkt. 116 at 15. Granting a

request after a six-year delay, however, is not fatal to this claim because "an

unreasonable delay in providing accommodations for a known disability can

amount to a failure to accommodate [the] disability." McCray v. Wilkie, 966

F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2020) (reversing 12(b)(6) dismissal because a factfinder

could find an eleven-month delay followed by an accommodation approval to be

unreasonable).

Finally, IHA argues that the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims must be

dismissed because Ms. Hornaday-Alberts was not denied access to the housing

program. Dkt. 116 at 13. But "refusing to make reasonable accommodations

is tantamount to denying access," so her allegations that IHA refused

accommodations are sufficient. McDaniel v. Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 823 (7th Cir.

2024).7 IHA's motion to dismiss the failure-to-accommodate claims is denied.

4. Retaliation claims (Count 5)

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts claims retaliation in violation of the FHA, Title VI,

Rehabilitation Act, § 1981 and/or § 19838, alleging that one day after she

requested accommodations from IHA, its CEO/Executive Director, William

Garrett, falsely told her that a cease-and-desist order was issued "to prevent

her from emailing" IHA staff about her requests. Dkt. 111 at 34, 42. These

claims require Ms. Hornaday-Alberts to "show that: (1) she engaged in

protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse action; and (3) there was a causal

connection between the two." Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Comm., LLC,

901 F.3d 856, 868 (7th Cir. 2018) (FHA); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779,

786 (7th Cir. 2009) (§ 1981 and Title VI); Lewis v. Ind. Dept. of Transp., 173

F.4th 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2026) (Rehabilitation Act).

IHA argues that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts failed to allege an adverse action

because its actions, at most, show rudeness, shunning, and ostracism; and its

actions were not causally related to the accommodation requests. Dkt. 116 at

19–20. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts responds that IHA's false statement about a

7 Because Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's FHA failure-to-accommodate claim is not subject to

dismissal under § 3604(f), the Court need not address IHA's argument that § 3604(a)

does not apply to post-acquisition discrimination, dkt. 116 at 12. See Funding, LLC,

136 F.4th at 724 (stating that if a "plaintiff states a plausible claim for relief under one

discernable legal theory" a federal court "start[s] and end[s] there").

8 IHA argues that the § 1983 claim must be dismissed because Ms. Hornaday-Alberts

did not allege municipal action for Monell liability. Dkt. 116 at 17–18. Ms. Hornaday-

Alberts's response does not address that argument, see dkt. 126 at 26–27, so she has

"abandoned the claim" and may no longer pursue it. Maclin, 520 F.3d at 788.

cease-and-desist order in response to her accommodation requests supports a

plausible retaliation claim. Dkt. 126 at 27.

For retaliation claims, an action is adverse if "a reasonable [person] . . .

would be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity." Arnold v. United

Airlines, Inc., 142 F.4th 460, 475 (7th Cir. 2025). Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's

allegation that she was falsely told that a cease-and-desist order was issued

against her plausibly meets that standard because she was told that the order

prevented her from engaging in further protected activities. See id.; cf.

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (the purpose

of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is to prevent interference with "efforts to

secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees").

Even if these actions were only "shunning" and "ostracism," those things

may qualify as an adverse action if they involve "material harm." Parkins v.

Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998). IHA doesn't

contend that there was no material harm, see dkt. 126 at 19, and "taking all

reasonable and favorable inferences" in Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's favor, she has

plausibly pleaded that they impeded her ability to communicate about her

accommodations. See Teva Pharma., 181 F.4th at 767.

For the causation element, a plaintiff need not plead a causal link

between protected activity and adverse action. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1029 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing dismissal of Title VII

retaliation claim because the alleged the first two elements of a retaliation

claim, which "is all [he] needed to do at that stage"). Moreover, Ms. Hornaday-

Alberts alleges that the adverse actions occurred only one day after her

accommodation request. See e.g. Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir.

1998) (noting that an adverse action occurring one day or one week after the

protected action could establish the required nexus).

IHA's motion to dismiss the retaliation claims is denied under the FHA,

ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Title VI, and § 1981.

5. Racial discrimination claims (Counts 6, 7)

Section 1981 prohibits discrimination based on race in making and

enforcing contracts. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th

Cir. 2011). Title VI similarly provides that "[n]o person in the United States

shall, on the ground of race . . . be excluded from participation in, be denied

the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2001d.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts claims that IHA violated those provisions when

processing her Section 8 benefits, alleging that she heard an IHA employee say

that "[w]e don't need no white people up in here stealing our benefits." Dkt.

111 at 35, 43. IHA argues that even if an IHA employee made the comment,

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts did not allege that IHA leadership knew about and was

deliberately indifferent to the comment. Dkt. 126 at 22. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts

responds that she adequately alleged that IHA "failed to provide services and

assistance" to her because of her race. Dkt. 126 at 27–28.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination need "only to allege" that an

adverse action occurred "because of [her] race." Freeman v. Metro. Water

Reclamation Dist. Of Greater Chi., 927 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2019); see

Collins v. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., 24-2557, 2025 WL 599630, at

*2 (7th Cir. Feb. 25, 2025) (reversing 12(b)(6) dismissal of a race discrimination

claim on a plaintiff's bare allegations that hospital staff prevented her from

visiting her mother because they "falsely portrayed [her] as an angry black

female"). Under this low pleading standard, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts needed to

allege only that IHA discriminated against because of her race, and she did so

here. Dkt. 111 at 43 (alleging that IHA "failed to provide services and

assistance to [her] based on her race" and discriminated against her "based on

race in processing her Section 8 vouchers."). While IHA argues that she did not

allege deliberate indifference to the comment she heard, pleading IHA's "actual

knowledge of the discrimination" and "authority to address [it]" are not

required. Su v. E. Ill. Univ., 565 F. App'x 520, 521–22 (7th Cir. 2014).

IHA's motion to dismiss these race discrimination claims is denied.

6. Breach of contract claims (Count 8)

The FSS program enables HUD-assisted individuals to increase their

income while reducing their dependence on public assistance. Dkt. 111 at 21.

Once an individual is "selected to participate" in the FSS program, they enter

into a contract with a PHA, like IHA. 24 C.F.R. § 984.303(a). That contract

requires the PHA to place "an amount equal to any increase in the amount of

rent paid by the family . . . that is attributable to increases in earned income by

the participating family" into an "interest-bearing escrow account established

by the eligible entity on behalf of the participating family." 42 U.S.C. §

1437u(e)(2).

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleges that she signed a five-year contract in 2019

with IHA to establish an FSS account, but that IHA failed to place her

disallowed income into her account and maintain those funds, leaving her

account with no money. Dkt. 111 at 24–25. IHA argues that the breach of

contract claim must be dismissed because there are no allegations of an offer

or consideration. Dkt. 116 at 25. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts responds that her

consideration was her employment under the terms of the program. Dkt. 126

at 28.

The Court must apply Indiana law by doing its best to predict how the

Indiana Supreme Court would rule on the issues of law. Mashallah, 20 F.4th

at 319. In Indiana, breach of contract claims require proof that: "(1) a contract

existed, (2) the defendant breached the contract, and (3) the plaintiff suffered

damage as a result of the defendant's breach." Tr. of Ind. Univ. v. Spiegel, 186

N.E.3d 1151, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). A valid contract requires "offer,

acceptance, consideration, and a manifestation of mutual assent." Id.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleged an offer by asserting that she signed a five-

year contract with IHA to establish an FSS account. Dkt. 111 at 24. While IHA

argues that she didn't allege that she was "selected into the program," her

allegations that she signed a contract and has an FSS account plausibly

support a reasonable inference that she entered the program. Orgone Cap. III,

LLC v. Daubenspeck, 912 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2019) (at the pleading

stage, plaintiffs receive "the benefit of all reasonable inferences").

IHA next argues that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts failed to plead consideration

because "she presents no allegation of something of value, or a forbearance,

that she gave in return" for IHA's obligation. Dkt. 116 at 25. But Ms.

Hornaday-Alberts alleged that she started working in 2020 under the FSS

program's rules, dkt. 111 at 24, which alleges a detriment to her that is enough

to plead consideration at this stage. See Ind. Dept. of State Rev. v. Belterra

Resort Ind., LLC, 935 N.E.2d 174, 179 (Ind. 2010) ("To constitute consideration,

there must be a benefit accruing to the promisor or a detriment to the

promisee.") (emphasis added).

IHA's motion to dismiss Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's breach of contract claim

is therefore denied.

C. Ms. Frechette's motion to dismiss

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts raises claims against her former landlord, Ms.

Frechette, for failing to accommodate her disability; retaliation; interference;

and breach of contract. Dkt. 111 at 38–44.

1. Failure-to-accommodate claims (Counts 3, 4)

Both the FHA and Rehabilitation Act allow discrimination claims based

on a failure to provide reasonable accommodations. Valencia, 883 F.3d at 966–

67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) and 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). A plaintiff must

show that: "(1) the plaintiff had a disability; (2) the defendant was aware of the

disability; and (3) the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate the

disability." Watters v. Homeowners' Ass'n at Preserve at Bridgewater, 48 F.4th

779, 789 (7th Cir. 2022) (FHA); Valencia, 883 F.3d at 966 ("the same analysis"

applies under the FHA and Rehabilitation Act).

Ms. Frechette argues that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts has not stated failure-

to-accommodate claims because her accommodation request allegations are

"unsupported." Dkt. 125-1 at 4, 16–17. Ms. Frechette also contends that,

regardless, she is exempted from liability for discriminatory FHA violations as a

single-family homeowner. Id. at 14–15. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts responds that

she has plausibly alleged a failure to make accommodations to the home, so

Ms. Frechette is not entitled to dismissal. Dkt. 138 at 5–6, 9–10. She further

argues that, as an affirmative defense, the FHA exemption would entitle Ms.

Frechette to dismissal only if the complaint established that the affirmative

defense applies, which it does not. Id.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleges that she requested accommodations like a

wheelchair ramp, a stairlift, and grab bars and that Ms. Frechette refused to

make those accommodations. Dkt. 111 at 29–30. That suffices to state

failure-to-accommodate claims. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 638

(7th Cir. 2012) (a complaint "cannot be dismissed under Rule 12" if it "invokes

a recognized legal theory" and "contains plausible allegations on the material

issues"). Ms. Frechette's argument that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts must also allege

"details as to when these purported requests were made," dkt. 125-1 at 16–17,

demands too much at the pleading stage. See Teva Pharm. USA, 181 F.4th at

767 (reversing 12(b)(6) dismissal because defendant's argument that the

plaintiff must allege "an exact date" of an event "demanded more than

plausibility").9

Nor does the FHA single-family-homeowner exemption require dismissal

of the FHA failure-to-accommodate claim at this stage. The FHA's anti-

discrimination provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, do not apply to "any single-family

house sold or rented by an owner" who "does not own more than three such

single-family houses at any one time." 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1). This exemption

is an affirmative defense, so dismissal is proper only when the "factual

allegations in the complaint unambiguously establish all the elements of the

defense." Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd., 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016);

Ho v. Donovan, 569 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts

alleges that Ms. Frechette "currently owns, owned and/or sold at least four (4)

properties," dkt. 111 at 42, so the affirmative defense's elements are not

established by the complaint. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts therefore has not "pleaded

[her]self out of court" on this basis. See Hyson USA, Inc., 821 F.3d at 939.

Ms. Frechette's motion to dismiss the failure-to-accommodate claims is

denied.

2. Retaliation claims (Counts 5)

Both the FHA and Rehabilitation Act prohibit retaliation against an

individual who exercises rights conferred by those statutes. See Wetzel, 901

F.3d at 868 (FHA) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3617); Stanek v. St. Charles Comm. Unit

9 Ms. Frechette argues that she installed grab bars to accommodate Ms. Hornaday-

Alberts and allowed her to stay despite unpaid rent, dkt. 125-1 at 17, but the Court

must take Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's allegations as true. See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404.

Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 2015) (Rehabilitation Act). Ms.

Hornaday-Alberts alleges that after she requested accommodations, Ms.

Frechette threatened to take her service animals; "disallowed" her from

receiving aid for accommodations; and filed complaints against her with HUD,

IHA, and the Social Security Administration. Dkt. 111 at 30–33, 41–42.10

Ms. Frechette argues that these allegations do not plausibly plead

retaliation because they do not allege that Ms. Frechette's conduct was

causally related to the accommodation requests. Dkt. 125-1 at 19–20.11 Ms.

Hornaday-Alberts responds that she plausibly pleaded retaliation because Ms.

Frechette threatened to remove her service animals and engaged in other

adverse behavior after the accommodation requests. Dkt. 138 at 8–9.

Retaliation claims under these statutes require a plaintiff "to show that:

(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse action; and (3)

there was a causal connection between the two." Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 868

(FHA); Lewis, 173 F.4th at 882 (Rehabilitation Act). At the pleadings stage,

however, Ms. Hornaday need not explicitly allege a causal nexus. See Luevano,

10 Ms. Hornaday-Alberts also asserts retaliation claims under Title VI and "§ 1981

and/or § 1983." Dkt. 111 at 41–42. Ms. Frechette argues that, substantively, the

claims against her arise only under the FHA and Rehabilitation Act. Dkt. 125-1 at 18.

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts doesn't respond to that argument, see dkt. 138 at 7, so she has

"abandoned the claim[s]" brought under the other statutes and may no longer pursue

them. Maclin, 520 F.3d at 788.

11 Ms. Frechette argues that her actions "reflect a landlord anxious about the state of

their [p]roperty" instead of retaliation. Dkt. 125-1 at 19. At this stage, however, the

Court must take Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's allegations as true, and they plausibly allege

adverse actions. See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404 (explaining that "plausibility" at the

12(b)(6) stage "does not imply that the district court should decide whose version to

believe, or which version is more likely than not").

722 F.3d at 1029 (reversing dismissal because the plaintiff sufficiently plead

the first two elements of a retaliation claim, which "is all [she] needed to do at

that stage."). And she has pleaded protected activity (her accommodations

requests) and adverse actions (including threats to remove her service animals

and complaints against her with administrative agencies). Dkt. 111 at 32–33.

Ms. Frechette's motion to dismiss the retaliation claims is therefore

denied. See Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1029.

3. FHA interference claim (Count 3)

Under § 3617 of the FHA, it is unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten,

or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of

his having exercised or enjoyed, . . . any right granted or protected by" certain

sections of the FHA. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 868. Interference claims require a

"plaintiff to show that: (1) she is a protected individual under the FHA; (2) she

was engaged in the exercise or enjoyment of her fair housing rights; (3) the

defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered with the plaintiff on

account of her protected activity under the FHA; and (4) the defendants were

motivated by an intent to discriminate. Farhan v. 2715 NMA LLC, 161 F.4th

475, 481 (7th Cir. 2025).

Ms. Frechette argues that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's complaint "failed to

prove any of these factors," and that a landlord-tenant dispute cannot form the

basis for an interference clam. Dkt. 125-1 at 16, 19–20 (emphasis in original).

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts responds that Ms. Frechette's refusal to provide

accommodations and her intimidating actions constitute interference. Dkt.

138 at 6.

Under the FHA, refusing to make reasonable accommodations

constitutes discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). So, refusing

accommodations, if done with discriminatory intent, can constitute interference

with an individual's housing rights. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2); see Bloch v.

Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 781 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's

allegations that Ms. Frechette refused accommodations, "disallowed" her from

receiving aid for accommodations, and threatened to take her service animals

allow for the plausible inference of discriminatory intent. Dkt. 111 at 30–31;

see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Staples v. Paragon Sys.,

Inc., 607 F. App'x 569, 569 (7th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (explaining that,

under Swierkiewicz and Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), "[i]ntent may be pleaded generally .

. . and it does not take much to allege discriminatory conduct").

Ms. Frechette nevertheless argues that landlord-tenant disputes do not

constitute interference or retaliation. Dkt. 125-1 at 19–20 (citing Farrar v.

Eldibany, 137 F. App'x. 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (unpublished)). Farrar held,

however, that bare allegations of a "simple" dispute about utilities and rent

were insufficient to allege interference because of race. 137 F. App'x. at 912.

Here, by contrast, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleges that Ms. Frechette

discriminated against her by failing to accommodate her disability and by

interfering with accommodations she needed for her disability, which is enough

at this stage to plead an intentional "pattern of harassment." Farrar. 137 F.

App'x. at 912.12

Ms. Frechette's motion to dismiss the FHA interference claim is denied.

D. Breach of contract claim (Count 9)

In 2019, Ms. Frechette signed a Housing Assistance Payments ("HAP")

Contract with IHA to rent her property to Ms. Hornaday-Alberts. Dkt. 111 at

11, 26–28. The contract established the monthly rent that Ms. Frechette may

charge, see id.; dkt. 125-3 (HAP Contract), and Ms. Hornaday-Alberts alleges

that Ms. Frechette breached this contract by increasing her rent. Dkt. 111 at

26–27. Ms. Frechette argues that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts cannot enforce this

contract because she is not a party to it. Dkt. 125-1 at 20–21. Ms. Hornaday-

Alberts responds that, under Indiana law, she may enforce the contract as a

third-party beneficiary. Dkt. 138 at 14–15.

The Court must apply Indiana law by doing its best to predict how the

Indiana Supreme Court would rule on the issues of law. Mashallah, 20 F.4th

at 319. Under Indiana law, a non-party may enforce a contract "by

demonstrating that [s]he is a third-party beneficiary to the contract." Anon.

Physician 1 v. White, 153 N.E.3d 272, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). To enforce a

contract as a third-party beneficiary, a plaintiff "must show (1) clear intent by

12 While Ms. Frechette relies on Farrar in arguing that Ms. Hornaday-Alberts has not

plausibly pleaded retaliation, Farrar concerns FHA interference so the Court addresses

the argument here. See dkt. 125-1 at 19–20. Ms. Frechette also argues that Ms.

Hornaday-Alberts did not "sufficiently put [Ms. Frechette] on notice of the statutory

basis for this Claim against her" because she did not specify FHA subsections for each

claim, dkt. 125-1 at 19, but plaintiffs need not "pin their claim for relief to any

particular legal theory," Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 493 (7th Cir. 2022).

the actual parties to the contract to benefit the third party; (2) a duty imposed

on one of the contracting parties in favor of the third party; and (3)

performance of the contract terms necessary to render the third party a direct

benefit intended by the parties of the contract." Id.

Here, Ms. Hornaday-Alberts plausibly pleads that she may be a third-

party beneficiary by alleging that Ms. Frechette and IHA signed the HAP

Contract for the subsidization of her rent and to establish housing quality

standards for her benefit. See White, 153 N.E.3d at 278; dkt. 111 at 11, 26–

28. Ms. Frechette also has not shown at this stage that the HAP Contract

excludes third-party recovery. See dkt. 144 at 10–12. The contractual

language she relies on states that "the [tenant] is not a party to or a third party

beneficiary of Part B of the HAP contract. The [tenant] may not enforce any

provision of Part B." Dkt. 125-3 at 7 (emphases added).13 So, unlike in the

Blevins case Ms. Frechette relies on, see Indiana Gaming Co., L.P v. Blevins,

724 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), the pleadings do not establish that the

contract language unambiguously precludes all third-party enforcement.

Ms. Frechette's motion to dismiss this claim is denied.14

13 Ms. Frechette attached the HAP Contract to her brief, arguing that the Court may

take judicial notice of it. Dkt. 125-1 at 5; dkt. 125-3. Ms. Hornaday-Alberts does not

dispute the HAP contract and refers to it in her operative complaint. Dkt. 111 at 3;

dkt. 138 at 12–13. The Court therefore considers the HAP contract at the pleadings

stage without converting Ms. Frechette's motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary

judgment. See Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2022).

14 Ms. Hornaday-Alberts reply brief asserts a breach of implied warranty of habitability

claim. Dkt. 138 at 11–12. But her operative complaint contains no such allegations,

see dkt. 111, and "a plaintiff may not amend [her] complaint in [her] response brief."

Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 448

(7th Cir. 2011), so the Court does not address these allegations.

IV.

Order to Show Cause

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's response brief to Ms. Frechette's motion to

dismiss, dkt. 138, includes non-existent quotations, misrepresented case

holdings, and unverifiable record citations. For example, counsel cites Harris

v. Itzhaki to show that the FHA's single-family home exemption is an

affirmative defense, dkt. 138 at 9, but Harris does not discuss FHA exemptions

or affirmative defenses, see 183 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999). Counsel also

cites Indianapolis-Marion Ctny. Public Lib. v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929

N.E.2d 722, to argue that non-parties may enforce a contract, but that case

discusses the economic loss rule in negligence actions, not non-party

contractual enforcement. Even more, counsel quotes non-existent language

from General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074 (7th

Cir. 1997), and to non-existent allegations in the operative complaint. Dkt.

138 at 10, 12, 14 (citing to pg. 47 ¶¶ 290–293 and pg. 48 ¶ 295 while the

operative complaint ends at pg. 46 and ¶ 277).

These errors are a hallmark of artificial intelligence use without

appropriate attorney engagement and verification. See Dec v. Mullin, 171 F.4th

940, 946–47 (7th Cir. 2026). But regardless of whether counsel used AI, she

was required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) to certify that to the

best of her knowledge, information, and belief, "the factual contentions have

evidentiary support" and the "legal contentions are warranted by existing law or

a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or

for establishing new law." Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dept., 164 F.4th

967, 970 (7th Cir. 2026) (applying Rule 11); see Dec, 171 F.4th at 947–48.

Courts in this district have imposed sanctions when an attorney has cited

nonexistent authority or misrepresented a case's holding. See e.g., Mid. Cent.

Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac LLC, No. 2:24-cv-00236-

JPH-MJD, 2025 WL 1511211, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2025) ($6,000 sanction);

Virgil v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., No. 1:25-cv-01641-MPB-MJD, 2026 WL

401066, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2026) ($10,000 sanction).

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's counsel is therefore ORDERED to show cause by

October 14, 2026, why sanctions should not be imposed for making

misrepresentations to the Court in her response brief to Ms. Frechette's motion

to dismiss, dkt. 138, in violation of Rule 11(b).

V.

Conclusion

HUD's motion to dismiss, dkt. [123], is GRANTED and the claims against

it are DISMISSED without prejudice. The clerk is directed to terminate as

Defendants Marcia Fudge (Scott Turner) and Housing and Urban

Development. IHA's and Ms. Frechette's motions are DENIED. Dkt. [115]; dkt.

[125].

Ms. Hornaday-Alberts's counsel is ORDERED to show cause by October

14, 2026, why sanctions should not be imposed for violations of Rule 11(b).

Magistrate Judge Baker is requested to set an appropriate schedule for

the remainder of this case.

Magistrate Judge Baker is requested to set an appropriate schedule for

the remainder of this case.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/15/2026 anni Pat tanbor—

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All electronically registered counsel

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